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Although the inequality of income and wealth is an old phenomenon, the book ”Capital in the
Twenty-First Century” by Piketty (2014) re-ignited an intense discussion about their distribu-
tion. He shows that the concentration of wealth and income has substantially increased over
the last decades. Albeit inequality of income and wealth is an international phenomenon, its
extent varies substantially across countries. Germany belongs to the countries with the highest
level of inequality in respect to wealth and income in Europe, in particular between gender
(Balestra and Tonkin, 2018; OECD, 2018). However, income and wealth differ substantially in
their distribution. One potential measure to compare distributions, in particular the inequality
of a distribution, is the Gini coefficient. The index takes on values between 0 and 1, with a
high value of the Gini coefficient indicating a high level of inequality. Comparing the Gini
coefficients for disposable household income and wealth, e.g. 0.29 (2014) and 0.74 (2017) in
Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2019; Grabka and Goebel, 2018), respectively, suggests that
wealth is substantially more unequally distributed than income. Against this background, it
might be appropriate to examine income and wealth separately.
Since German Reunification, the yearly average disposable income has steadily increased from
20,000 euro in 1991 to 24,000 euro in 2016. This, however, mainly results from the considerable
income growth of the tenth decile, whose income has increased by 35 % over this period. In
contrast, income in the lowest decile has decreased, especially since 1999. Thus, the income
gap has substantially increased over this time period (Grabka et al., 2019).
Although disposable income depends on many factors such as transfers or taxes, most im-
portantly it depends on earnings. Earnings, in contrast, depend on wages and working hours.
However, even when comparing wages, there remains a substantial gap (Fernandez Kranz, 2006;
Fitzenberger, 2012). In particular, wages differ between high- and low-skilled workers (Fitzen-
berger, 2012) and by age (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017b). Thus, it is mainly low-skilled and
young workers who are affected by low wages at the minimum wage level. Therefore, this gap
results from diverging endowments in human capital. According to Becker (1985), the wage
level depends on education and experience. That is, in the sense of the Human Capital The-




Moreover, wages, especially men’s, in West Germany are considerably higher than in East
Germany (Fuchs et al., 2019). One potential reason for these regional differences in wages
is that sectors are differently located across Germany. The wage level is particularly high in
regions where economically powerful industrial firms are located. Since men are more likely to
work in the industry sector (e.g. Finke, 2010), they are more affected by the economic strength
of the region. In contrast, women tend to work in public or health sectors, which depend less on
the economic power of the specific region. Thus, the regional variance in the wage level stems
from economic conditions and from different demands for labor.
Further, the German labor market is characterized by remarkable differences in pay between
men and women, often referred to as the Gender Pay Gap. In 2018, this gap amounted to 21
% and is caused by numerous factors, including choice of occupations and divergent work ex-
perience (e.g. Finke et al., 2017). Thus, female-dominated occupations have, on average, lower
wages than male-dominated occupations (Hausmann et al., 2015). However, in most occupa-
tions, there still exist significant Gender Pay Gaps within occupations – even after controlling
for differences in human capital endowments (Zucco, 2019). In a prominent paper, Goldin
(2014) shows that the linearity in earnings may be related to the Gender Pay Gap. That is, the
wage gap is particularly high for individuals with an MBA or JD degree, thus, in occupations in
which the hourly wage increases with the number of hours worked (non-linear pay). In contrast,
in pharmacy, an occupation, where the hourly wage does not depend on the working hours, the
Gender Pay Gap is small.
Moreover, wage differences between men and women may result from different positions within
occupations. That is, women are under-represented in higher occupational positions (e.g. Holst
and Friedrich, 2017; Holst and Wrohlich, 2019; Kohaut and Mo¨ller, 2019), while being over-
represented in lower occupational positions (WSI, 2019). Since wages increases with the level
of the occupational position, the vertical segregation can partly explain the occupation-specific
Gender Pay Gap (e.g. Finke et al., 2017). However, even within these occupational positions,
men earn 2 percentage points more than women (Finke et al., 2017).
Besides occupations and occupational positions, the Gender Pay Gap emerges from different
labor market biographies. This relationship is evident when comparing women’s and men’s
wages over the life course (see Figure 1). While wages of men and women are very similar at
the beginning of their careers, the gap increases from the age of 30. The graph demonstrates
that men’s wages continue to rise, while women’s wages stagnate, which translates into an
increasing Gender Pay Gap. Since women give, on average, birth to their first child at the age
of 30 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019), this finding suggests that motherhood and the Gender
Pay Gap are interrelated. A recent prominent study by Kleven et al. (2019) provides evidence
that parenthood has substantial and long-lasting effects on women’s earnings but not on men’s.
Moreover, the study shows that the motherhood gap is particularly pronounced in Germany
and in Austria.
These gaps may result from long employment interruptions after birth and the subsequent
part-time work of mothers, while men work full-time steadily. In this context, it is worth
mentioning the established role that family leave policies have on the prospective careers of
15






















Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office of the La¨nder, SES, 2014,
own calculations. Based on employees between 25 and 55 years. Values
are weighted.
Figure 1: Gender specific wage levels over the life course
mothers. Ruhm (1998) demonstrates that when designing paid parental leave, policy makers
face a trade-off between high employment rates, and high wages. That is, long parental leaves
are correlated with higher employment rates on the one hand, but lower wages on the other. In
contrast, shorter parental leave is associated with higher wages but with fewer women returning
to the labor market. Therefore, parental leave reforms may have a substantial impact on the
Gender Pay Gap.
Against this backdrop, Germany introduced a new parental leave benefit in 2007 (”Elterngeld”)
and replaced the previous benefit (”Erziehungsgeld”), which targeted medium-income mothers.
In the context of the 2007 parental leave reform, the previous means-tested benefit was replaced
with an earnings-related transfer that increased the incentives to not work during the first year,
especially for high-income mothers. Moreover, it shortened the maximum parental leave from 24
to twelve months, which increased the incentive to work for low-income mothers. Additionally,
the parental leave reform introduced a ”daddy quota” of two months, i.e. two out of 14 months
are earmarked individually to one parent, specifically targeting fathers, encouraging them to
take a more active role in child care. Thus, the reform aimed at decreasing the Gender Pay
Gap by setting incentives for mothers to return to the labor market one year after giving birth
and by encouraging fathers to take parental leave. Subsequently, a number of studies show that
the reform positively affected both maternal employment rates (e.g. Bergemann and Riphahn,
2011, 2015; Geyer et al., 2015; Kluve and Schmitz, 2018) and paternal leave uptake (Samtleben
et al., 2019). Note that the reform may have a negative effect on the Gender Pay Gap, since
it specifically increases employment rates of low-income mothers, which may have a negative
effect on the average female wage level. However, it may decrease the Gender Lifetime Earnings
Gap (Boll et al., 2017) and the Gender Pension Gap (e.g. Hammerschmid and Rowold, 2019).
Although the 2007 parental leave reform could have decreased the earnings gap between men
and women, it might have increased the gap between women with high and low prior-to-birth
16 Introduction
earnings. The reform targeted women with high incomes before giving childbirth since their
benefit increased by (at maximum) 1,800 euro, while women with low prior-to-birth earnings
faced marginally higher benefits. Moreover, the reform increased the maximum duration of paid
leave by twelve months for high-income mothers but shortened the duration by twelve months
for low-income mothers. In addition, parental leave take up for both mothers and fathers also
implies that the household can afford to forego on parts of the monthly wage for some months.
This, however, is more likely in high-income households than in low-income households. Thus,
not surprisingly, only mothers with medium or high prior-to-birth incomes benefited from the
positive effects of the reform on employment and job quality in the medium run (Kluve and
Schmitz, 2018). Moreover, Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2019) and Trappe (2013) show that paternal
leave take up has particularly increased in high-income and high-educated households. Hence,
these imbalanced reform effects on gender equality and employments may have increased the
wage gap between mothers at the bottom and the top of the wage distribution, and, therefore,
may increase income inequality. Thus, the question arises whether different accumulations of
life-time earnings translate also in wealth inequality in the long run.
The literature agrees on the fact that income and wealth are correlated across different wealth
and income deciles (e.g. Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales, 2015; Corneo et al., 2016;
Kontbay-Busun and Peichl, 2014). In the top percentile, however, the impact of heritage on
wealth is substantially higher (Corneo et al., 2016). According to survey data, this top percentile
owns about 24 % of total wealth in Germany (Vermeulen, 2018). Nevertheless, there is reason
to believe that this share is underestimated, since non-response bias in voluntary surveys tends
to increase with wealth (Vermeulen, 2018), which is apparent from comparisons of survey data
and national accounts (Chakraborty et al., 2018; Chakraborty and Waltl, 2018; Vermeulen,
2016). Therefore, the distribution of wealth might be even more unequal than what the data
suggest.
This dissertation is motivated by the aforementioned literature and aims at extending the
current state of research with respect to inequalities of wealth and income. In particular,
this thesis gives descriptive evidence on the inequality of wealth and in earnings, specifically
between men and women. Moreover, this dissertation shows how occupational characteristics
and vertical mobility within occupations are linked to the Gender Pay Gap. Further, it provides
evidence on the question whether the 2007 parental leave reform had effects on mothers’ long-
run earnings, and, therefore, also on the Gender Life Time Earnings Gap.
Overview and Summary
To this end, this dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 to 3 are concerned with
income, more precisely with gross wages, and chapter deals 4 with wealth. Table 1 sums up the
key elements of these four chapters.
The first chapter is motivated by the large Gender Pay Gap in Germany of 21 %, which varies
substantially between occupations. Therefore, this chapter is concerned with the question
whether occupational differences are related to these differences. I use data from the Structure of
17



































































































Table 1: Overview and summary of different chapters
18 Introduction
Earnings Study (SES) provided by the Federal Statistical Office matched with task information
provided by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) to link individual and occupational
characteristics with hourly wages. In a two-step-approach, I first estimate the Gender Pay Gaps
within occupations. Second, I descriptively systematize the differences between occupations by
explaining the variance in the occupation-specific Gender Pay Gaps. For this systematization,
I aggregate information on working conditions at the occupational level. I find that wages
between men and women differ less in occupations with more linear earnings and with a low
level of routine tasks. Moreover, Gender Pay Gaps are higher in occupations where a high share
of employees have supervisory power, which indicates a ”glass ceiling”. In addition, I find that
the share of public firms reduces the inequality in wages between men and women, since these
firms are more likely to provide collective agreements.
Thus, chapter 1 provides descriptive evidence on Gender Pay Gaps within occupations, which
occur especially in higher occupational positions. The focus of chapter 2 is, therefore, the
Gender Pay Gap within occupational positions and aims at examining whether this gap is
related to different increases in earnings after promotions for men and women. For this purpose,
we draw a subsample from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) that encompasses
every individual who has ever worked subject to social security. We find that women’s earnings
increase more than men’s due to the promotion but the descriptive results suggest that men’s
earnings have already increased before the promotion took place. Thus, the findings indicate
that women’s earnings growth depends more on promotions than men’s. Further, we find
that women are less likely to be promoted to higher occupational positions, but the results do
not indicate larger gender gaps in the highest occupational positions, which suggests a ”glass
ceiling” rather than a ”sticky floor.” However, once we add firm fixed effects to the model gender
differences are no longer significant, which may result from collective agreements. Moreover,
the findings suggest that mothers are less likely to be promoted to higher positions but that
they do not face lower wage increases due to promotions than non-mothers.
These differences in probability of promotions for women with and without children, presented
in chapter 2, may partly explain the motherhood gap. In order to reduce motherhood penalties
on the one hand and to increase financial stability during the first year after childbirth on
the other, Germany has implemented a parental leave reform in 2007, which is the focus of
chapter 3. In the context of this reform, the old means-tested parental leave benefit was
replaced by a more generous, earnings-related benefit. Moreover, the maximal duration of
this parental leave reform has shortened from 24 to 14 months, where two out of these 14
months are earmarked individually to each parent. Therefore, the reform has changed the
financial incentives to work during the first two years after childbirth of mothers with high and
low prior-to-birth incomes differently. While high-income mothers have post-reform a higher
incentive not to work during the first year after birth, low-income mothers are more likely to
work during the second year after childbirth. In this chapter, we aim at investigating how these
changes in the duration of employment interruptions translate in long-run earnings. We apply a
difference-in-difference approach to identify the causal effect, i.e. we compare earnings of first-
time mothers who gave birth just before and right after the reform. To net out seasonal effects,
19
we include the year before. For this purpose, we draw a sample from the IEB that contains
the total population of mothers, who gave first birth during this period and who have worked
subject to social security before giving birth. We confirm previous results by showing that the
average duration of employment interruptions increases for high-income mothers. These longer
employment interruptions, however, do not translate into lower earnings. Contrary to what
we would expect from the Human Capital Theory, we find even positive effects on earnings,
which diminish over time. Using data from the Microcensus, we can show that these effects
do not come from changes in the working hours or observed characteristics. Further, we can
rule out that the effects come from changed fertility patterns or employment stability. There is
suggestive evidence that stronger involvement of fathers may have facilitated mothers’ return
to the labor market, which, by consequence may have had a positive effect on their earnings.
The reform, however, has not increased the earnings of low-income mothers.
In chapter 4, we change the focus from earnings to wealth and from the individual to the
household perspective, and analyze the top tail of the wealth distribution. In addition to
Germany, this chapter also investigates the wealth distribution in France and Spain. We aim
at analyzing the wealth distribution by capturing the missing rich. It is a well-established fact
that surveys are likely to under-represent the very wealthy. In order to capture the missing rich,
we match the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), which is provided by the
European Central Bank, with rich lists. In particular, we use national rich lists, which cover
a larger share of the very wealthy, and the Forbes list. Based on this integrated data set, we
estimate a Pareto distribution and impute missing rich households. We find that imputing the
missing rich, has a substantial effect on the wealth share of the richest 1 %. We also show that
national rich list can particularly improve the estimation in countries, where only few dollar
billionaires make it onto the Forbes list, such as Spain.
Contributions
Using different kinds of data, more precisely household survey data (HFCS, Microcensus),
linked employer-employee data (SES) and administrative data (IEB), each chapter makes an
individual contribution to the existing literature, which is discussed in more detail within the
respective chapters, I will hereafter sum up the main contributions of this dissertation.
First, chapter 1 and 2 highlight the relationship between occupations and the Gender Pay
Gap. Previous literature such as Finke et al. (2017) and Hausmann et al. (2015) have shown
that an important part of the Gender Pay Gap is related to the fact that female-dominated
occupations have on average lower wage levels than male-dominated occupations. However,
there exists very few studies on Gender Pay Gaps within occupations. In particular, less is
known about the link between occupational characteristics and the Gender Pay Gap. With
chapter 1, I first contribute by providing evidence about the variance in the occupation-specific
Gender Pay Gap. Moreover, I am able to confirm the negative relationship between linearity
in earnings and the Gender Pay Gap for Germany, which Goldin (2014) has found for the
U.S. That is, Gender Pay Gaps are particularly high in occupations, in which the hourly wage
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depends on the number of hours worked. Moreover, I extend the findings by Goldin (2014) to
a more general level: The relationship between the linearity in earnings and the Gender Pay
Gap, which she observed in specific occupations such as Pharmacy and MBA, is not random
but rather systematical.
The second chapter is – to the best of my knowledge – the first study that investigates the
impact of promotions on women’s and men’s earnings in Germany. Moreover, this paper can
contribute substantially to the literature, since we are the first to analyze different levels of
promotion. Hence, we are able to analyze whether the potential gender gaps widen or shorten
at higher occupational positions. With this distinction, we can considerably contribute to the
recent literature in respect to the role of ”glass ceiling” and ”sticky floors”. By finding no gender
differences on the firm level, we confirm previous findings by Blau and DeVaro (2007), Booth
et al. (2003), and Olson and Becker (1983). The administrative data allows us to observe the
entire employment biography, which enables us to compare earnings growth after a promotion
to earnings growth in the years before and after the promotions. The results reveal that men’s
earnings have increased more strongly than women’s before the promotion took place. With
these findings, we make an important contribution to the literature, since we can show that
promotions affect women’s earnings more strongly than men’s. That is, while women’s earnings
increase in particular when they get promoted, men’s earnings growth is less depending on
promotions.
In chapter 3, we make important contributions to the literature on the 2007 parental leave
reform. The effects of the reform have been investigated for various outcomes such as fertil-
ity (Cygan-Rehm, 2016; Raute, 2019), family living arrangements (Cygan-Rehm et al., 2018),
domestic work (Schober, 2014), norm effects (Unterhofer and Wrohlich, 2017; Welteke and
Wrohlich, 2019) or child outcomes (Huebener et al., 2019). Since the reform has in particular
changed the incentives to work during the first years after childbirth, a large part of literature
focuses on labor market outcomes. In particular, the short-term effects of the reform on em-
ployment have been analyzed in a number of studies (e.g. Bergemann and Riphahn, 2011, 2015;
Geyer et al., 2015). Moreover, a recent study by Kluve and Schmitz (2018) investigates the
medium-run effects of the reform on employment and employment stability. However, much
uncertainty still exists about long-run outcomes. Further, there exists no research on the impact
of the reform on earnings, which might be one of the most fundamental outcomes when eval-
uating the reform. Therefore, we considerably contribute to the existing literature of research
by investigating the effects of the reform on earnings in the short, medium and long run.
Finally, in chapter 4 we rely on a method, which was proposed by Vermeulen (2018). This
approach uses both survey data and rich lists, to estimate the Pareto distribution that gives
us the Pareto coefficient, which we need to create synthetic households. We then match the
wealth information from the synthetic households with the survey data and rich lists to analyze
the impact of the missing rich on the wealth distribution. In this study, we use national rich
list in addition to the Forbes list, and compare the impact of the top tail for different rich list
specifications. In doing so, we contribute to the existing literature, since we provide evidence
that national rich lists can improve the estimation of the top tail compared to the Forbes list,
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in particular when the number of national billionaires is small. Moreover, the generated data
set can be used for further studies, e.g. in micro-simulation analyses Bach and Thiemann
(2016a,b) estimate the impact of an inheritance and wealth tax based on the adjusted wealth
distribution.
Chapter 1
Occupational characteristics and the
Gender Pay Gap
1.1 Introduction
In 2017, the German Federal Statistical Office reported that the raw Gender Pay Gap (GPG),
i.e. the relative wage differences between men and women, is 21 % in Germany. The report
shows that occupational choice plays an important role in the GPG (Finke et al., 2017). As
shown in Table 1.1, which presents the GPGs in the ten largest occupations in Germany, the
GPG varies substantially across occupations: For instance, in Nursing as well as Education and
Social Work, women and men have similar wages on average. In contrast, in occupations such
as Machine-building and -operating, and Business Organization, the GPGs are very large. In
these occupations, men earn on average 25 % and 35 %, respectively, more than women. Hence,
the question arises why the GPGs vary so much between occupations and how occupational
characteristics are related to these differences.
In this paper, I systematize occupational differences in order to reveal whether, and to which
extent, the GPG is linked to occupational characteristics in Germany. Using the Structure of
Earnings Study (SES) data from the Federal Statistical Office matched with task information
provided by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB), I link individual and occupational
characteristics with hourly wages. Applying a two-step-approach, I first estimate the GPGs
within occupations. Second, I descriptively systematize the differences between occupations by
explaining the variance in the occupation-specific GPGs. For this systematization, I aggregate
information on working conditions at the occupational level.
To highlight the relationship between occupational characteristics and the GPG, I show differ-
ences in the GPG between different occupations. In the raw data, I observe higher GPGs in
occupations with mainly leadership positions and in occupations with interactive and analytical
non-routine tasks. Moreover, the data suggest a relationship between the linearity in earnings
22
1.1. Introduction 23
Occupation Gender Pay Gap
Nursing −0.02
Education and Social Work −0.02
Cleaning Services −0.08
Drivers of Vehicles in Road Traffic −0.16
Warehousing and Logistics −0.16
Office Clerks and Secretaries −0.17
Public Administration −0.20
Average −0.21
Sales Occupations (without Specialization) −0.25
Machine-building and -operating −0.24
Business Organization −0.35
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, SES, 2014, own
calculations. Values are weighted and are based on employees between 25 and 55 years.
Table 1.1: Gender Pay Gap in the ten largest occupations in Germany
and the size of the GPG. An occupation is defined as linear if hourly wages are constant along
the distribution of working hours. In contrast, persons who are employed in occupations with
non-linear earnings face wage premia for longer working hours. Specifically, the data reveal
that in particular occupations in the medical sector that have low GPGs, tend to remunerate
linearity. In contrast, occupations with non-linear earnings, which are more pronounced in
the business sector, have higher GPGs. However, these findings may result from differences in
observables.
Therefore, I estimate, in the first step, the adjusted GPG within occupations based on indi-
vidual characteristics. After controlling for human capital and firm characteristics, the average
GPG within occupations is 13 %. While in some occupations women earn more than men (e.g.
Civil Engineering or Event Organization), female employees in Legal Services earn 33 % less,
while Actresses, female Dancers and Athletes earn even 51 % less than their male colleagues do.
Excluding part-time workers from the regression leads to different results, which emphasizes
the necessity to include part-time workers when estimating the GPG.
In the second step, I regress occupational characteristics on the GPG obtained in the first step.
To measure, whether or not, the linearity in earnings is related to the GPG, I introduce the
non-linearity index. This index gives the relative occupation-specific difference in the hourly
wage between persons working more than 40 hours per week and those working less than 25
hours. I find that occupations with more linear earnings show less differences between men’s
and women’s wages. Thus, this result extends Goldin’s (2014) study, which highlights this
link for selected occupations, to a more general level. Moreover, in contrast to the raw data,
occupations with more routine tasks have larger GPGs on average. According to the litera-
ture, occupations with linear earnings (Goldin, 2014) and with non-routine tasks (Bhalotra and
Ferna´ndez, 2018) have a higher level of substitution. These relations indicate the importance
of substitution when it comes to the GPG: The more employees can replace each other, the less
pricey is the absence of a particular employee and the lower is the GPG. Moreover, GPGs are
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higher in occupations where a high share of employees have supervisory power, which indicates
a ”glass ceiling”. In addition, I find that the share of public firms reduces the inequality in
wages between men and women as these firms are more likely to provide collective agreements.
These agreements do not just decrease the leeway in discrimination among workers but might
also have positive external effects on other firms. Hence, private companies may reward their
employees according to the wage agreements of the public firms.
A considerable literature examines the various reasons for the GPG.1 Besides the large strand
that focuses on gender differences on behavior (Babcock and Leschever, 2003; Bertrand, 2011;
Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), many earlier studies focus on sort-
ing. That is, men often earn more than women because they select in better paying firms
(Card et al., 2016; Coudin et al., 2018; Goldin et al., 2017) or work in occupations with higher
earnings (Blau and Kahn, 2017; Cutillo and Centra, 2017; Ludsteck, 2014; Murphy and Oesch,
2016). But even within occupations, there is still a substantial GPG (Goldin, 2014; Hinz and
Gartner, 2005). However, less is known on the occupation-specific GPGs, and more precisely,
why they vary substantially across occupations.
My interest on the role of occupational characteristics to explain differences in the GPGs be-
tween occupations is based on a study by Goldin (2014). In this paper, she shows that the
GPGs in the U.S. labor market vary substantially between occupations and that is linked to
the degree to which hourly wages increase with the number of working hours. Hence, in occu-
pations where the wage level is independent of working hours, the GPG is lower than in those
occupations where earnings increase disproportionately with the number of hours worked.
There is still uncertainty, however, to what extent these results can be transferred to other
labor markets. In this paper, I focus on the German labor market because it is characterized
by a high share of part-time work. However, part-time work is a quite female phenomenon: in
2017, 48 % of women and 11% of men worked in part-time (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018a).
Moreover, the role of occupations in Germany is very important as they determine, to a high
degree, the professional pathway. Since the German education and vocational training system
is highly standardized, apprenticeship training serves as a strong signal for a specific knowledge
in one particular occupation. As a result, the number of occupational shifts decreases, while
making occupational changes rather complicated (Allmendinger, 1989). Moreover, I extend the
analyses of Goldin (2014) by incorporating additional characteristics, such as the distribution
of occupational positions and the tasks on the occupational level to describe why the GPGs
vary between occupations.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents some bivariate correlations be-
tween the raw GPG and some occupational characteristics. Section 1.3 is concerned with
definitions and the data. Section 1.4 describes the estimation strategy used to analyze the
relationship of occupational characteristics and the GPG, which consists of two steps. In the
first step, I estimate the occupation-specific GPGs. The second steps aims at systematizing the
differences in the gaps across occupations by regressing the GPG on occupational characteris-
tics. Section 1.5 provides the results of the estimation, while section 1.6 discusses the findings.
1A large review of the current state of research is given by Blau and Kahn (2017).
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The last section concludes.
1.2 Why the GPG may be linked to occupational charac-
teristics
Before discussing the empirical strategy and results, this section presents bivariate correlations
between wages and several occupational characteristics, which highlights the role of occupations
when analyzing the GPG.
1.2.1 Linearity of earnings
For the U.S. Labor Market, Goldin (2014) shows that differences in the GPGs between occupa-
tions are related to the degree to which hourly wages depend on the number of working hours.
In this context, she differs between occupations with ”linear” and ”non-linear” earnings. In
occupations with linear remuneration, hourly wages are independent from the number of hours
worked and thus, earnings increase linearly with the number of working hours. In contrast, in
occupations with non-linear or convex earnings, wages rise with the number of working hours.
Therefore, the earnings increase disproportionately with the hours worked. Goldin (2014) ar-
gues that in occupations with non-linear remuneration, presence is of high value and therefore,
flexible working hours is costly to the firm as employees are not available at a specific time.
Conversely, workers in occupations with linear earnings can easily be substituted by each other
such that flexible working hours do not lead to higher costs for the employers. She observes that
occupations with linear earnings (e.g. pharmacy) have lower GPGs than those with non-linear
earnings (e.g. MBA, JD). As part-time workers are predominantly female, the (non-)linearity
of earnings can partly explain why the GPG varies over occupations in the U.S.
The correlation between the linearity of earnings and the size of the GPG may also hold true
in the German labor market, as shown in Figure 1.1. Out of the ten largest occupations in
Germany, Business Organization is the one with the highest GPG, while Nursing has the small-
est (see Table 1.1). Comparing the size of the gross hourly net wages in both occupations by
the number of weekly working hours, shows notable differences in the correlation of working
hours and wages. Employees in Nursing have, on average, the same wage independent of the
numbers of working hours. The average gross wages of persons working 20, 30, or 40 hours
is 19 euro per hour. Hence, the remuneration in these occupations is linear. In contrast, the
average gross wages in Business Organization increases with the number of working hours per
week. That is, employees with 15 hours earn 14 euro, those with 30 hours earn 19 euro and
those with 40 hours earn 27 euro per hour. As salaries rise disproportionately with the hours
worked, Business Organization is defined as an occupation with non-linear remuneration. These
examples show that the wage level is in some occupations more dependent on the number of
working hours than in others. Moreover, occupations with non-linear earnings tend to have a
higher GPG than occupations with linear earnings. This correlation indicates that the degree
of linearity in earnings may be related to the differences in the GPGs between occupations.
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Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, SES, 2014, own calculations;
Based on employees between 25 and 55 years.
Figure 1.1: Hourly gross wages by working hours for employees in Business Organization and in
Nursing
1.2.2 Occupational positions and tasks
Moreover, a considerable literature shows that the GPG is substantially large at the top of the
wage distribution (Arulampalam et al., 2007; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Busch and Holst, 2009b;
Collischon, Forthcoming; Gallego Granados and Wrohlich, 2018). This finding may be the result
of a ”glass ceiling,” i.e. it is difficult for women to enter top positions. Hence, the variation
in the GPG between occupations may be related to the fact that occupations are differently
affected by the ”glass ceiling.”
Figure 1.2 classifies occupations by the mode of the occupational positions, giving the average
male and female wage level for occupations that are mostly characterized by leadership positions,
very difficult activities, complex activities, skilled work or unskilled work. The graph shows
that wage differences between men and women increase with the occupational position. The
largest gaps occur in occupations with mainly leadership positions. These descriptive results
suggest the existence of a ”glass ceiling.” As some occupations may be more affected by a ”glass
ceiling” than others, the share of leadership positions within an occupation may be correlated
with the GPG.
In addition, the literature emphasizes the role of tasks to explain the GPG. Black and Spitz-
Oener (2010) show that the decrease of the GPG over time is partly related to changes in
the work content because of workplace computerization. This is why, the share of non-routine
interactive and analytical tasks has increased more for women than for men. In contrast,
women’s share of routine tasks has decreased stronger than men’s. Moreover, computerization
decreases the relative price of routine tasks. Thus, the task-based technological change favors
women more than men, and is, therefore, partly explaining why the GPG has decreased over
time.
However, less is known about GPGs within tasks. Therefore, occupations are grouped on
























































Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, SES, 2014, own calculations.
Based on employees between 25 and 55 years.
Figure 1.2: Wage level within occupational positions by gender
the task that is mainly performed, with Figure 1.3 showing male and female wages within
each task. The graph indicates that men’s wages differ substantially across tasks: While men
earn, on average, 15 euro per hour in occupations with manual non-routine tasks, the male
wage level in occupations with analytical non-routine tasks amounts to 27 euro per hour. In
contrast, female wages are more constant across tasks, varying between 13 and 16 euro. Only
in occupations with analytical non-routine tasks the average hourly wage is above 21 euro.
Hence, Figure 1.3 illustrates that the GPG varies across tasks. Moreover, it indicates that
these gaps between men and women are mostly related to remarkable heterogeneities of male
wages between different tasks.
To sum up, comparing wages between occupations with different occupational characteristics
suggests that they may be correlated with the GPG. However, these findings are based on
simple group comparisons and may also result from differences in observables. Therefore, the
next sections provide more information on the data set and the empirical strategy to test
whether, and if so, which occupational characteristics are linked with the adjusted GPG.
1.3 Data and Descriptives
1.3.1 Data Source
The estimation is based on the SES, which is a linked employer-employee data set provided by
the Federal Statistical Office. The data set offers detailed information on work characteristics,
28 1. Occupational characteristics and the Gender Pay Gap








Source: SES 2014; Based on all employees between 25 and 55 years.
Figure 1.3: Wage level within main tasks by gender
including earnings and hours worked. The data come from the employers or, in Education and
Public Administration and Defense or Social Insurance sectors, from the personnel statistics
of the public service (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018c). In contrast to survey data, the admin-
istrative provision of wage information substantially decreases the likelihood of measurement
errors. Due to the duty of disclosure, nonresponse, which is often a concern in survey data,
does not bias the results (Kapteyn and Ypma, 2007).
The SES are cross-sectional data that are collected every four years since 2006. The data offer
information about the employee (e.g. gender and occupation), the employment (e.g. wage and
working hours) and the employer (e.g. firm size and public vs. private ownership).
In this paper, I use the 2014 wave, which also provides information on occupational positions,
shift work, leadership positions, and overtime hours. The gross sample size of employers ex-
ceeds 60,000, while that of employees exceeds 1 million observations (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2018c). This large sample size is a major benefit of the data as it allows detailed analyses
within occupations. Another important advantage of the data is that it provides information
on working hours. Existing studies (e.g. Gartner and Hinz, 2009; Hirsch, 2013) that estimate
the size of the GPG in Germany use administrative data provided by the IAB. As IAB data
offer daily wage information but not work hours, the analyses are usually only based on full-
time employed persons to make wages more comparable. Restricting the sample to full-time




The estimation of the GPG is based on hourly wages, which relies on the number of agreed
2As mentioned before, the 48 % of the employed women work in part-time (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018a).
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working hours per week plus the number of paid over-time hours. Further, this number is mul-
tiplied times 4.3 to determine the number of agreed monthly hours. Finally, the monthly gross
earnings, which includes pay for overtime and shift work, is divided by the number of working
hours per month.
ii. Occupations
Occupations form the key element of this study and group similar jobs with similar formal train-
ing. They are defined based on the three-digit-level3 and differentiate between 144 occupations,
which are given in Table A.2 the appendix. As an example, this definition allows distinguishing
between human and veterinary medicine, but not between surgeons and pediatricians.
iii. Tasks
Assuming that the task composition has not changed between 2013 and 2014, I merge the
SES with aggregated data on tasks for the latest year (2013) provided by the IAB. This data
contain the composition of tasks and the main task within each occupation (see Dengler et al.
(2014) for more detail). The tasks are grouped in the following way: Analytically non-routine
tasks, interactive non-routine tasks, cognitive routine tasks, manual routine tasks and manual
non-routine tasks. An overview of the specific activities within each tasks is presented in Table
A.1 in the appendix.
As an example, in the occupation of Education and Social Work, the share of analytically
non-routine tasks is 33 %, of interactive non-routine tasks is 51 %, and of manual non-routine
tasks is 11 %, while the share of routine tasks in this occupation is rather small. Only 5 %
are cognitive-routine tasks and there exist no routine manual tasks. In contrast, industrial
occupations such as glass- or ceramic-making have mainly routine manual tasks.
The task-data do not offer information on soldiers. For this reason, I exclude four occupations,
which describes different ranks of the German army, from the analysis.
iv. Non-linearity index
To measure the linearity of earnings within occupations, I introduce the non-linearity index. It
gives the relative wage gap within occupations between persons working more than 40 hours
per week and those working less than 25 hours. The less linear the remuneration within an
occupation, the larger is the hourly wage gap between persons working more than 40 and less
than 25 hours, and, thus, the higher is the index.
Table 1.2 shows the non-linearity index for the five occupations with the most (non-)linear
remuneration of all occupations that have more than 1,000 observations. In these ”most linear”
occupations, such as non-medical therapy and alternative medicine, sales occupations for drug-
store products or journalism, part-time workers earn more than those who work more than 40
hours per week. In contrast, managers who work less than 25 hours per week earn 43 % less
than their colleagues with long working hours do.
In comparison to the U.S. labor market, Germany shows similar trends with regard to occupa-
tions with (non-)linear earnings: Occupations in the medical sector, such as selling drugstore
products or pharmaceuticals or nursing, tend to remunerate more linear, while occupations
3The assignment to the different occupations is based on the classification of occupations 2010 (KldB 2010,
Paulus and Matthes, 2013).
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in the business sector such as business organization or managing are occupations with highly
non-linear earnings. This finding emphasizes that despite the international differences between
the German and the U.S. labor markets, the conditions within occupations seem to be similar.
Occupation Linearity (in %)
Occupations in non-medical therapy and alternative medicine −9.2
Sales occupations (Drugstore products, pharmaceuticals) −8.2
Doctors’ receptionists and assistants −7.4
Occupations in nursing and obstetrics −6.2
Occupations in editorial work and journalism −4.9
...
...
Occupations in legal services, jurisdiction, and other officers of the court 35.1
Occupations in business organization and strategy 35.9
Teachers and researchers at universities and colleges 37.6
Technical occupations in paper-making and packaging 40.0
Managing directors and executive board members 43.3
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, SES, 2014, own
calculations.
Note: Linearity index in occupations with more than 1,000 observations; Estimations based on employees
between 25 and 55 years. Linearity =
wage>40h−wage<25h
wage>40h
Table 1.2: Occupations with the most (non-)linear earnings
1.3.3 Descriptive Overview
I restrict the sample to persons between 25 and 55 years of age and exclude trainees and those
working less than 9 hours per week. The final sample contains 595,333 employees, of which
290,735 are women. Table 1.3 provides the summary statistics for the entire sample and sep-
arately for women and men. With respect to their individual characteristics, men and women
differ in their wages, tenure, and the probability of holding a leadership position. As expected,
men have significantly higher hourly wages than women. While men earn on average 21.6 euro
per hour, the average hourly wage of women is more than 4 euro smaller. Moreover, women
tend to work longer in the same establishment than men and are less likely to hold a leadership
position. Additionally, the average age is 42 years and 88 % of the sample has a permanent
contract.
The majority of the sample (55 %) does not have any A-Levels; instead they have vocational
training, with a distinct minority of the sample having completed tertiary education (Univer-
sity: 24 %, Polytechnical school: 3 %). The share of persons without vocational training is
slightly smaller than the official numbers in the Microcensus provided by the federal statistical
office. As the sample is restricted to the working population, it is better educated than the
average population.
One quarter of the (female and male) employees work in East Germany4. On average, the
4East Germany comprises the new federal states (former GDR) including Berlin, while West Germany make
up the old federal states (former FRG)
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Total Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Individual Characteristics
Hourly wage 19.40 11.04 17.14 8.04 21.56 12.93
Female 0.49 0.50 1 0 0 0
Age 41.89 8.91 41.98 8.95 41.80 8.88
Tenure 12.72 10.55 13.25 10.16 12.20 10.16
Education
No A-level, No VT 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24
No A-Level, VT 0.55 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.54 0.50
A-Level, No VT 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15
A-Level, VT 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27
Polytechnical degree 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16
University 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.44
Permanent Contract (vs. Temporary
Contract)
0.88 0.33 0.87 0.34 0.89 0.32
Leadership Position 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.26
Firm Characteristics
East vs. West Germany 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43
Size of the Establishment 1070.32 2967.16 1055.84 2460.67 1084.14 3380.49
Occupational Characteristics
Overtime hours 1.75 1.36 0.70 0.85 1.63 1.58
Shift bonus 31.72 48.14 19.91 36.78 43.00 54.57
Non-linearity Index 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.22 0.11
Occupational positions
Supervisory Power 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.20
Very Difficult activity 0.24 0.16 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.16
Difficult activity 0.48 0.20 0.48 0.16 0.48 0.19
Skilled work 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10
Unskilled work 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.07
Tasks
Analytical Non-Routine Tasks 0.33 0.22 0.35 0.40 0.31 0.23
Interactive Non-Routine Tasks 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.14
Cognitive Routine Tasks 0.28 0.18 0.28 0.19 0.27 0.18
Manual Routine Tasks 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.19
Manual Non-Routine Tasks 0.17 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.24
Share of Women 0.49 0.27 0.64 0.20 0.35 0.26
Public Firms 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.27 0.35
N 595,333 290,735 304,598
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, SES, 2014, own calculations.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics
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establishment have more than 1,000 employees but men tend to work in larger establishments.
The third part of the table shows occupational characteristics. The table demonstrates that
women work in occupations with fewer overtime hours and smaller shift bonuses. Furthermore,
men tend to work in occupations with a lower level of linearity of earnings. Regarding the distri-
bution of occupational positions, typically employees work in occupations, where the majority
has difficult activities and the minority does unskilled work. The distribution of these groups
does not differ between men and women. Moreover, the table shows how tasks are distributed
across the sample. Employees work mostly in occupations with analytical non-routine (33 %)
or cognitive routine tasks (28 %). In addition, men are more likely to work in occupations with
manual tasks and women in occupations with more interactive non-routine tasks.
As expected, the summary statistics reveal that women tend to work in female-dominated oc-
cupations and men in male-dominated occupations. Further, women are more likely to work in
public firms.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Section 1.2 presented binary relations between occupational characteristics and the raw GPG.
However, parts of these wage differences may come from dissimilarities regarding education
levels, tenure or firm size. To control for these differences, I estimate the adjusted GPG within
occupations as a first step. In the second step, I use occupational characteristics to systematize
the variance in the adjusted GPGs between occupations.
Thus, as a first step, hourly wages (yij) are regressed on age, tenure, education, location of the
establishment (East vs. West Germany) size of the establishment, having a leadership position,
and having a permanent contract. These variables are summarized in vector Xi. In addition,
the model contains gender (δi), occupational fixed effects (γj), and their interaction (αj). This
interaction term gives the conditional wage differences between men and women within each
occupation j, i.e. the adjusted GPG, and, therefore, is the coefficient of interest. The indicators
illustrate that each individual i is working in an occupation j.






αj Occj ∗ Femalei + µXi + ij (1.1)
However, it is likely that some unobserved preferences are correlated with the explanatory vari-
ables, especially with the occupation fixed effects. Hence, persons working as managers may
have stronger preferences for professional success, while employees in Education and Social
Work may seek a better reconciliation of family and working life. That is, wage differences
between those two occupations may also come from selection processes.
In addition, the αj coefficient might be biased due to different selection processes within occu-
pations. It is possible that in some occupations, such as medicine, men and women select into
different occupational sub-groups with diverging wage levels. But women are more likely to
select into the relatively low remunerated occupational sub-group of pediatricians as into the
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sub-group of surgeons, which has a relatively high wage level (Gesundheitsberichterstattung des
Bundes, 2019; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018b). Therefore, the size of αj might not necessarily
come from discrimination, but might also be the result of (unobserved) selection.
Thus, the estimates of (1.1) would be unbiased if the residuals were orthogonal. But due to
the selection within occupations and occupational groups, the condition formulated in (1.2)
might be violated. Therefore, the estimated coefficients do not necessarily reflect the causal
link between the independent variables and the wage.
E(j |Femalei, Occj , Occj ∗ Femalei, Xi) = 0 (1.2)
The second step aims at systematizing the variance in the adjusted GPG, αj , between occu-
pations. Therefore, the occupation-specific wage differences, estimated in (1.1), are regressed
on different occupational characteristics (δ) such as shift bonus, non-linearity of earnings, and
tasks.
αˆj = β0 + δCj + νj (1.3)
Selection into occupations also has a crucial impact on the interpretation of the results because
it affects both sides of equation (1.3). As mentioned above, it is probable that estimated
αj differs from the true α
∗
j . Therefore, the relationship between the true and the estimated
coefficient can be formulated as following, where a signifies the measurement error:
αj = α
∗
j + a with a 6= 0 (1.4)
Thus, equation (1.3) can be rearranged as follows:
αˆ∗j = β0 + δCj − a+ νj (1.5)
The results of the estimation are only affected if the measurement error a is correlated with
the covariates. However, this is very likely, if we think, for example, about the share of women
within an occupation. Hence, women working in a female-dominated occupation, such as sales
or nursing, may prefer to work in these occupations as they offer a better reconciliation of family
and working life due to flexible working hours.5 Men, in contrast, may work in these occupations
for other reasons. It is also possible that women working in male-dominated occupations, like
technical occupations in the automotive building industry, is a very selective group. That is,
these women might be more ambitious than the average population and, therefore, more labor
market attached than men in these occupations.
In addition, the selection into occupations also may affect the right-hand side of equation (1.5).
It is possible that persons select into an occupation because it has shift bonuses or, in contrast,
other persons may not work in this occupation because it includes shift work.
Because people do not select randomly into occupations, the assumption of orthogonal residuals
5However, for the U.S., McCrate (2005) does not find that women have more flexible work hours than men.
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does not hold (equation (1.6) and (1.7)).
E(νj |Cj) = 0 (1.6)
E(a|Cj) = 0 (1.7)
As a result, the estimates of the second step (1.3) are likely to be biased. This is why the
coefficients cannot be interpreted in a causal way. However, even if the results come from
selection, the estimated coefficients tell us more on wage differences between women and men:
The results indicate whether, and if so, which occupational characteristics are correlated to the
GPG.
1.5 Results
This section presents the relationship between occupational characteristics and the GPG. First,
I present the estimation results of occupation-specific GPGs. In the second step, I descriptively
systematize the differences in the adjusted GPGs between occupations. Therefore, I analyze to
what extent occupational characteristics can explain the variance in the GPGs.
1.5.1 First step: The GPG within occupations
Figure 1.4 graphs the distribution of the coefficient of interest αj , estimated in equation (1.1)
that gives the adjusted GPG in each occupation for two specification.6 The first specification
shows how the GPGs are distributed if equation (1.1) is estimated for the entire sample (a).
The second specification is based on full-time employees only (b).
The results show that there are few differences in the adjusted GPGs between occupations.
Moreover, the graphs emphasize that the distribution of the gaps changes slightly if part-time
workers are excluded. The GPGs in the full-time sample tend to be slightly smaller. This may
be the result of a positive selection of women working in full-time (Gallego Granados, 2019).
6The estimation results of equation (1.1) for the entire and the full-time sample, i.e. working more than 32
hours a week, is given in the appendix in Table A.3
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Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, SES, 2014, own calculations; GPG
equals αj
Figure 1.4: Distribution of the Gender Pay Gap
In addition, the sample selection could affect the estimation results of previous studies (e.g.
Ludsteck, 2014), which estimated the occupation specific GPGs based on full-time employees.
The results would be biased if the relationship between the occupations, thus the ranking, is
affected. Therefore, Table 1.4 presents the occupations with the highest and lowest GPG in
both specifications.
In the main specification, which is based on the entire sample, Event Organization and Al-
ternative Medicine have the lowest GPG, which is even positive. That is, in these occupation
men earn on average 7 % and 5 % less than women. There are other occupations like Civil
Engineering, Education and Social Work, as well as Church Community Work, where women
earn more than men. Note that the raw GPG for persons employed in Education and Social
Work (see Table 1.1) turns from a slightly negative to a positive value after controlling for
observables. Thus, in this occupation the (raw) GPG may be rooted in from different human
capital endowments or the fact that men are more likely to hold leadership positions.
However, in other occupations, like paper-making and -processing and in printing technology,
women earn 32 % and 30 % less than men. The highest GPG occurs for Actors, Dancers and
Athletes, where women earn 51 % less than men. However, these are rather small occupations,
where a few outliers can have an outsized impact on the results.
In the second specification, which excludes part-time workers, the ranking changes substantially
in some occupations such as food layers. Hence, the selection into full-time might affect oc-
cupations differently. This result highlights the importance of adding part-time workers when
comparing GPGs across occupations.
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Entire Sample Only Full-time
1 0.07 Event Organization 0.10 Floor Layers
2 0.05 Alternative Medicine 0.10 Vini- and Viticulture
3 0.03 Service in Passenger Traffic 0.04 Event Organization
4 0.01 Church Community Work 0.02 Church Community Work
5 −0.01 Occupations in Event Technology 0.02 Drivers of Construction Vehicles
6 −0.01 Presenters and Entertainers 0.01 Building services engineering
7 −0.02 Education and Social Work 0.00 Service in Passenger Traffic
8 −0.02 Sales Occupation: Books and Art −0.01 Education and Social Work
9 −0.02 Nursing −0.01 Occupational Health and Safety
10 −0.02 Drivers of Construction Vehicles −0.01 Nursing
...
...
131 −0.26 Artisan Craftworks −0.24 Sales Occupations: Durables
132 −0.26 Sales occupations: Clothes −0.25 Photography
133 −0.27 Photography −0.26 Musical Instrument Making
134 −0.27 Fishing −0.26 Paper-making and -processing
135 −0.28 Floor Layers −0.26 Artisans designing ceramics
136 −0.28 Product and Industrial Design −0.26 Printing Technology
137 −0.29 Metal-Making −0.28 Metal-Making
138 −0.30 Printing Technology −0.34 Sales Occupations: Foodstuffs
139 −0.32 Paper-making and -processing −0.31 Product and Industrial Design
140 −0.51 Actors, Dancers and Athletes −0.64 Actors, Dancers and Athletes
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, SES, 2014, own calculations. The
GPG equals the exponential value of αj minus 1.
Table 1.4: Occupations with the highest and the lowest Gender Pay Gap
1.5.2 Second step: The relationship between occupational character-
istics and the GPG
The second step aims at explaining the variance of the GPG across occupations that was ob-
tained in the first step. Therefore, I add occupational characteristics stepwise to the model.
The first row of Table 1.5 includes the average number of overtime hours within occupations.
The insignificance of the coefficient indicates that the differences in the GPGs between occupa-
tions are not correlated with the number of overtime hours. The summary statistics (see Table
1.3) reveal that men work in occupations with higher over-time hours. This finding suggests
that women are less likely to select into occupations with many over-time hours, but once they
work in these occupations they do not earn less than men.
The second row shows that the shift bonus amounts correlate slightly negatively with the GPG.
That is, the GPG is higher in occupations where shift work has a larger impact on wages. Shift
bonus are paid for night work or for work on Sundays and holidays. Assuming that women are
more concerned about reconciliation of family and working life (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2017),
they will be less likely than men to work on weekends or at night.
In the third row, the non-linearity index is included in the model. The negative and significant
coefficient emphasizes the relationship between linearity in earnings and the GPG, which was
indicated in section 1.2. Thus, the larger the relative wage difference between persons, who
work less than 25 hours per week, and those working more than 40 hours, the higher is the
occupation-specific GPG. As a reminder, women are more likely to work part-time and, there-
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fore, are more affected by part-time penalties.7 This result confirms not only Goldin’s (2014)
findings but extends them to a more general level: The relationship between the linearity in
earnings and the GPG, which is observed in some occupations such as Nursing or Business
Organization, is not random but rather systematical.
However, this relationship might not (only) be the result of discrimination but can also come
from selection into full- or part-time. In a recent study, Gallego Granados (2019) highlights
that positive selection into full-time work has a substantial impact on the part-time wage gap.
Hence, lower wages in part-time do not necessarily mean a part-time penalty but can also result
from lower productivity.
In specification (IV), the distribution of occupational positions within occupations is added to
the model. The results indicate that the GPG is greater in occupations with a large share
of employees holding leadership positions, which is also observed in the raw data (section 2).
As the link still holds after controlling for observables, this finding suggests the presence of a
”glass ceiling” and, therefore, is in line with previous studies (e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2007;
Collischon, Forthcoming). In addition, this result broadly supports the work of Busch and Holst
(2009b, 2011), which shows higher GPGs in managerial positions. Moreover, the insignificance
of the coefficients of the remaining occupational positions reveals that the link between the
GPG and the distribution of the occupational positions is not linear but rather represents a
penalty for women in leadership positions. In addition to the ”glass ceiling”, this relationship
may also have other causes, such as differing negotiation skills. Previous research shows that
women negotiate their wages less successfully than men (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007)
and negotiating occurs mainly in jobs with supervisory power. Moreover, after including oc-
cupational positions, the coefficient of shift bonus becomes insignificant. This result indicates
that the correlation between the shift bonus and the GPG in specification (II) and (III) may
be driven by occupations with large shift premia and high shares of employees in leadership
positions.
Occupational tasks enter the model in the fifth row of Table 1.5. The highly significant co-
efficients and the large increase of the R2 emphasize the importance of tasks in explaining
differences in the GPG between occupations. The results reveal that the GPG is larger in
occupations that have mainly cognitive or manual routine tasks.
The findings is consistent with that of Bhalotra and Ferna´ndez (2018), who observe a similar
relationship for the Mexican labor market. The authors argue that the level of substitution
between men and women, which varies across tasks, can explain the differences in the GPG.
Compared to those with manual and routine tasks, occupations with analytical non-routine
tasks have a high level of substitutability between genders, which decreases the GPG. Assum-
ing that this link holds more generally, the finding suggest that non-routine tasks have a higher
level of substitution than routine tasks. Thus, this relationship underlies the argument of
Goldin (2014) saying that the more that workers can replace each other, the lower is the GPG.
In contrast, higher GPGs in routine tasks may also result from selection. Adda et al. (2017)
7Barns and Preston (2010) show that one reason why women earn less than men is that part-time workers,
who are mostly female, have lower probabilities to be promoted. The link between promotions and the GPG is
discussed in more detail in chapter 2.
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assume that women with a higher preference for fertility select into occupations with manual
routine tasks. That is, the GPG in these occupations may come from differences in labor market
attachment between men and women. But compared to the raw GPGs within tasks (Figure 1.3)
the higher GPGs in routine tasks is surprising. Without controlling for observables, the data
reveal the largest (absolute) wage gaps in interactive and analytical non-routine tasks. These
differences between the adjusted and the raw GPG indicates that women are either working in
generally less remunerated occupations within these tasks or that men have higher endowments
of human capital.
In rows (VI) and (VII), the linear and quadratic terms of the share of women is added to
the model. The insignificance of both coefficients emphasizes that women earn less than men
irrespective of whether they work in a female- or a male-dominated occupation. Like previous
studies, I find that a large part of the GPG is linked to the fact that male-dominated occupa-
tions are on average higher rewarded than female-dominated occupations (e.g. Levanon et al.,
2009 in the U.S., Hausmann et al. (2015) in Germany). However, once they are working in a
male-or female-dominated occupation, the size of the occupation-specific GPG does not depend
on the share of women.
The last specification includes the share of public owners within occupations to explain the
GPG. The coefficient is highly significant, which indicates that public ownership is negatively
correlated with the GPG. That is, the size of the GPG depends on whether an occupation is
mainly performed in public or private firms. One possible reason for this relationship may be
that employees in the public sector are mainly paid in accordance with collective agreements.
These contracts ensure that persons with the same work experience and educational degree
earn the same, which prevents discrimination. In contrast, in the private sector wages are often
negotiated. As women are typically less successful at wage negotiations than men (e.g. Croson
and Gneezy, 2009), this might explain why the GPG is higher in the private sector. In addition
to collective agreements, the positive relationship between the share of public firms and the
GPG may result from selection. Hence, it may be that more labor market orientated men
prefer to select private firms. In addition, after including the firm ownership in the model, the
coefficient of manual non-routine tasks becomes significant. That is, occupations with mainly
manual non-routine tasks have, on average, higher GPGs. This finding is consistent with that
of Bhalotra and Ferna´ndez (2018) who find lower level of substitutability between men and
women in occupations with manual tasks. The result also highlights that this relationship is
more likely to appear in occupations that are mainly done in private firms.
Thus, some characteristics like the linearity in earnings, the distribution of occupational posi-
tions, tasks, and the share of public owners are related to the size of the GPG. However, in total,
occupational characteristics cannot even explain a third of the variance in the GPG. Hence,
the major part of the GPG is not linked to the observed occupational characteristics; rather
there might exist more characteristics that cannot be observed in the data. As an example, it
is possible that the link between within-occupational segregation and the within-occupational
GPG is stronger in some occupations than in others. In human medicine, for example, women
are more likely to work as pediatricians, while men tend to work as surgeons; the latter having
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a higher average wage level (Gesundheitsberichterstattung des Bundes, 2019; Statistisches Bun-
desamt, 2018b). In the occupation of teachers, in contrast, men are more likely to be math or
physics teacher and women are more likely to teach languages (Weeber and Hobler, 2015). This,
however, has no effect on their wages, as, due to collective agreements, these are independent






















GPG (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Overtime hours −0.0084 −0.0032 −0.0025 −0.0022 0.0056 0.0069 0.0063 0.0096
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Shift bonus (in 100 e) −0.0280∗ −0.0030** −0.0243 −0.0196 −0.0176 −0.0178 −0.0195
(0.0148) (0.0143) (0.0155) (0.0152) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0151)
Non-linearity Index −0.1353** −0.1307** −0.1313** −0.1274** −0.1231∗∗ −0.1269**
(0.0429) (0.0441) (0.0427) (0.0438) (0.0445) (0.0425)
Occupational position (Ref: Difficult activity)
Supervisory Power −0.0732 −0.1201** −0.1192** −0.1112** −0.1607**
(0.0580) (0.0581) (0.0583) (0.0600) (0.0590)
Very difficult activity 0.0180 −0.0261 −0.0235 −0.0139 −0.0672
(0.0715) (0.0773) (0.0778) (0.0797) (0.0776)
Skilled work −0.1243 −0.0631 −0.0630 −0.0496 −0.0404
(0.1719) (0.1740) (0.1746) (0.1765) (0.1687)
Unskilled work −0.0111 −0.0255 −0.0328 −0.0311 −0.0790
(0.2055) (0.1970) (0.1983) (0.1989) (0.1905)
Tasks (Ref: Analytical non-routine tasks)
Interactive non-routine tasks 0.0239 0.0198 0.0194 0.0216
(0.0356) (0.0369) (0.0371) (0.0354)
Cognitive routine tasks −0.0655** −0.0660** −0.0684** −0.0658**
(0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0263) (0.0252)
Manual routine tasks −0.1020** −0.1022** −0.1019** −0.0976**
(0.0375) (0.0377) (0.0378) (0.0361)
Manual non-routine tasks −0.0500 −0.0509 −0.0532 −0.0597*
(0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0322) (0.0308)
Share of women 0.0162 −0.0559 −0.0708
(0.0375) (0.1282) (0.1226)




Constant −0.1368 −0.1314 −0.1087 −0.0945 −0.0589 −0.0687 −0.0624 −0.0680
(0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0138) (0.0309) (0.0382) (0.0445) (0.0458) (0.0438)
Occupations 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
R2 0.0158 0.0402 0.1056 0.1208 0.2230 0.2241 0.2263 0.2991
R2adj 0.0087 0.0262 0.0859 0.0742 0.1562 0.1508 0.1464 0.2206
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, SES, 2014, own calculations.
Note: GPG equals αj obtained in the first step; Standard errors presented in parentheses; Significance levels: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001
Table 1.5: Results: Second step
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1.6 Discussion: What the data cannot explain
The previous section shows that some occupational characteristics are linked with the GPG
but the question arises as to why we still observe substantial differences in the gaps between
occupations. To answer this question, it might be useful to take a step back and to look at wage
differences in greater detail. By graphing the GPG across age, Figure 1.5 highlights that the
wage differences between men and women increases with age. While women until the age of 30
– the average age of the first birth (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019) – earn nearly the same as
men, the GPG increases substantially afterwards. The increase of the GPG is mainly related
to the fact that women’s wages stay constant after giving birth while men’s wages continue to
rise. Thus, this gap suggests a relationship between motherhood and earnings and, therefore,
may reflect a motherhood penalty.






















Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the
La¨nder, SES, 2014, own calculations.; Based on all employees between 25
and 55 years.
Figure 1.5: Hourly gross wages by age
However, the previous findings suggest that these age-specific GPGs alter between occupations.
Figure 1.6 plots the male and female wage level by age in Education and Social Work, Sales
Occupations (without Specialization) and in Business Organization. In Education and Social
Work, an occupation with a very small adjusted GPG of 2 %, there exists barely any wage
differences between men and women across life. Until the age of 35, the GPG is even positive
and turns into a slightly negative gap. In contrast, in Sales Occupations the difference between
the male and the female wage level is quite constant over the different age groups but increases
slightly after the age of 35. In Business Organization, the data reveal a substantial increase of
the GPG over age. As men’s wages continue to raise, the female wage level increases until the
age of 32 and stays then constant until the age of 55. But why is the motherhood penalty more
pronounced in this occupation than in others? As shown before, Business Organization and
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(a) Education and Social Work






















(b) Sales Occupations (without Specialization)























(c) Business Organization and Strategy
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of
the La¨nder, SES, 2014, own calculations; Based on all employees between
25 and 55 years.
Figure 1.6: Hourly gross wages by age for employed in Business Organization and Strategy, Sales
Occupations and in Education and Social Work
Strategy is a non-linear occupation, and therefore an occupation where full-time employees earn
considerably more than part-time workers. Hence, one reason for this motherhood gap might
obviously be that women are more likely to work in part-time and, thus, have lower wages.
The second reason for this motherhood penalty might become more evident, when looking at
men: Their wages increases substantially more between the age of 25 and 40 than between 40
and 55. That is, the first half of the working life has more impact on earnings than the second
half. However, this is also the time when couples decide to start a family and is, therefore, a
period, in which women tend to have longer career breaks than men. Thus, being absent from
the labor market seems to be more costly in this occupation than in others. Nevertheless, note
that women earn less men even before the age of 30. Thus, the GPG between the age of 25 and
30 may be the result either of different endowments, discrimination or selection.
To see, to which extent these gaps come from differences in endowments, Figure 1.7 plots the
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adjusted GPGs within age groups for these occupations.8 The results support the work of
Tyrowicz et al. (2018), which shows that the adjusted GPG increases with age. In Education
and Social Work, there exists even a positive GPG for the youngest cohorts, i.e. persons
between 25 and 30 years. This finding seems surprising but may result from selection. Giving
that Education and Social Work is a female-dominated occupation with a share of women of
around 85 %, men working in this occupation may be a very selective group. For all other
age groups, there is no (adjusted) GPG. In Sales Occupation, the rising (unadjusted) wage
differences between men and women across the age groups come along with an increase of the
adjusted GPG. However, the data do not allow analyzing whether this comes from unobserved
career breaks, selection or discrimination. Giving that Sales Occupations often have collective
agreements, the GPG in the youngest cohort of 17 % is surprising. As most people start to work
in this occupation after their vocational training around the age of 18, this gap may also result
from (unobserved) fertility decisions and, thus, (unobserved) career breaks or part-time work
experience. Finally, the graph plots a constant adjusted GPG of 19 % in Business Organization
and Strategy. That is, the adjusted GPG at the beginning of the career is relatively high
compared to the other occupations. Moreover, in this cohort the adjusted GPG is nearly the
double of the unadjusted (10 %) gap. Hence, the observed wage difference of only 10 % comes
from the fact that women have better endowments. Even if a part of this adjusted GPG at
the beginning of the career may come from selection (e.g. men select into better paying firms),
this result suggests that discrimination may be an issue in this occupation. Assuming that
this gap comes also from wage negotiations, where women tend to be less successful because of
traditional gender roles (Babcock and Leschever, 2003; Mazei et al., 2015), the discrimination
may not come through the employer but is rather the result of socialization (Karamessini and
Ioakimoglou, 2007).
1.7 Conclusion
The aim of this study is to analyze whether or not, occupational characteristics are able to
explain the variation in the GPG in Germany. Based on a two-step approach, I show that
the adjusted GPG varies substantially across occupations: The largest gap is observed in the
occupation of Actors, Dancers and Athletes (51 %), and in other occupations such as in Event
Organization, in contrast, women earn even 7 % more than men.
In the second step, I link the GPG to occupational characteristics such as the share of women
or the non-linearity index that gives the relative difference in hourly wages between persons
working more than 40 hours per week and those with less than 25 hours. The results reveal that
four occupational characteristics that are highly correlated with the GPG: The non-linearity in
earnings, the hierarchical composition, the tasks and the ownership of a firm. Hence, the results
do not only confirm previous findings from the U.S., where selected occupations with non-linear
earnings tend to have higher GPGs, but extends them to a more general level. Moreover, there is
evidence of a ”glass ceiling” as the GPG increases with the share of persons having supervisory
8The model was extended by age-occupation fixed effects and respective interactions with the female dummy.
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Sales occupation (without Specialization)
Business organization
Education and social work
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the
La¨nder, SES, 2014, own calculations.; Based on all employees between 25
and 55 years.
Figure 1.7: Adjusted wage gaps within age groups in selected occupations
power. In addition, the result supports the findings from the task-based literature, as it shows
higher GPGs in occupations with routine tasks. Both, the negative relationship between the
non-linearity in earnings and the GPG and higher wage differences in routine tasks, emphasize
the role of substitution: The more that employees can be substituted with other employees, the
lower is the GPG. Finally, collective agreements in public firms result in lower wage differences
wages between women and men.
However, the model explains only a quarter of the variance in the GPGs across occupations, thus
emphasizing that a major part of the GPGs across occupations remains unobserved. Further,
information such as actual work-experience in part- and full-time might be correlated with the
GPG but cannot be observed in the data. Therefore, the adjusted GPG and, thus, differences
between occupations may be overestimated.
Chapter 2
A question of gender? How promotions
affect earnings
2.1 Introduction
Indicated by a Gender Pay Gap of 21 %, wage differences between men and women in Germany
are the second largest within the EU (Boll and Lagemann, 2018). Among many other reasons,
women earn less than men because they work in lower occupational positions than men on
average. That is, the difference in the occupational position between men and women explain
nearly 5 percentage points of the German Gender Pay Gap, since men are more likely to work
in higher positions than women. However, parts of the unexplained Gender Pay Gap is also
related to the occupational position, i.e. after controlling for differences in endowments, men
still earn 2 percentage points more than their female colleagues within the same position (Finke
et al., 2017). The aim of this paper is to analyze whether or not different promotion effects on
earnings for men and women can explain the Gender Pay Gap within occupational positions.
Using administrative data from Germany, we are not only able to identify promotions but also
to link them with the entire employment biography. We contribute to the literature as being the
first who can differentiate between different levels of promotion. In doing so, we can investigate
whether the gender gap depends on the level of promotion. Moreover, we are – to the best of
our knowledge – the first to analyze gender differences in earnings growth due to a promotion
in Germany.
In the following, we refer to promotions as upward changes of the occupational position within
the same occupation and the same firm. The identification of promotion relies on the new
classification of occupation (KldB 2010) that is observable in our data since 2012, which – in
contrast to the prior classification scheme (KldB 1988) – contains additional information on the
occupational position. Following Matthes and Vicari (2017), we use a change in this variable
to identify promotions. We base this study on unique data from the Institute of Employment
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Research (IAB), which is a subsample of the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) that
encompasses every individual who has ever worked subject to social security. We restrict the
sample to full-time employees to make daily earnings more comparable. In total, we observe
more than 100,000 individuals, which allows us not only to estimate precise effects but also to
compare gender gaps across different subsamples, e.g. women with and without children.
We base our theoretical framework on the considerations of Booth et al. (2003). In this setting,
differences in earnings growth can occur for three reasons: a divergent number of job offers,
different preferences to stay in the firm or dissimilar productivity. Since the literature indicates
that promoted women receive fewer job offers on the one hand, and are more able than men
on the other, we formulate two contradicting hypotheses suggesting either a lower or a higher
earnings increase for women due to promotion. Moreover, we hypothesize that in particular
mothers have a lower earnings growth due to promotion than men because previous studies
show that women with children are less likely to change a firm for pecuniary reasons.
Next, we extend this model for different levels of promotions. Again, we argue that the size of
the gender gap in earnings growth depends on job offers, the preference to stay in the firm and
productivity. Using evidence from a study by Neumark et al. (1996) that suggests that women
receive fewer job offers in more prestigious jobs, we expect that the gender gap widens at higher
levels of promotions (Sticky Floor Hypothesis). However, we anticipate the contrary from the
Glass Ceiling Hypothesis. That is, since women are less likely to enter higher occupational
positions than men, we suggest that those women who achieve these positions, have a higher
level of productivity than their male colleagues. Therefore, we would conclude that the gender
gap does not increase with the level of promotion. Finally, we derive from the model that the
outside wage offer increases with the level of promotion and, therefore, the costs for a higher
preference for the firm increases. Since women, in particular mothers, are more likely to stay in
the current firm for family reasons (e.g. Webber, 2016), we expect that the gap in wage growth
between mothers and men increases with the level of promotion.
To test these hypotheses, we use a pooled OLS regression, where we add the controls stepwise
to the model. Thus, by including firm and occupation fixed effects, we can analyze to what
extent different selection processes can explain gender gaps.
The descriptive results show that the share of women decreases with the level of promotion, in
particular if we include part-time workers. While men and women are equally distributed in the
lowest level of promotion, the share of men in the highest position is 70 %. For full-time workers,
we observe similar results but with the highest share of women in the intermediate category.
In addition, we compare mothers to non-mothers and find that mothers are underrepresented
in our sample, in particular in the full-time sample. Moreover, we observe that the share of
mothers decreases with the level of promotion. That is, only 30 % of the full-time working
women who have been promoted to the highest occupational position have children.
Further, the data reveal that men’s wage level is higher than women’s. Moreover, we find
that men’s earnings increase is larger than women’s in the year before the promotion took
place, while women’s earnings growth exceeds men’s in the year of the promotion. Therefore,
the findings suggest that women’s earnings are more depending on promotions while men’s
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earnings increase even in the absence of a promotion.
In our main specification, i.e. when we exclude part-time workers, we find that women have
larger earnings growth than men. However, this gap decreases in size when we add occupations
to the model. After controlling for firm effects, the gender gap turns insignificant. Hence,
our results highlight the role of collective agreements within firms, which may prevent large
difference in earnings growth after promotions between employees. The results are similar if we
compare men to childless women.
We do not find that the gap increases with the level of promotion; instead, the results indicate
that women are less likely to be promoted to higher occupational positions. Thus, our result
indicate a ”glass ceiling” rather than a ”sticky floor.” Moreover, we observe that the effects are
less strong if we exclude mothers from the sample, which we interpret as the following: Only
few mothers work in full-time and get promoted to higher occupational positions but those
who do, represent a highly ambitious group of women. Hence, the results suggest that the
higher earnings growth of women, in particular of mothers, compared to men in the highest
occupational position may result from differences in productivity.
We further interpret the estimated gender gap as a lower bound, since we argue that we compare
men to a more positive selected group of women, i.e. men and women in this sample do not
have the same selection processes. First, we restrict the sample to persons who have been
promoted, which represents a positive selected group on the labor market for both genders. But
given that men are more likely to be promoted, in particular in higher occupational positions,
we argue that promoted women might be even more labor market attached (compared to all
women) than promoted men (compared to all men). Second, the average wage level in female-
dominated occupations is lower than in male-dominated occupations (e.g. Hausmann et al.,
2015). By controlling for occupations, we compare either a typical woman with an atypical,
less career orientated man, in a female-dominated occupation or a typical man with an atypical,
more ambitious woman in a male-dominated occupation. That is, comparing men and women
within the same occupation might underestimate the effect of gender. Third, we analyze gender
differences in earnings growth for persons working within the same firm. Card et al. (2016)
show that men are more likely to select into high-paying firms, which suggests that women who
work in high-paying firms might be a positive selected group of women, while men working in
low-paying firms might be a negative selected group of men. Thus, comparing men and women
working in the same firm might again underestimate the effect of gender. Lastly, we restrict the
sample to persons who stay in the firm after the promotion. Since men are more likely to change
firms for pecuniary reasons (Albrecht et al., 2018; Fitzenberger and Kunze, 2005; Loprest, 1992;
Manning, 2003), those men who stay in the firm might reflect a negatively selected group (out
of the promoted men).
With this study, we contribute to the small body of literature examining the relationship be-
tween gender gaps and promotions. The first theoretical approach stems from Lazaer and Rosen
(1990), who show that women have to be more able than men to be promoted. The authors
argue that women have a higher risk of leaving the labor market and, therefore, women have to
reach a higher level of skills to be promoted. However, once they have entered the (promoted)
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job, they do not face lower wages than men. Based on these theoretical considerations, Booth
et al. (2003) extend the model by the ”sticky floor” assumption. That is, men and women have
the same likelihood of being promoted but men face more outside offers than women, thus, have
a higher wage growth than women.
Besides these theoretical considerations, there exists empirical investigations that analyze whether
the probability to be promoted differs between genders and whether promotions lead to the same
effects on earnings for both men and women. While the literature agrees on the fact that men
are more likely to hold leadership positions (Blau and Kahn, 2017; Busch and Holst, 2009b),
there is mixed evidence on the relationship between gender and the probability to be promoted.
Some studies find that men are more likely to be promoted than women (Blau and DeVaro,
2007; Bronson and Thoursie, 2019; Cobb-Clark, 2001; Cobb-Clark and Dunlop, 1999; Lazaer
and Rosen, 1990)9, others do not find significant differences between men and women (Booth et
al., 2003; Lewis, 1986), whereas still others find higher probabilities for women to be promoted
(Gayle et al., 2012; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1989; Hersch and Viscusi, 1996).10
Previous studies have already examined the impact of promotion on earnings growth of men
and women for the U.S. (Blau and DeVaro, 2007; Cobb-Clark, 2001; Olson and Becker, 1983)
and the British labor markets (Booth et al., 2003). However, none of the studies has found
significant differences in wage growth between men and women. Addison et al. (2014) confirm
the result but show that the effects on earnings growth differ slightly between educational
groups and career stages.
Thus, by finding no gender differences in earnings growth due to promotions within firms we
confirm previous results. Moreover, we contribute to the literature by showing that this finding
comes mostly from selection. Thus, women who end up being promoted depict a highly positive
selected group of women in the labor market.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 2.3 deals with
the model, while section 2.4 covers the empirical strategy. Section 2.5 presents the results and
the last section concludes.
2.2 Data
We base the estimation on a unique administrative data set from the Institute of Employment
Research (IAB). This data set is a 75 % subsample of the total population who had a change in
their occupational position between 2012 and 2017 in the Integrated Employment Biographies
(IEB), i.e. the population of all individuals subject to social security. The IEB is adminis-
trative data based on notifications of the employer, and, therefore, encompasses high-quality
information on earnings and on the entire employment biography of all individuals subject to
social security. Since employers have to report the employment status for each employee on a
daily basis, the data are provided as spells. That is, each spell gives the beginning and the end
9These studies relate to promotions within the same firm. However, Neumark et al. (1996) shows that men
are to likely to be promoted when they apply to another firm.
10Addison et al. (2014) find that the differences of being promoted between men and women depends on the
level of education and the career stage.
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of the employment and further information such as earnings and occupation. As soon as one of
these information changes, e.g. an advancement in the occupational position, the current spell
ends and a new spell begins. Because the notification have to be transmitted at least once a
year, the maximal duration of a spell is 365 days (366 days in leap years).
A potential drawback of the data are that some occupational changes may not be recorded.
Thus, it is possible that persons have been promoted but the employer did not report this
change to the security records.11 Although we might not be able to identify every promotion,
we argue that every change that is observable in the data effectively has happened. We assume
that employers do not have an incentive to misreport a promotion if it has not really occurred.
In addition, we do not expect that the non-reporting of promotions is systematic with respect
to gender or earnings. Instead, we think that some employers are more accurate than others
(Fitzenberger et al., 2005).
Promotion
Due to a change in the classification of occupations, we are able to observe hierarchical mobility
within occupations. Therefore, we define the fifth digit in the classification of occupation
(KldB 2010) as occupational position. The data allow disentangling between four positions:
1) Unskilled work; 2) Skilled work; 3) Complex activities; and 4) Very difficult activities and
supervisory power.
We define a promotion as an upward change by one category in the occupational position
within the same occupation and establishment. We concentrate on promotions in the main
employment. Moreover, we restrict the sample to those persons who still work in the same
(promoted) occupational position in the spell after the promotion to reduce the impact of
potential misreporting. In case, a person had more than one promotion, he or she enters
multiple times in the estimation.12
Earnings and earnings growth
In an ideal world, we would like to estimate the effect of gender on hourly wage growth. However,
the data give only information on daily earnings13 and on whether the employee works in part-
or full-time.14 Consequently, differences in earnings could also come from divergent working
11There is evidence that not every change in the data is recorded. As an example Frodermann et al. (2013)
show that employers do not always adjust the working time. Hence, persons who started to work in part-time
are still coded as full-time workers.
12We use at maximum three promotions per person. However, we do not think that this affects our results
as 97 % of the individuals in our sample have only one promotion. In order to consider that persons may have
more than one promotion, we cluster standard errors on the personal level.
13Since, there is a limit for social security contributions, earnings above this threshold are censored. To
impute earnings above the censoring limit, we follow Reichelt (2015).
14As these records might be wrong, especially for part-time worker, we adjust working time as follows: First,
if the employee earns less than 90 % of the last spell and is coded as full-time employed, we classify her or him
as part-time worker, and vice versa. Second, if the full-time daily earnings are less than 40 euro, we change the
working time to part-time work. Third, due to the important change in the classification scheme, employers were
very likely to validate the records in 2012. Therefore, we assume that the information in 2012 is more correct
than the previously recorded. That is, if someone is listed as full-time worker in 2011 with the same earnings as
in 2012, when he or she is recorded as part-time worker, we adjust the information in 2011. We apply the same
approach for those who are (probably) wrongly coded as part-time worker. Lastly, we adjust the working time
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time, which we cannot observe. For this reason, in our main specification, we restrict our sample
to full-time employees.
The dependent variable in our model is earnings growth, which we define as the relative dif-
ference between the new and the old earnings. The new earnings refer to the spell where the
person works for the first time in the (promoted) occupational position; the old earnings to the
last spell before the promotion.
Motherhood
In the data, we do not directly observe if someone has children. Therefore, we use the approach
by Mu¨ller and Strauch (2017), which allows us to identify motherhood. This method exploits
the information on earnings replacement paid by the health insurance. During paid maternity
leave the health insurance pays previous earnings for twelve weeks – six weeks before and eight
weeks after the estimated date of birth. Based on this information, it is possible to identify
the (estimated) date of birth of children for women who have worked subject to social security
before giving birth. However, the number of children might be underestimated, as we cannot
identify births that took place during employment interruptions, unemployment spells or before
entering the labor force.
Moreover, this method can only be applied for women and not for men, since it relies on
maternity leave. Hence, we cannot make a statement about fatherhood. Since research shows
that parenthood affects mainly mother’s careers and not father’s (Kleven et al., 2019), we do
not think that ignoring fatherhood would affect our results.
Sample
We restrict our sample to persons who had an upward change in their occupational position
between 2012 and 2017 within the same firm and the same occupation. We exclude persons
who had promotions that last only for one spell15 and part-time employed persons before and
after the promotion.
The summary statistics of our sample given in Table 2.1 reveal that men have, on average,
higher earnings pre- and post-promotion. However, the promotion leads to a higher increase in
earnings for women than for men, both in relative and absolute terms.
Further, men tend to work in larger firms and have more tenure than women. On average,
women have less work experience than men, especially in full-time. In contrast, women tend
to have more labor market experience in part-time. Women are, on average, slightly higher
educated than men: While men are more likely to have vocational training without A-levels
and women are more likely to have vocational training with A-levels.
The comparison of the summary statistics of full-time sample and the one including part-time
workers (Table B.3 in the Appendix) reveals that the full-time sample, especially for women,
of mothers following Frodermann et al. (2013). In case a mother has given birth and, subsequently, interrupted
employment, we compare her earnings in the first spell of employment with her earnings ten months prior to
birth.
15Since the duration of a spell does not exceed a year, we do not think that the spell duration affects our
result.
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is positively selected. Thus, full-time workers have more (full-time) work experience, tenure,
and are slightly higher educated. Furthermore, the restriction of working full-time pre- and
post-promotion reduces the female sample by 75 % and the male by more than 40 %.
Total Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Main Variables
Earnings pre-promotion 107.08 46.81 93.90 40.45 112.66 48.19
Earnings post-promotion 113.80 47.84 101.66 42.46 118.95 49.05
Relative earnings growth 0.09 0.21 0.11 0.23 0.08 0.21
Absolute earnings growth 6.73 22.61 7.76 19.82 6.29 23.68
Level of promotion
Skilled work 0.37 0.48 0.29 0.46 0.35 0.48
Difficult activity 0.38 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.42 0.49
Very difficult activity & 0.25 0.43 0.19 0.40 0.23 0.42
Supervisory Power
Individual Characteristics
Age 37.17 9.99 36.52 10.16 37.45 9.91
Work experience (ft, months) 145.50 102.81 111.45 86.94 159.93 105.58
Work experience (pt, months) 14.52 31.26 26.94 47.68 9.26 18.31
Tenure (months) 86.01 90.78 71.07 77.41 92.34 95.18
Share of unemployment expe-
rience
0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07
Education
No A-level, No VT 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.23
No A-Level, VT 0.28 0.45 0.13 0.33 0.23 0.42
A-Level, No VT 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17
A-Level, VT 0.43 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.47 0.50
Polytechnical degree 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.14
University 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.40
Firm Characteristics
East vs. West Germany 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.40 0.21 0.41
Size of the Establishment 3494.96 8499.93 2289.76 6837.52 4005.93 9065.47
Observations 112,566 33,503 79,063
Source: IEB, 1976-2017, own calculations.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
2.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we sketch a theoretical model from which we will derive our hypotheses. We base
our model on the theoretical considerations of Booth et al. (2003) to investigate why women
and men may not have the same increase in earnings due to the promotion. Further, we extend
their model by introducing different levels of promotion and analyze in this theoretical setting
how the gender gap develops across different levels of promotions.
In this one-period model, we focus on wage processes around promotions, since a large strand
of literature has shown that promotions have an important effect on wage growth (e.g. Baker
et al., 1994a,b; Frederiksen et al., 2016; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). Further, Waldman
(1984) shows that promotions serve as a signal to other firms about the ability of the employee.
Given this signal, the other firms will make wage offers that may be higher than his or her
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current wage in firm A, the firm where the employee has worked before being promoted. In
the following, the current firm A decides whether or not it matches the outside offer, if not the
employee leaves firm A (e.g. Bernhardt and Scoones, 1993; Bognanno and Melero, 2015).
In this framewok, we make some crucial assumptions. First, we assume a fixed skill level S,
which is unaffected by the promotion (see Figure 2.1). In addition, we assume that the employer
can observe the productivity due to the promotion P , i.e. the sum of the skill level S and the
increase in the complexity of the task due to the promotion E, which is the same for every
promoted employee. We also assume that the firm A guarantees a (higher) wage wp due to the
promotion. In addition, we introduce ω which reflects both the individual-specific productivity
and the preference to stay or leave the firm. While a higher productivity or a preference to leave
the firm are indicated by a positive value of ω, ω will take negative value if the employee has
a high preference to stay in the firm or a low individual-specific productivity level. Moreover,







P = S + E
stays in firm i
stays if firm i matches outside offer
leaves firm i
−Ω Ω
Source: Booth et al. (2003)
Figure 2.1: Bargaining model
Thus, due to the promotion, the employer guarantees the wage wp, which is higher than the
previous wage, which is why we formulate our first hypothesis:
Wage Gain Hypothesis: Wages increase due to the promotion.
Moreover, we infer the following negotiation process: Before the employee starts working in the
promoted position, firm A learns whether the employee has outside offers. Since firm A knows
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the productivity of the employee due to the promotion, it will match outside offers as long as
the wage does not exceed the productivity of the employee. In this model, wage differences
arise for three reasons: a divergent number outside offers, other preferences to stay in the firm
or different productivity.
Hence, in this model potential wage differences between men and women may come from these
three sources. First, there is evidence that women receive fewer job offers than men. One
prominent example is the so called Orchestra Study. In their study, Goldin and Rouse (2000)
refer to the introduction of ”blind” auditions in orchestras in the U.S. The authors find that
these ”blind” auditions increased the probability that a woman reaches the next round by 50 %.
Moreover, the share of women has increased from 5 % in the 1970s to 25 % in the 2000s.16
Further, Baert et al. (2016) investigated the differences in job offers between men and women in
a randomized control trial. To this end, the authors sent applications, where they vary between
jobs, which imply a promotion and those who do not. They find that women receive 33 % fewer
invitations to job interviews if a job implies a promotion. This study suggests that women
receive fewer job offers because of their gender. Therefore, we conclude our next hypothesis:
Job Offer Hypothesis: Women’s increase in earnings after a promotion is lower than
men’s because they receive fewer job offers.
A further reason why men and women may not have the same wage growth due to a promotion
in this model are potential differences in their productivity. A number of studies has shown
that women have to be more able than men to be promoted (Blau and DeVaro, 2007; Bronson
and Thoursie, 2019; Cobb-Clark and Dunlop, 1999). Lazaer and Rosen (1990) argue in the
sense of statistical discrimination, i.e. employers prefer to promote men and to invest in their
careers’, since women have a higher risk to leave the labor market.17 Therefore, we argue that
promoted women have a higher productivity than men.
Productivity Hypothesis: Women’s increase in earnings after a promotion is higher than
men’s because they are more productive.
Finally, wage differences between women and men may occur because they differ in their pref-
erences to stay or to leave the firm. For Germany, Hirsch et al. (2010) find that men’s labor
supply to the firm is more elastic than women’s. In a recent study, Webber (2016) shows that
marital status and motherhood explain around 60 % of the difference in the labor supply elas-
ticity, since it affects women’s but not men’s elasticity. The author argues that women prefer
to work in a firm, which allows a good reconciliation of family and working life, over a high-
paying firm. From these findings, we conclude that women are less likely to leave the firm for
16However, previous research has established that the difference in the likelihood depends strongly on the
share of women within an occupation. The higher the share of women, the more likely is a woman compared to
a man to be invited for a next round (Booth and Leigh, 2010; Ku¨bler et al., 2018).
17Thomas (2016) provides evidence for statistical discrimination in the context of promotion. She shows
that the introduction of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 has not only increased women’s likelihood
to return to the labor market but also decreased their likelihood to be promoted. Thus, due to this reform
employer have less signals about the productivity of women, hence, the information asymmetry increases and,
therefore, employer are less likely to promote women.
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pecuniary reasons. Card et al. (2016), who find that women are more likely to work in lower
paying firms, support this result. Although Webber (2016) finds that the labor supply elasticity
for married childless women is slightly smaller than men’s, the effect of children on the labor
supply elasticity is much stronger. Thus, we conclude that women with children have a higher
preference to stay at firm A for non-pecuniary reasons.
Bargaining Hypothesis: Mothers’ increase in earnings after a promotion is lower than
men’s because they have a lower preference for a higher paying firm.
In the following, we will extend the model by making assumptions about different levels of
promotion. Therefore, we introduce a second promotion, which demands more skills and more
effort, i.e. S ≤ S′ and E ≤ E′. Accordingly wp ≤ w′p and P ≤ P ′. Further, we assume that ω
may change with the level of promotion. That is, having a high preference for a certain firm or
the size of individual-specific productivity depends on the level of promotion such that ω ≤ ω′.
Since the skill level increases with the level of promotion, we also expect better outside offers












P ′ = S′ + E′
Figure 2.2: Bargaining model for different promotions
Since wp ≤ w′p, we derive from the model that the wage gain due to the promotion increases
with the level of promotion. This hypothesis is supported by Caines et al. (2017), who find that
there is a positive relationship between the complexity of a task and wage growth. Therefore,
we formulate our next hypothesis:
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Increasing Wage Growth Hypothesis: The wage growth due to the promotion increases
with the level of promotion.
Again, gender differences in the number of outside offers, in preferences to stay in the firm
or in productivity can explain different wage growth in the model. We start by hypothesizing
that the higher the level of promotion the larger the number of outside offers of men compared
to women. We build this hypothesis on an audit study by Neumark et al. (1996). In this
study, male and female candidates applied for waiters and waitresses in different restaurants.
The authors find that the level of discrimination against women is substantially higher in high-
price restaurants than in low-price restaurants. These findings can be interpreted as decreasing
job offers for women (compared to men) across the level of occupational positions. Thus, we
formulate the following hypothesis:
Sticky Floor Hypothesis: Women’s increase in earnings after a promotion (compared to
men’s) decreases with the level of promotion because they receive fewer job offers the higher
the occupational position.
Next, the increase in earnings across different levels of promotion between men and women may
differ because they have not the same productivity. The share of women decreases with the
level of promotion (Holst and Wrohlich, 2019; Kohaut and Mo¨ller, 2019; OECD, 2016)18 and
productivity is equally distributed across gender, especially in the absence of children (Gallen,
2018). Since only the most productive individuals of each gender end up to be promoted
(Landers et al., 1996), the gap in productivity (in favor of women) increases with the level of
promotion.19 Once they have reached this position, however, they do not face lower increases
in earnings (Lazaer and Rosen, 1990).
Glass Ceiling Hypothesis: Women’s earnings growth after a promotion increases (rela-
tively to men’s) with the level of promotion because the gap in productivity between women
and men increases.
Lastly, we want to discuss why the level of promotion affects the preference to work in a certain
firm of women and men differently. Therefore, we refer to the well-established fact that women,
in particular if they have children, are more likely to change the firm for non-pecuniary reasons
(such as better reconciliation of family and working life), while men are more likely to have
turnovers for monetary reasons (e.g. Fuller, 2008; Manning, 2003; Webber, 2016). Moreover,
one assumption of the model is that the higher the level of promotion the higher the outside
wage offers. Given that mothers feel more responsible for care work than men (Craig and
Mullan, 2011; Samtleben, 2019), they have a higher preference to stay in firm A, which is more
18Baxter and Wright (2000) argue that the share of women in top position can be very small although
the likelihood of women to be promoted (compared to men) does not decrease. They argue that if women’s
probability to be promoted is smaller than men’s but constant across different hierarchy levels, the share of
women within each occupational position decreases by construction.
19Arulampalam et al. (2007) differ between a Gender Pay Gap that widens at the top of the distribution
(”glass ceiling”) and at the bottom of the distribution (”sticky floor”).
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costly in higher occupational levels. In contrast, a low preference for the firm leads to higher
bargaining power when it comes to negotiations. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Decreasing Bargaining Hypothesis: Mothers’ increase in earnings after a promotion (com-
pared to men) decreases with the level of promotion because costs for a high preference for the
current firm increase with the level of promotion.
2.4 Empirical approach
In the following, we want to test these hypotheses by estimating the effect of gender on earnings
growth due to promotion. However, this is not trivial, since being promoted might also depend
on previous decisions, e.g. the hierarchy structure of the occupation and the firm. By controlling
for occupation and firm fixed effects, we want to analyze potential sources of selection.
In the following, we define earnings growth as ∆y = (yt − yt−1)/yt−1, where yt is the daily
earnings in the first spell after being promoted and yt−1 reflects the daily earnings in the last
spell before the promotion. Gender differences in the wage growth are captured by α. In
addition, we differentiate between specific levels of promotion. We assume that unobserved
characteristics, such as ambition, might be correlated with the occupational position. That is,
persons that are more ambitious might work in a higher occupational position. Moreover, we
include some individual-specific observables, such as work experience (in full-time and part-
time), tenure, unemployment experience, and schooling. In addition, the model contains firm
specific controls (e.g. firm size, region). These control variables are summed up in Xi.
∆yi = β0 + α femalei + γ
L∑
l=1
occ. positionl + µXi + i (2.1)
To test the sticky floor, glass ceiling and the decreasing bargaining power hypotheses, we include
the interaction of the level of promotion and gender. Thus, in equation 2.2, α gives the overall
gender gap in earnings growth for persons working within the same level of promotion and ξ
reflects differences in the gender gap between the occupational positions.
∆yi = β0 + α femalei + γ
L∑
l=1
occ. positionl + ξ
L∑
l=1
occ. positionl × femalei + µXi + i (2.2)
In addition, we control on a further source of selection: occupation.20 We expect that persons
who select into different occupations may differ in their unobservables. As an example, persons
working as teachers may differ in their labor market attachment or fertility decisions from
20We argue that neither occupation nor firm fixed effects are bad controls (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Bad
controls would be an issue if occupational or firm choices also affect the gender gap, i.e. the share of women
within occupations or firms determine the gender gap. It is shown that women are less likely to select into
high-paying occupations and firms but there is no evidence that the gender gap correlates with the share of
women see chapter 1.
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persons working as managers (Adda et al., 2017; Polachek, 1981). In addition, male-dominated
occupations tend to be more hierarchical, which increases the likelihood of promotions in these
occupations (Busch and Holst, 2009a). Moreover, we expect that occupations differ in their
wage growth. Therefore, we include occupation fixed effects to reduce the heterogeneity in the
model, since we assume that persons working within the same occupation may be more similar
in their unobservables compared to persons working in other occupations. Including occupation
fixed effects also allows us to analyze the role of occupations on the gender gap. In equation
2.3, α indicates the gender gap in earnings growth within occupation j after being promoted
in occupational position l.
∆yi = β0 + α femalei + γ
L∑
l=1
occ. positionl + ξ
L∑
l=1






In addition, we expect that the selection within firms is also correlated with success on the
labor market. More specifically, we assume that differences in earnings, in particular between
men and women, come from selection into firms with higher or lower earnings (Card et al.,
2016). We also suppose that persons who select into the same firm f are more similar in their
unobservables, such as ambition or attitudes towards the future career. We also expect that
firms differ in their wage growth because of different collective agreements. Therefore, we add
firm fixed effects to our model. Hence, in this case α gives the gender gap in earnings growth
within occupation j and firm f after being promoted in the occupational position l.
∆yi = β0 + α femalei + γ
L∑
l=1
occ. positionl + ξ
L∑
l=1









To test differences in bargaining power between women with and without children, we repeat
the estimation for childless women compared to men. In the final model, given in equation (2.4),
α gives the difference between men and women who made similar decisions in their life but we
do not know the reasons for these decisions. Thus, even though both groups seem to be very
similar in their observables, they might differ in their unobservables. For the interpretation of
our results, we have, therefore, to keep in mind that we cannot disentangle whether our findings
come from differences in productivity or from discrimination.
2.5 Results
The aim of this study is to investigate whether promotions have the same effects on earnings
for women and men. The findings, however, also depend on the selection process into those
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promotions. Therefore, the first part of this section will descriptively examine whether men
and women as well as childless women and mothers are equally distributed within each level
of promotion and how men’s and women’s earnings increase before and after being promoted.
The second part deals with the effects on earnings growth.
2.5.1 Descriptive results
In our setting, we focus on full-time employment. However, to describe how promotions are dis-
tributed on the labor market, we will first discuss the share of women within each occupational
position for the entire labor market, i.e. including part-time workers. These shares are given in
the first row of Table 2.2. It is apparent from the table that men and women are nearly equally
distributed in our sample (48 % of the sample is female) but the share of women varies across
the different levels of promotions. While slightly more women get promoted to ”skilled work”
(52 %), men are somewhat over-represented in ”difficult activity” (share of women: 46 %). In
the highest level ”very difficult activity & supervisory power,” the share of women is consider-
ably smaller: only 29 % of persons who have been promoted to this occupational position are
female. Thus, these descriptive findings suggest that men are more likely to get promoted to
higher positions.
However, these descriptives may be biased by comparing two different groups: Full-time and
part-time workers. Thus, the second row of the table gives the share of women for full-time
employed workers. While interpreting the shares, note that the share of women in the total
sample is smaller. Only 27 % of the persons who got promoted in full-time is female. Giving the
total shares, the distribution in the lower two categories reverses. In the full-time sample, women
are slightly under-represented in ”skilled work” and in ”very difficult activity & supervisory
power,” where the share of women is 25 %. In contrast, women are over-represented in the level
of ”difficult activity,” indicated by a share of women of 37 %.
In the third and fourth row of the table, we compare mothers to childless women. It is ap-
parent from the table that mothers are underrepresented in the sample compared to the total
population, where around 80 % of women have children (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017a). If
we include part-time workers, almost half of the promoted women have children. Comparing
the different levels of promotions, however, indicates that the share of mothers decreases with
the level of promotion. Thus, the higher the occupational position the lower the probability of
women with children (compared to childless women) to be promoted.
Restricting the sample to full-time employees decreases the share of mothers to 33 %. Again, we
see that the higher the promoted position the lower the share of mothers. However, the differ-
ences between mothers and non-mothers is less pronounced than in the total sample (including
part-time workers). The results indicate first that mothers are less likely to be promoted than
women without children. Further, the results suggest that mothers are also less likely to be
promoted to higher positions.
Besides the differences in probability to be promoted between men and women, it is worthwhile
to look at differences in earnings growth between men and women before and after the promo-
tion. Therefore, the left panel of Figure 2.3 plots how the earnings growth of men and women
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Share of women in % Share of mothers in %
Level All Full-time All Full-time
Skilled work 52.0 25.2 49.4 34.9
Difficult activity 45.6 36.5 44.8 32.5
Very difficult activity &
Supervisory Power
29.4 24.6 36.4 29.8
Total 47.6 27.3 47.3 32.7
Source: IEB 1976-2017; own calculations. Share of mothers gives the share of women with
children in relation to all women.
Table 2.2: Share of women within occupational positions including and excluding part-time worker
have evolved during a period of two years before and after the promotion. Two years before
the promotion occurs, women’s and men’s relative wage growth are quite similar. However, one
year before the promotion takes place, men’s earnings growth is higher than the year before,
while women’s earnings growth is smaller in this year. In contrast, in the year of the promotion,
women’s earnings growth exceeds men’s. In the years after the promotion, however, there are
no observable differences in the average wage growth between men and women. These descrip-
tive results suggest that promotions have a higher impact on women’s earnings than on men’s,
since men’s earnings increased strongly even before the promotion took place. Moreover, the
decreasing earnings growth over time supports previous studies that find that the wage growth
decreases with experience (e.g Lagakos et al., 2018; Mincer, 1974).
The right panel of the figure shows how this relative earnings growth translates into daily
earnings. While women’s (90 euro) and men’s earnings (99 euro) are relatively equal two years
before the promotion, men’s earnings increase by 14 euro in the second year and women’s only
by 4 euro. Thus, in the year before the promotion takes place the gender gap in absolute terms
is 19 euro. Since women’s increase in earnings after the promotion is higher, than men’s, the gap
in daily earnings decreases to 17 euro. In the years after the promotion, men and women have
a similar relative earnings growth but since men’s earnings level is higher, the gap rises again
to 19 euro in both years. Thus, we can conclude from these descriptive results that women’s
earnings are on average lower than men’s. The promotion decreases the gender gap in absolute
earnings in the year of the promotion. However, the gender gap increases again in the years
after the promotion.
2.5.2 General gender gap in earnings growth
After observing differences in the likelihood to be promoted, the question arises whether this
promotion has the same effect on earnings for men and for women. To answer this question,
we add sequentially variables to the model.
In our main specification, we analyze the differences in earnings effects for men and women
for full-time workers (see Table 2.3).21 In the first row, we only include gender in the model
and observe a positive effect. Thus, women’s increase in earnings due to the promotion is 3
21The whole regressions of row (VIII) of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 is given in Table B.4 in the Appendix.
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Source: IEB 1976-2017; own calculations.
Figure 2.3: Earnings growth and earnings before and after promotion
percentage points higher than men’s. In the second row, we include the level of the promotion
to the model. The results suggest that the differences in earnings growth between men and
women is significantly lower in promotions into occupational positions with difficult activities.
In contrast, women’s earnings growth compared to men’s in the level ”very difficult activity &
supervisory power” is even larger than in the reference group ”skilled work.”
While adding previous earnings growth does not affect the female coefficient, the gender gap
decreases when we add individual controls to the model. Interestingly, controlling for individual
characteristics decreases the female coefficient in ”very difficult activity & supervisory power,”
i.e. women within the same occupational positions are more skilled than their male colleagues.
Next, we add occupations to the model, which has a considerable effect on the results, since it
reduces the gender gap substantially. This result might be driven by the full-time restriction,
which represents a positively selected group of women. Full-time working women might be more
labor market attached and, therefore, might be less likely to select into occupations that offer a
better reconciliation of family and working life but lower wages (Adda et al., 2017). The results
for part- and full-time workers confirm this assumption (see Table B.1 in the Appendix): We
find that the positive female effect decreases when adding occupations to the model. Further,
the negative female coefficient interacted with the occupational position ”difficult activity”
decreases slightly after including occupations in the model.
In row (VII), we further add firm fixed effects, which leads to an increase of the R2 from 7 to
54 percent, i.e. nearly 50 percent of the variance in earnings growth can be explained by intra-
firm differences in earnings growth. From this, we conclude that differences in earnings growth
due to promotion mostly depend on the sorting in firms with high or low earnings growth.
Further, the gender gap is no longer significant. That is, once men and women have selected
into the same occupation and the same firm, there are no differences in earnings growth e.g.
due to collective agreements. Surprisingly, the interaction of the occupational position ”difficult
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activity” and female is still negatively significant. Thus, women’s earnings increasing due to
a promotion into ”difficult activity” compared to men is smaller than the earnings growth of
women compared to men, who got promoted to ”skilled work”, even if they work in the same
occupation and the same firm. Controlling on the year of promotion, does slightly change
the results, in particular the interaction of the occupational position ”difficult activity” and
female is no longer significant. Thus, this result suggests that since the change in size of the
coefficient is only marginal, the difference in the gender gap in difficult activities within firms
and occupations is not very robust. Further, we estimate the effects of promotions on the
absolute increase in earnings and find very similar results (see Table B.2 in the Appendix).
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Female 0.025*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.009** 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Level of promotion (ref: Skilled work)
Difficult activity 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.025*** -0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Very difficult activity & 0.006** 0.006** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.000 -0.000
Supervisory Power (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Female*Level of promotion (ref: Skilled work)
Difficult activity -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.022*** -0.012* -0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Very difficult activity & 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.011* 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.009
Supervisory Power (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.186*** 0.191*** 0.185*** 0.022 0.164**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.044) (0.052)
N 84,308 84,308 84,308 84,308 84,308 84,308 84,308 84,308
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.54 0.55
Earnings growth t−1 X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X
Firm specific controls X X X X
Occupation fixed effects X X X
Firm fixed effects X X
Year fixed effects X
Source: IEB 1976-2017; own calculations. DV: Relative Earnings growth = (earningsafter − earningsbefore)/earningsbefore; Occu-
pations: 3-digit level (KldB2010); Controls: Experience in part- and full-time (single and quadratic), Education (w/o A-levels and voc.
training; Voc. Training w/o A-Levels; A-levels, w/o voc. training; A-levels + voc. training; University of appl. science; University),
Month of tenure, Age, East/West Germany, Firm size. Sample: Persons who were promoted between 2012 and 2017 within the same
occupation and the same firm before and after being promoted and who have worked in full-time before and after the promotion.
Women without children and all men. Significance levels:* p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Standard errors are clustered on the
individual level.
Table 2.3: Effect of promotion on (relative) earnings growth, for full-time sample
From the Wage Gain Hypothesis we expect that earnings increase due to promotion. The
average effect of promotions on earnings is indicated by the constant. As an example, we can
see from the constant in row (I) that men’s earnings increase by 7 % after a promotion. Since
the female coefficient is significantly positive, women’s wage growth after promotions is even
larger (10 %). Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis of increasing earnings.
Further, we formulated two contradicting hypotheses, which suggest higher increases in earnings
for men (Job Offer Hypothesis) or for women (Productivity Hypothesis). Indicated by a positive
female coefficient in the models without firm fixed effects, the results suggest that women have a
higher wage growth due to promotion than men. This confirms the descriptive findings depicted
in Figure 2.3. Moreover, the gender differences in the probability to be promoted indicate that
women have to be more able than men to be promoted, which is in line with our Productivity
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Hypothesis. However, once we control for firm fixed effects, gender differences are no longer
significant. One potential explanation for this finding is that collective agreements within firms
do not allow differences in wage growth.
We argue that our result reflects the lower bound, since we compare full-time working women
and men within the same occupation and the same firm, who did not change their employer
after the promotion. The main reason for this assumption is that men and women in our
setting differ substantially in the selection process. First, we exclude part-time workers from
our model in our main specification to make earnings more comparable. Since this restriction
affects women considerably more than men and Gallego Granados (2019) shows that women
working full-time represent a positively selected group, we argue that full-time working women
are more positively selected (compared to all women) than the full-time working men (compared
to all men). Comparing the summary statistics of the main specification (Table 2.1) to the one
including part-time workers (Table B.3 in the appendix) confirms this assumption since the full-
time sample is more experienced and higher educated. The differences between the full-time
sample and the sample including part-time workers are more pronounced than for women, e.g.
the share of individuals with university degree in the full-time sample is 22 % for women and
19 % for men and the sample with part-time workers 13 % for women and 14 % for men. Once
we include part-time workers in the model, women’s earnings growth due to the promotion is
lower than men’s (see Table B.1 in the Appendix). However, these results should be interpreted
with caution, since a large increase in earnings in the model with part-time workers may also
result from a change from part-time before the promotion to full-time after the promotion.
Moreover, we compare men and women who work in the same occupation, i.e. we compare
a typical man with an atypical woman, or vice versa. Assuming that female-dominated occu-
pations compensate lower wages with a better reconciliation of family and working life (Adda
et al., 2017; Polachek, 1981)22, we conclude that women who select into male-dominated are
more labor market attached. In contrast, men who select into female-dominated occupations
might be less career orientated. Thus, once we look at gender gaps within an occupation, we
might compare a more positively selected group of women (compared to all women) to a less
positively selected group of men (compared to all men).
In addition, we compare men’s and women’s earnings growth within the same firm. For Portu-
gal, Card et al. (2016) show that men are more likely to select into higher paying firms. Thus,
women who also work in the same (higher paying) firm might be more labor market attached
than the average working woman. In contrast, men who sort into lower paying firms might
reflect a negative selected group of men. Similar to occupations, estimating earnings effects
within firms implies that we compare more labor market attached women (compared to all
women) to less labor market attached men (compared to all men). That is, we argue again that
we either compare a more career orientated woman to a typical man in a high-paying firm or a
less labor market attached man to a typical woman in a low-paying firm.
Finally, we focus on persons who work in the same firm before and after being promoted. Pre-
22This argument, however, is highly discussed in the literature (e.g. Budig and England, 2001; Glauber, 2011,
2012; Jacobs, 1990).
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vious research shows that women and men differ in their reasons to change the firm. Thus, men
are more likely to change the firm for pecuniary reasons (e.g. Albrecht et al., 2018; Fitzenberger
and Kunze, 2005; Loprest, 1992; Manning, 2003). Therefore, we conclude that those men, who
stay in the firm might reflect a negatively selected group.
From these different selection processes, we argue that our estimated effects reflect a lower
bound. Thus, the effect may be underestimated because we compare an average labor market
attached group of men to a strongly positively selected group of women.
Note that we cannot observe productivity in our model, which means that we are not able to
identify whether gaps in promotion and in earnings growth come from differences in productivity
or discrimination.23 Moreover, we argue that men and women may differ in their selection but
we do not control on unobservable differences. A way to control for this endogeneity would
be to estimate a fixed effects model. Further, it is possible to identify the causal effect of
promotion on earnings and its difference between men and women in an event study setting.
In this framework, we would be able to analyze how women’s and men’s earnings develop pre-
and post-promotion. However, using fixed effects we cannot investigate the role of sorting into
firms or occupations.
Lastly, we want to mention that higher earnings growth for women (in the specifications without
firm fixed effects) may be the result of general gender differences in the earnings level and the
role of promotions on wage growth over time. Thus, as depicted in Figure 2.3 promotions have
a higher impact on female earnings growth than on men’s, since men have high earnings growth
even before the promotion took place, which could also be analyzed in an event study setting.
2.5.3 The role of motherhood on the gender gap in earnings growth
Further, we hypothesize that mothers’ earnings increase less due to promotions because they
are less likely to change the firm for monetary reasons, i.e. may have a higher preference for
the firm. To test whether effects differ between women with and without children, we restrict
our female sample to childless women, which we compare to all men.
The results presented in Table 2.4 are very similar to our main specification. However, the
female coefficients increases slightly when we exclude mothers from the sample. According to
our model, mothers might, therefore, have a higher preference for the current firm. Another
explanation may be that mothers may be less productive than women without children because
having children may reduce their energy or motivation (Ejrnæs and Kunze, 2013).
Again, we argue that this result may be a lower bound because women with children, who
work in full-time and who get promoted, may reflect a highly labor market attached group
of mothers. The relatively small share of mothers, particular in the sample (see Table 2.2),
confirms this assumption.
23In our model we argue that differences come from job offers or productivity, however, it might be possible
that women receive more job offers than men but are less successful in negotiations (e.g. Babcock and Leschever,
2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).
64 2. A question of gender? How promotions affect earnings
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Female 0.032*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.014*** 0.006 0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Level of promotion (ref: Skilled work)
Difficult activity 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Very difficult activity & 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.002 0.002
Supervisory Power (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Female*Level of promotion (ref: Skilled work)
Difficult activity -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.023*** -0.009 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Very difficult activity & 0.019** 0.019** 0.008 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.000
Supervisory Power (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.188*** 0.194*** 0.187*** 0.022 0.161**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.044) (0.053)
N 76,311 76,311 76,311 76,311 76,311 76,311 76,311 76,311
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.55 0.55
Earnings growth t−1 X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X
Firm specific controls X X X X
Occupation fixed effects X X X
Firm fixed effects X X
Year fixed effects X
Source: IEB 1976-2017; own calculations. DV: Relative Earnings growth = (earningsafter − earningsbefore)/earningsbefore; Occu-
pations: 3-digit level (KldB2010); Controls: Experience in part- and full-time (single and quadratic), Education (w/o A-levels and voc.
training; Voc. Training w/o A-Levels; A-levels, w/o voc. training; A-levels + voc. training; University of appl. science; University),
Month of tenure, Age, East/West Germany, Firm size. Sample: Persons who were promoted between 2012 and 2017 within the same
occupation and the same firm before and after being promoted and who have worked in full-time before and after the promotion.
Women without children and all men. Significance levels:* p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Standard errors are clustered on the
individual level.
Table 2.4: Effect of promotion on (relative) earnings growth, for full-time sample, all men and childless
women
2.5.4 Glass ceiling vs. Sticky Floor
Before testing whether the gender gap changes across the levels of promotions, we will first
examine whether the earnings growth increases with the level of promotion. Therefore, we refer
to the coefficients for the different levels of promotions. Since in row (II) to (VI) the coefficients
for both ”difficult activity” and ”very difficult activity & Supervisory Power” are positive and
significant, we can infer that earnings growth after being promoted to ”skilled work” is the
lowest. However, before adding occupation fixed effects to the model, the wage gain of being
promoted to ”very difficult activity & Supervisory Power” is smaller than after promotions to
”difficult activity”. Once we add occupations to the model, we observe that individuals who are
promoted to highest occupational position have the largest increase in earnings. Thus, we can
confirm the hypothesis if we compare individuals within the same occupation. When we add
firm fixed effects to the model, however, differences between the levels of promotions disappear,
which may be the result of collective agreements within firms. Thus, we cannot find differences
in (relative) earnings growth between the levels of promotion within firms.24
From our theoretical model, we derived two counteracting hypotheses: The Sticky Floor Hy-
pothesis and the Glass Ceiling Hypothesis. The Sticky Floor Hypothesis, argues that the higher
women get promoted, the fewer their number of job offers. However, in our model we do not find
24In absolute terms, however, the earnings growth increases with the level of promotion (see Table B.2 in the
Appendix).
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any support for this hypothesis, since the largest gender gap appears in occupational positions
with ”difficult activity”. Women’s earnings compared to men is even the largest in positions
with ”very difficult activity & supervisory power”.
From the descriptive results, however, it is apparent that women are less likely to be promoted to
the highest occupational position. Moreover, the findings suggest that in occupational positions,
where the share of women is relatively high (”difficult activity”), men’s earnings growth is
larger than women’s. In contrast, in those positions, where the share of women is relatively low
(”skilled work” and ”very difficult activity & supervisory power”), women’s earnings growth
is larger than men’s. Therefore, these results are in favor of the Glass Ceiling Hypothesis.
However, once we add firm and year fixed effects to the model, these effects are no longer
statistically significant, which again supports the role of collective agreements.
Note that the data do not differ between ”very difficult activity” and ”supervisory power,”
which differ substantially in the share of women and also the gender gap in earnings (see
chapter 1). Since previous research shows that the gender gap widens, especially at the top
(Arulampalam et al., 2007; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Collischon, Forthcoming), it is probable that
we would observe a gender gap in the occupational position ”supervisory power.” As women
are considerably less likely to enter these positions (e.g. Holst and Friedrich, 2017), the gender
gap in positions with ”supervisory power” might be overlaid by the fact that women’s earnings
growth is higher than men’s in positions with a ”very difficult activity”.
2.5.5 The role of motherhood on the gender gap in earnings growth
across the levels of promotions
Finally, we want to test whether the ”motherhood penalty” increases with the level of promo-
tion. Therefore, we compare the interactions between the female coefficient and the level of
promotion for the sample including (Table 2.3) and excluding (Table 2.4) mothers. Interest-
ingly, after adding individual controls to the model, the gender gap for ”very difficult activity
& supervisory power” is no longer significant in the specification without mothers. This find-
ing indicates that the large earnings growth for women in the highest occupational position is
driven by mothers and, therefore, highlights the role of selection: Those few mothers, who work
in full-time and are promoted into the highest occupational position (7 % out of our female
sample), represent a highly labor market attached group, i.e. these women may be more pro-
ductive than their male counterparts and will, therefore, have higher earnings growth. Thus,
we cannot confirm the Decreasing Bargaining Hypothesis.
2.6 Conclusion
The Gender Pay Gap is a well-established fact that has different reasons, including part-time
work, firm selection, occupations and occupational positions. With this paper, we contribute
to the literature by providing evidence whether promotions affect women’s and men’s earnings
differently. To this end, we use administrative data from Germany, which offers not only
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information on promotions but also on the entire employment biography. After adding firm
and occupation fixed effects to the model, we do not find gender differences in earnings growth.
Thus, our results confirm previous studies for the U.S. and the UK that also find no gender
differences (Blau and DeVaro, 2007; Booth et al., 2003).
We argue that this result is a lower bound, since selection processes within full-time, promotions,
firms and occupations differ substantially between women and men. Therefore, we compare a
highly positively selected group of women to an average selected group of men.
Further, our results provide evidence for a ”glass ceiling”. That is, women are less likely to
be promoted to the highest occupational position. However, we do not observe that women’s
earnings growth (compared to men’s) is lower in the highest occupational position.
These results suggest that promoted women are not only more labor market attached than the
average women in the labor market but also more ambitious than promoted men. However,
with this model we are not able to control for individual specific effects. Thus, using a fixed
effects model, or more specifically an event study framework, we could identify the causal
effect of promotion. Arguing that – besides of gender, childless women do not differ in their
unobservables from men – this framework also allows for estimating the causal effect of gender
on earnings due to promotion.
Chapter 3
Long-term Effects of the German
Parental Leave Reform on Mothers’
Earnings
3.1 Introduction
Paid parental leave as it is common in many industrialized countries has been shown to be
associated with higher women’s employment rates on the one hand, but lower relative wages
at extended durations of paid leave on the other hand (e.g. Ruhm, 1998). A synthesis from
many empirical studies from various countries and institutional settings shows that there seems
to be a non-monotonic relationship between the length of the leave and mothers’ labor market
outcomes (e.g. Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017). Besides promoting work-family life balance,
family policy often defines additional goals such as child well-being and financial security for
families that might conflict with the goal of strengthening the labor market attachment and,
thereby, the economic independence of mothers. Against this background, many countries are
currently discussing the optimal design of parental leave policies.
Germany implemented a parental leave reform in 2007 that changed the old parental leave
benefit scheme in three important ways. First, it replaced a means-tested benefit targeted
at lower-income families by an earnings related transfer that is paid to all mothers. Second,
while the duration of job-protection has not been changed, the maximum duration of paid leave
was cut from 24 to 12 months. Depending on household income and individual prior-to-birth
earnings, this changed work incentives for mothers in the first and second year after giving
birth. Incentives to take a leave for one year have strongly increased for mothers with high
prior-to-birth earnings. For mothers with low prior-to-birth earnings and low household income,
incentives to take up employment in the second year after giving birth have increased. Third,
the new parental leave scheme had a ”daddy quota” of two months. This means that two out
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of 14 months are earmarked individually to each parent. If one parent does not take parental
leave, the maximum duration of paid parental leave for the family is twelve months.
Several empirical evaluation studies have shown that this reform had the expected short-run
labor supply effects for mothers: High-income mothers’ labor supply decreased in the first year
after giving birth, i.e. their average leave duration increased. Low-income mothers, in contrast,
increased labor supply in the second year after giving birth (see. e.g. Bergemann and Riphahn,
2011, 2015; Geyer et al., 2015; Kluve and Schmitz, 2018; Kluve and Tamm, 2013; Welteke and
Wrohlich, 2019).
However, much less is known on the medium- and long-run effects of the parental leave reform. A
recent study by Kluve and Schmitz (2018) has shown that the parental leave reform had several
positive effects, in particular for high-income mothers, in the medium-run. The authors find
that after the reform, mothers have a higher probability to return to their previous employer,
which in turn leads to higher job quality in the medium run.
Evaluation studies that analyzed previous reforms of maternity leave in (West) Germany from
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s has shown that extensions of paid leave and the job-protected leave
have increased the employment interruptions of mothers (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014). These
longer employment interruptions had – with one exception – no negative effects on mothers’
earnings in the medium term (i.e. up to six years after giving birth).
In this paper, we broaden the focus from the short and medium-term perspective to long-
term outcomes and investigate the effects of changes in the duration of mothers’ employment
interruptions on their earnings up to nine years after giving birth to a child. To this end, we
use data from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) that contain information on the
total population of individuals in Germany who have an employment contract subject to social
security contributions. For the identification of the causal effect of the parental leave reform
of 2007 on mothers’ wages we follow previous literature on short-term effects of parental leave
in Germany and exploit the quasi-experiment that was set by the introduction of the parental
leave benefit in 2007. In particular, we compare mothers whose first child born was in the last
quarter of 2006 (control group) to mothers whose first child was born in the first quarter of
2007 (treatment group). In order to rule out seasonal differences, we add first-time mothers
who gave birth to a child in the last quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006 and employ
a difference-in-difference analysis.
Our results confirm previous findings and show that the parental leave reform has increased
employment interruptions for high-income mothers by almost 3 months on average. However,
these longer employment interruptions did not lead to lower earnings in the long run. On the
contrary, we confirm findings by Kluve and Schmitz (2018) who find that high-income mothers
benefited from the reform. We show that two to nine years after giving birth, mothers with
high prior-to-birth earnings have higher earnings than mothers in the control group. Only eight
years after giving birth, however, the positive effect is not statistically significant. Therefore, we
conclude that the strong positive effects of the parental leave reform on labor market outcomes
of mothers in the medium run diminish in the long run. Moreover, for low-income mothers, we
do not find any positive effects of the parental leave reform on earnings in the medium nor in
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the long run.
In our empirical analysis, we are able to rule out that the positive effects are caused by a change
in working hours, employer stability, socio-demographic characteristics of working mothers or
changed fertility patterns. One potential mechanism that increases mothers’ earnings in the
first couple of years after giving birth could be the increased share of fathers getting involved
in childcare.
From a policy perspective, our results show that granting a more generous benefit in the first
year in order to provide a financial safeguard for families with young children has increased the
duration of employment interruptions for certain groups of mothers without harming their long-
term career perspectives. In contrast, mothers with high prior-to-birth earnings even experience
positive effects on their wages. Thus, the suspected trade-off between providing a safeguard for
families with a new-born child and strengthening mothers’ labor market attachment and their
long-term economic independence does not seem to be empirically relevant in the context of the
German parental leave reform of 2007. In fact, there is suggestive evidence that this trade-off
has been mitigated by simultaneously incentivizing the use of parental leave by fathers, thereby
facilitating the re-entry into the labor market for mothers after their family-related employment
interruptions.
However, our results also reveal that only mothers with medium or high incomes benefited
from this parental leave reform. Low-income mothers potentially not only lost income due to
the cut of the maximum duration period. Moreover, they did not gain higher earnings in the
short, medium or long run. Also, fathers from low-income families had a lower probability to
take parental leave. If family policy aims at facilitating the work-life balance also of mothers
with lower earnings potential, the parental leave scheme should be reformed for example by
providing higher earnings replacement rates for parents with low income.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional setting and
summarize the related literature. Section 3.3 presents the empirical approach, while section 3.4
provides information on the data. We present the results of our empirical analysis in section
3.5 and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background and Previous Literature
In Germany, parental leave legislation is, in particular in comparison to the United States, rather
generous with respect to both, job protection and monetary benefits. First, there is maternity
leave, which assures employed women a leave of six weeks before and eight weeks after giving
childbirth financial benefits that replace their total net prior-to-birth earnings. After this, each
parent can take parental leave from his or her job and is granted employment protection for
a maximum of three years. However, not all of this maximum parental leave period is or has
been paid: Up until the end of 2006, families with a new born child could draw a cash benefit
amounting to 300 euro per month for a maximum period of 24 months (”Erziehungsgeld”).
This benefit was means-tested at the household level and income thresholds were set to target
the median of household income of families with young children. Above this income threshold,
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families did not get any financial benefit after the maternity leave period expired.
In 2007, Germany implemented a major parental leave reform that had three goals. First, it was
meant to increase financial stability for families with young children and providing a financial
safeguard during the first year of a child’s life. Second, an explicit aim stated in the law
was to increase economic independence of both parents, in particular mothers’, by shortening
employment interruptions of mothers. Finally, gender equality goals were also explicitly stated
in the law: Fathers should be encouraged to take a more active role in child care by introducing
financial incentives such as a fathers’ quota in the parental leave benefits scheme.
The ”Elterngeld” that was introduced in 2007 replaced the ”Erziehungsgeld.” In contrast to this
previous benefit, the new Elterngeld is not means-tested and more generous for most families.
It replaces 67 percent of prior-to-birth net earnings of the parent on leave, up to a maximum
of 1,800 euro per month. The minimum amount of Elterngeld awarded is 300 euro per month,
which is equivalent to the monthly benefit paid under the previous Erziehungsgeld. However,
it is paid for a shorter period of time (12 months if only one parent takes leave or 14 months if
both parents take leave).
Figure 3.1 summarizes the changes in financial incentives for two stylized mothers who earn
1,000 euro and 3,000 euro per month, respectively. Depending on prior-to-birth earnings and
household income, the reform changed financial incentives to work in a different way during the
first two years after the child is born. For mothers with high prior-to-birth earnings, incentives
to stay at home in the first year after the maternity leave period ended increased strongly.
For mothers with no or low prior-to-birth earnings and below-median net household income,
incentives to go back to work in the first year have decreased, while they have increased in the
second year.
Source: Welteke and Wrohlich (2019)
Figure 3.1: Changes in financial incentives due to the 2007 parental leave reform
The parental leave benefit reform of 2007 has been evaluated in several empirical studies.
For example, Kluve and Tamm (2013) exploit the quasi-experimental setting of the reform
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and find that the probability that mothers return to work during the first year after giving
birth to a child has declined, in particular for high-income mothers. This finding has been
confirmed in later studies, e.g. by Bergemann and Riphahn (2011, 2015), Geyer et al. (2015),
and Welteke and Wrohlich (2019). Kluve and Schmitz (2018) analyze mothers’ employment
responses not only in the first and second year after giving birth but also in the third to fifth
year. Based on data from the German Microcensus, they find a large and significant increase in
the employment rate of mothers with three to five year old children. Moreover, they find that
the reform increased employer continuity, i.e. a higher share of mothers returned to their pre-
birth employer. Moreover, Welteke and Wrohlich (2019) show that the reform changed social
norms regarding the length of parental leave via social interaction effects among coworkers.25
Research analyzing several parental and maternity leave reforms from earlier periods (Ludsteck,
2014) has shown that extending parental leave in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in (West) Germany
prolonged mothers’ employment interruptions, however, did not affect mothers’ earnings in the
medium run, i.e. up to 6 years after giving birth. Only one reform that strongly extended the
period of paid leave (from 6 to 22 months) has been shown to affect medium-term earnings
to a small extent. Similarly, Lalive et al. (2014) have shown for Austria that reforms that
have increased the maximum duration of paid leave in combination with job-protection have
prolonged mothers’ employment interruptions quite strongly, however did not harm mothers’
earnings in the medium run. Similar results have also been found for the parental leave scheme
introduced in California (e.g Baum and Ruhm, 2016), Canada (Baker and Milligan, 2008)
and Australia (Broadway et al., Forthcoming). As summarized by Rossin-Slater (2018), the
general conclusion from the literature is that leave entitlements up to one year can improve job
continuity for women and increase their labor market attachment, however, longer leaves can
negatively affect their earnings, employment and career advancement.
Against this background of previous empirical findings and the way how the 2007 parental leave
reform in Germany changed incentives to work during the first and second year after childbirth,
we expect the following effects on earnings: Given that the reform has ambiguous effects on
the duration of employment interruption of mothers with low pre-birth earnings, later labor
market outcomes of this group could be either positive or negative. On the other hand, the
expected longer employment interruptions of mothers with high pre-birth earnings resulting
from the parental leave reform, could potentially lead to negative effects on long-term labor
market outcomes. However, since it has been shown by previous research (Kluve and Schmitz,
2018) that this reform has yielded some positive labor market effects for high-income mothers
in the medium run, such as higher employer stability and a larger share of unlimited work
contracts, there might also be positive effects in wages in the medium and long run.
Due to these ambiguous mechanisms, the sign and the magnitude of the long-term effects of
the 2007 parental leave reform on mothers’ earnings remain an empirical question that will be
analyzed in the remainder of this paper.
25There are many further studies analyzing the effect of the 2007 parental leave reform with respect to other
outcomes. For example, Cygan-Rehm (2016) and Raute (2019) analyze its effects on fertility, Huebener et al.
(2019) the effects on child outcomes, Cygan-Rehm et al. (2018) look at parents’ living arrangements, and Tamm
(2019) evaluates the effects on father’s childcare involvement.
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3.3 Empirical Approach
To identify the causal effects of the reform on mothers’ long-run labor market outcomes, we
exploit the introduction of the new parental leave benefit scheme in January 2007 as a natural
experiment. Due to the timing of this reform, parents of children born in the first quarter of
2007 could not know that they would be eligible for the new benefits at the time of conception
of their child (see, e.g. Kluve and Tamm, 2013). Comparing mothers with children born in the
first quarter of 2007 (treatment group) to mothers with children born in the last quarter of
2006 (control group) thus identifies the intention-to-treat effect (ITT) of the reform.
Mothers with children born in winter, however, might differ in their labor market outcomes
from mothers with children born in spring.26 To control for these potential seasonal effects,
we add observations from the last quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006 and employ
a difference-in-difference estimation strategy. Moreover, this approach allows controlling for
potential seasonality in the labor demand or for seasonal bonus payments. In particular, we
estimate the effect of the parental leave reform using the following equation:
Yit = α+ βFirstQuarteri0 + γ Reformi0 + δFirstQuarteri0 · Reformi0 + ωXit + it (3.1)
where Yit denotes the log of the daily wage of mother i in year t. The dummy variable FirstQuar-
ter takes on the value 1 if the mother has given birth to her first child in the first quarter of
the year 2006 or 2007 and 0 if the birth has taken place in the last quarter of 2005 or 2006.
The dummy variable Reform takes on the value 1 if the mother gave birth to a child in the
months around the implementation of the reform, i.e. in the last quarter of 2006 or in the first
quarter of 2007, and 0 if the birth has taken place in the year before. Under our identifying
assumptions, the coefficient δ of the interaction term of these two dummy variables is the causal
effect of the parental leave reform. Figure 3.2 shows the definition of the treatment and control
groups in our setting graphically.
The identification of the causal effect is only valid if the assignment of mothers into treatment
and control groups is random. As already mentioned, the reform was announced in June 2006
and came into effect in January 2007 (Kluve and Tamm, 2013). This timing implies that
parents whose child was born in the first three months of 2007 could not know that they would
be eligible for the new benefits at the time of conception of their child. To exclude potential
selection into the treatment group around the cut-off date by postponing birth27 we exclude all
mothers who have given birth to a child 14 days before and after January 1, 2007.
26Previous studies for the U.S. and the Czech Republic have shown that the season of birth is correlated with
socio-demographic factors of the mother and the child’s later outcomes (Bobak and Gjonca, 2001; Buckles and
Hungerman, 2013; Clarke et al., 2019).
27Neugart and Ohlsson (2013) and Tamm (2013) show that some mothers, in particular employed mothers,
postponed their birth after January 1st, 2007. The timing of birth around cut-off points has also been found for
other reforms (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra, 1999; Gans and Leigh, 2009)
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One year before the
reform (Pre-Reform)
Year of the re-
form (Reform)
Source: Own depiction
Figure 3.2: Changes in financial incentives due to the 2007 parental leave reform
3.4 Data
For the empirical analysis we mainly use individual information generated from labour admin-
istration and social security data processing (Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB)) based
on the integrated notification procedure for health, pension, and unemployment insurances.
The IEB is provided by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) and contains the total
population of individuals in Germany who have either an employment contract subject to social
security contributions, receive benefits in accordance with Social Code Book II or are registered
with the Federal Employment Agency as a job-seeker.
From these data, we select a sub-sample of all mothers for whom we can identify the first birth
of a child in the last quarter of 2005 or 2006 or the first quarter of 2006 or 2007 and who have
been employed before childbirth. For these individuals, we observe their whole employment
history and wages up until nine years after giving birth.
As the date of childbirth is not directly observed in the IEB data, we apply the birth identi-
fication strategy developed by Mu¨ller and Strauch (2017). This approach allows us to make
assumption about the date of birth. However, this approach is based on the expected date of
birth which may differ from the real date. Since we exclude births that took place two weeks
before or after January 1st, it is unlikely that we confound treated and controls.
One major advantage of the IEB data is that we observe the universe of women working subject
to social security. Therefore, the data offer a very large number of observations and the statuses
and wages depicted exactly at each day. This allows us to use a data-consuming empirical
methodology. The quasi-experimental setting needs us to use observations from a very narrow
time window around the introduction of the new parental leave benefit in order to identify truly
causal effects of the reform. However, one shortcoming of the IEB data is that it only contains
daily earnings.28 Hourly wages cannot be computed, since information about the hours worked
28As earnings in the IEB are top-censored above the contribution limit for the pension insurance, we estimate
earnings above this limit. However, the censoring affects only two percent of our sample.
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is not available in this data set. We, therefore, use daily earnings as the main outcome variable
of interest.
Daily earnings, however, depend on the hours of work and, therefore, differ between part-time
and full-time employees. Employment patterns with respect to hours of work, however, may
also have changed as a result of the reform. If, for example, more women are working part-time
as a result of the reform, we would find a negative effect of the reform on daily earnings. In that
case, these results should not be interpreted as an effect of the parental leave reform on mothers’
hourly wages but as a combined effect on working hours and (potentially) hourly wages.
In order to disentangle potential effects on daily earnings by changes in working hours and
changes in hourly wages, we additionally need to analyze the long-term effects on working
hours. To this end, we analyze data from the German Microcensus. The German Microcensus
is a one percent random sample of the population living in Germany and includes more than
800,000 individuals in more than 350,000 households per year. We use the waves 2008 to 2016
and select mothers who gave birth to a child in the last six months of 2005 or 2006 or in
the first six months of 2006 to 2007. Based on these data, we are able to identify the effect
of the parental leave reform on working hours one to nine years after giving birth to a child.
Further, the socio-economic variables in the Microcensus allow us to examine whether effects in
earnings may come from sample selection. However, a major drawback of this data set is that
is does not provide information on the past such as previous wage. Therefore, we use the level
of education as a proxy for previous earnings. In particular, we define individuals with ”high
level of formal education” as those with a tertiary degree. In contrast, we refer to ”low level of
formal education” as persons without vocational training or A-levels. 29
Since the changes in economic incentives induced by the parental leave reform differ by prior-
to-birth earnings of the mother, we run separate estimations for mothers with high, and low
prior-to-birth earnings in all our regressions. In this context, we define mothers with low prior-
to-birth30 earnings as those who had daily earnings of up to the 25th percentile (42.3 euro per
day) and those with high prior-to birth earnings as those who had daily earnings above the
75th percentile (91.7 euro per day). As a robustness check, we will also estimate the effects for
mothers with medium prior-to-birth-earnings, defined as earnings between these two thresholds.
While the IEB data allows us to observe earnings exactly one, two or more years before and
after birth, the survey data in the Microcensus gives information only to one specific day of the
year. Thus, for the Microcensus, we have to assume that the information at the date of the
interview in 2008 corresponds to the employment status one year after birth, 2009 to two years
after birth, and so forth. Thus, it is possible that the working hours differ between the date of
the interview and the date of the corresponding year after birth. However, we do not expect
this potential difference to be correlated with the treatment status.
Descriptive statistics on the dependent variables daily earnings and working hours based on
29Since the Microcensus is substantially smaller than the IEB, we estimate the reform effects for both groups
of mothers in one single regression. In order to differentiate the causal effect for high- and low-educated, we add
an interaction term of the treatment variable and the level of education to equation (3.1).
30In accordance with Frodermann et al. (2013), we define prior-to-birth as ten months before the expected
date of birth.
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IEB and Microcensus data can be found in Tables C.1 to C.4 in the Appendix. Table C.1
gives the descriptive statistics of daily earnings for high- and low-income mothers in treatment
and control group(s) for all years starting from two years before giving birth up to nine years
after giving birth based on IEB data. With two exceptions, we observe no differences in daily
earnings between the treatment and the control groups for mothers with high and low prior-to-
birth earnings. The first exception occurs in the first year after birth for high-income mothers:
The earnings in the treatment group is around 10 euro higher than in the control groups, while
the number of observation in this group is substantially smaller. This relationship indicates
that mothers with high prior-to-birth earnings who worked during the first year after birth
even though they were eligible for the new benefit, represent a highly labor market attached
group of mothers. The second exception affects low-income mothers in the second year after
birth, in which the earnings in treatment group and number of observation is higher than in
the control groups. This finding, in contrast, might reflect a negative selection of working
mothers pre-reform. That is, mothers who worked, even though they were eligible for the old
benefit, could not afford not to work during the second year after childbirth. This descriptive
results emphasize the differences in the financial incentive pre- and post-reform for high- and
low-income mothers, since the Never-Taker lead to opposed selection effects for both income
groups.
Table C.2 summarizes descriptive statistics for all relevant control variables for the same groups
nine years after giving birth based on IEB data. Similarly, Tables C.3 and C.4 summarize
working hours (conditional on working) and control variables, respectively, for all mothers in
treatment and control groups based on the Microcensus. None of these tables indicates any
difference in the control variables or the number of working hours between the treatment and
control groups.
3.5 Results
In this section, we first describe the effects of the parental leave reform on the duration of
mothers’ employment interruptions. Following this, we present the effects on daily earnings
and on average weekly working hours. Next, we show the potential changes in the socio-
demographic characteristics of working mothers and changes in their probability to return to
their pre-birth employer caused by the parental leave reform. Finally, we discuss the effects
of changes in fertility patterns and in fathers’ take-up of parental leave before presenting the
results of analyses of the reform effects on earnings for several socio-economic subgroups.
3.5.1 Effects on employment interruptions
The analysis of the effect of the introduction of the new parental leave benefit on mothers’ em-
ployment interruptions based on the IEB data confirms the predictions of a standard economic
model of labor supply – given the changes in financial incentives – as well as the findings of
previous studies. In particular, we find an increase in the duration of the employment interrup-
tions in the first year after giving birth for high-income mothers (Figure 3.3, right panel). A
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considerably larger share of high-income mothers in the treatment group chooses employment
interruptions up to 12 months as compared to mothers in the control-groups. 12 months after
giving childbirth, however, employment rates of high-income mothers do not differ by treat-
ment and control groups. Results from an estimation of equation (3.1) with the duration of the
employment break (measured in months) as the dependent variable show that the reform in-
creases the employment interruption for high-income mothers by 2.8 months on average (Table
3.1, column II).
(a) Low-income mothers (b) High-income mothers
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations.
Figure 3.3: Effects of the parental leave reform on the duration of employment interruptions
Duration of employment break (months) Low-income mothers High-income mothers
First quarter (vs. last quarter) -1.540** -0.869*
(0.511) (0.412)
Reform (vs. Pre-reform) -1.467* -2.081***
(0.494) (0.406)






Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations. Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.1: Effects of the parental leave reform on employment interruptions (in months)
The effects for low-income mothers are shown in the left panel of Figure 3.3 and in column (I)
of Table 3.1: For these mothers, the probability to return to employment in the first year after
giving childbirth has slightly decreased, while it has increased in the second year. However,
the reform had on average no effect on the duration of employment break for mothers with low
prior-to-birth earnings.
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3.5.2 Effects on daily earnings
Estimation results of the earnings effects based on the difference-in-difference model show that
mothers with low prior-to-birth earnings face higher earnings in the second year after giving
birth (Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4).31 Two years after giving birth, earnings of treated mothers in
this group are on average 7 percent higher than for mothers in the control group. This effect
might be the result of a negative-selected group of mothers pre-reform, i.e. women who were
eligible for the benefit but who could not afford not to work (see table C.1 in the Appendix).
However, this positive effect on earnings disappears already in the next year. In the long run,
we do not find any effects on earnings resulting from the shorter employment breaks induced
by the parental leave reform.
Low-income mothers High-income mothers
Log earnings
Control Difference Difference Control Difference Difference
mean† T-C T-C mean† T-C T-C
with controls‡ with controls‡
yt-2 24.04 −0.035 −0.025 110.98 −0.006 −0.013*
(0.021) (0.016) (0.008) (0.006)
yt-1 23.84 0.006 −0.003 118.16 0.011 0.010*
(0.016) (0.013) (0.006) (0.004)
yt+1 15.08 0.016 0.036 56.13 0.091 0.067
(0.042) (0.036) (0.051) (0.041)
yt+2 15.89 0.044 0.054* 60.05 0.085*** 0.099***
(0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.018)
yt+3 18.30 0.030 0.029 65.35 0.061** 0.066***
(0.031) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017)
yt+4 19.90 0.023 0.012 68.03 0.041 0.047**
(0.027) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016)
yt+5 21.74 −0.016 −0.024 66.56 0.040 0.038*
(0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)
yt+6 22.84 −0.006 −0.013 67.25 0.044* 0.046**
(0.027) (0.021) (0.019) (0.014)
yt+7 23.51 0.039 0.022 67.30 0.041* 0.033*
(0.026) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013)
yt+8 24.11 0.017 0.004 67.30 0.034* 0.020
(0.026) (0.020) (0.018) (0.013)
yt+9 27.81 0.025 0.014 74.03 0.040* 0.026*
(0.026) (0.020) (0.018) (0.013)
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations. All specifications control for seasonal trends (pre-reform dummy),
† Control mean refers to the average mean of mothers who gave birth in the last quarter of 2006, as the
exponential of the log wage; Controls ‡: Pre-birth wage, age at birth, education, experience (ft & pt), rel.
duration of unemployment, size of establishment, working time before birth, change of establishment, east
Germany, citizenship, no. of children, region, tenure and change of employer after birth. The number of
observations vary between 6,358 (yt+1) and 23,093 (yt−1) for low-income mothers and 8,128 (yt+1) and
34,751 (yt−1) for high-income mothers. Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.2: Effects of the parental leave reform on daily earnings for mothers with high and low prior-
to-birth earnings
For mothers with high prior-to-birth earnings, on the other hand, we find positive effects on
earnings: In the second year after giving birth, the parental leave reform increases earnings for
high-income mothers by 10 percent. This substantial effect diminishes in the subsequent years
(6 percent in the third, 4 - 5 percent in the fourth and 3 percent in the seventh year) (Table
3.2, and Figure 3.4).
31The entire regression for low- and high-income mothers nine years after giving birth is shown in table C.7
in the Appendix.
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Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations. The graph plots the causal
effect of the reform with the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3.4: Effects of the parental leave reform on daily earnings for mothers with high and low
prior-to-birth earnings
These positive effects of the parental leave reform on the earnings of mothers with high prior-to-
birth earnings are in contrast to predictions of human capital theory, since for this group we find
an extension of the duration of the average employment interruption by almost three months. In
the next sub-sections, we will check whether these positive effects can be explained by changes
in working hours, socio-demographic characteristics of working mothers (i.e. selection effects
on observable characteristics) or job characteristics.
3.5.3 Effects on working hours
One explanation of the positive effects of the parental leave reform on the daily earnings of
mothers with high prior-to-birth earnings could be that - as a response to the parental leave
reform - they work longer weekly hours after they return to the labor market. In order to
analyze whether mothers react to the parental leave reform with respect to their working hours,
we estimate equation (3.1) with the weekly working hours as the dependent variable based on
the German Microcensus.
Regression results based on this data set show that there is mainly no statistically significant
causal effect of the parental leave reform on weekly working hours of mothers in the years after
giving birth (Table 3.3). This is true for both, mothers with a high level of formal education,
and for those with a low level of formal education.
Based on this result, we conclude that the parental leave reform had no effect on the working
hours of mothers after re-entering the labor market. Thus, the positive effect on daily earnings
for high-income mothers does not stem from an extension of their working hours but can rather
be interpreted as a positive effect on their hourly wage.
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Low-educated mothers High-educated mothers
Weekly
working hours
Control Difference Difference Control Difference Difference
mean? T-C† T-C mean ? T-C T-C
with controls † ‡ with controls‡
2008 24.78 6.340 5.525 29.40 1.444 1.408
P(β(Treatment) =0)** 0.765 0.837 0.418 0.600
2009 23.32 1.586 0.175 30.20 −0.265 −0.592
P(β(Treatment) =0)** 0.170 0.365 0.132 0.316
2010 23.29 1.924 3.176 29.18 1.481 1.371
P(β(Treatment) =0)** 0.489 0.653 0.335 0.382
2011 26.28 1.630 2.075 29.28 0.430 0.721
P(β(Treatment) =0)** 0.312 0.474 0.512 0.710
2012 23.66 2.805 2.948 28.64 −0.650 −1.269
P(β(Treatment) =0)** 0.844 0.406 0.731 0.255
2013 22.29 −3.967 −2.630 28.16 0.778 0.365
P(β(Treatment) =0)** 0.829 0.884 0.360 0.523
2014 20.22 1.422 2.656 27.94 0.533 0.523
P(β(Treatment) =0)** 0.976 0.881 0.842 0.971
2015 18.88 2.891 4.314 27.45 −2.306 −1.891
P(β(Treatment) =0)** 0.126 0.185 0.101 0.201
2016 24.53 −3.138 −3.630 28.56 0.150 −0.128
P(β(Treatment) =0)** 0.671 0.990 0.895 0.921
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, Microcensus 2008-2016; own
calculations. All specifications control for seasonal trends (pre-reform dummy); Treatment dummy equals 1 if the
first child is born in the first half of 2007.;**: F-Test of joint significance: For low-educated P( β (Treatment) +β
(Treatment* Low-educated)) and for high-educated P( β (Treatment)) ?: The control mean equals the average working
hours of women who gave birth to their first child in the last half of 2006. † The size of the coefficient equals the
sum of the treatment effect and the interaction of the treatment and the lowest educational group. Controls ‡: Age
(single and quadratic), number of children, region (East vs. West and Urban vs. Rural), nationality, marital status;
The number of observations vary between 905 (2008) and 1,920 (2016). Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p< 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.3: Effect of the parental leave reform on working hours
3.5.4 Changes in socio-demographic characteristics
Since we do not observe any statistically significant changes in weekly working hours of moth-
ers that could explain the positive effects on daily earnings, we analyze whether the selection
of working mothers in terms of observable socio-demographic characteristics has changed due
to the parental leave reform. To this end, we run several estimations of equation (3.1) with
socio-demographic characteristics such as education level, age and marital status as dependent
variable. As summarized in Table 3.4, there is no statistically significant change in the compo-
sition of working mothers with respect to these characteristics resulting from the parental leave
reform in any of the years 2008 to 2016, with only one minor exception. In the year 2013, we
find that working mothers in the treatment group have a higher probability to be married than
in the control groups. We do not find this effect, however, in any other year, and, therefore,
argue that this finding is negligible.
3.5.5 Changes in employer stability
Previous research has shown that as a result of parental leave reforms, employer stability has
increased. For example, studies by Baker and Milligan (2008) and Baum and Ruhm (2016)
have shown that in cases where employment-protected period of leave (paid or unpaid) was
introduced, employer stability has increased significantly. Kluve and Schmitz (2018) have shown
that even for the German 2007 reform, where the job-protection period of 3 years has been
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Year
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
High education
Control mean 0.63 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.74 0.75
Difference T-C 0.00 −0.04 −0.07 −0.02 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.02 −0.02
Standard Error (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Age
Control mean 30.30 31.53 32.39 33.25 34.32 35.12 35.84 37.32 38.67
Difference T-C −0.17 −0.57 −0.45 0.60 0.90 0.72 0.66 −0.04 0.48
Standard Error (0.61) (0.59) (0.57) (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.51) (0.50) (0.45)
Married
Control mean 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.76
Difference T-C −0.00 −0.07 −0.08 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03
Standard Error (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
High-educated
Age
Control mean 33.55 34.52 35.27 36.04 37.10 37.96 38.10 39.22 40.46
Difference T-C −0.44 −0.29 −0.34 0.22 −0.13 0.16 0.45 −0.02 0.54
Standard Error (0.53) (0.54) (0.52) (0.49) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.49) (0.45)
Married
Control mean 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.79
Difference T-C −0.05 −0.01 −0.05 0.03 0.01 0.10* 0.02 0.02 0.05
Standard Error (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Low-educated
Age
Control mean 26.05 27.26 27.38 28.02 29.79 30.66 31.73 33.31 34.44
Difference T-C −0.62 −0.65 0.57 1.20 1.17 0.73 0.81 −0.20 1.15
Standard Error (0.91) (0.95) (0.89) (0.90) (0.90) (0.98) (0.96) (1.08) (0.99)
Married
Control mean 0.59 0.66 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.61 0.67 0.67
Difference T-C 0.02 −0.10 −0.04 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.10 −0.01
Standard Error (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, Microcensus 2008-2016; ?: The control mean
equals the average working hours of women who gave birth to their first child in the last half of 2007.; Treatment dummy equals
1 if the first child is born in the first half of 2007. Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
Table 3.4: Effects of the parental leave reform on the socio-demographic characteristics of working
mothers
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left unchanged and only the duration and level of payments changed, employer stability has
increased. In their analysis based on the Microcensus, they find that mothers have a higher
probability to return to their pre-birth employer. Our analysis of the IEB data shows very
similar results. We find that high-income mothers who return to birth in the second year
after giving birth have a 2 percentage points higher probability of returning to their pre-birth
employer (Table 3.5).
Probability to change the em-
ployer
Control mean Difference T-C Control mean Difference T-C
yt+1 0.041 −0.002 0.022 −0.005
(0.009) (0.006)
yt+2 0.190 −0.016 0.096 −0.020**
(0.012) (0.007)
yt+3 0.276 0.006 0.137 −0.006
(0.008) (0.008)
yt+4 0.288 −0.003 0.151 −0.001
(0.012) (0.009)
yt+5 0.299 −0.023 0.147 −0.005
(0.012) (0.008)
yt+6 0.276 0.010 0.149 0.002
(0.012) (0.008)
yt+7 0.254 0.003 0.131 −0.002
(0.011) (0.008)
yt+8 0.244 0.002 0.113 0.003
(0.011) (0.007)
yt+9 0.254 0.004 0.119 −0.006
(0.011) (0.007)
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations. All specifications control for seasonal trends (pre-reform dummy),
† Control mean refers to the average mean of mothers who gave birth in the last quarter of 2006, as the
exponential of the log wage; Controls ‡: Pre-birth wage, age at birth, education, experience (ft & pt), rel.
duration of unemployment, size of establishment, working time before birth, change of establishment, east
Germany, citizenship, no. of children, region, tenure and change of employer after birth. The number of
observations vary between 6,358 (yt+1) and 23,093 (yt−1) for low-income mothers and 8,128 (yt+1) and 34,751
(yt−1) for high-income mothers. Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
Table 3.5: Effects of the parental leave reform on the probability to change the firm after the employ-
ment interruption
Kluve and Schmitz (2018) argue that this increased employer stability is rewarded by a higher
job-quality in terms of length of contract. Similarly, it could be that employers also reward
higher job stability with higher wages. We, therefore, analyze the long-run earnings effects of
the parental leave reform separately for mothers who return to their pre-birth employer and
those who return to the labor market with a new employer. Interestingly, the earnings effects are
very similar in both groups, in particular for high-income mothers (Table 3.6). Both, mothers
who do or do not return to their previous employer, have on average 10 percent higher daily
earnings in the second year after giving birth as a result of the parental leave reform. The
results for the subsequent years are also very similar, although positive earnings effects fade
out already after six years for mothers with a new employer and are still significant after nine
years after giving birth for mothers returning to their pre-birth employer. From these results
we conclude that the increase in job stability cannot explain the positive effects on earnings
that we find for the first two to seven years after giving birth. We, therefore, conclude that the
increased employer stability is not the reason for the positive earnings effects in the medium
run.
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Low-income mothers High-income mothers
Control Difference Difference Control Difference Difference
mean† T-C T-C mean† T-C T-C




13.53 0.858* 13.61 2.418***
(0.426) (0.349)
Log earnings
yt−2 23.81 −0.010 −0.013 109.28 −0.005 −0.012
(0.028) (0.023) (0.009) (0.007)
yt−1 23.32 0.003 −0.007 116.27 0.013 0.003
(0.022) (0.017) (0.007) (0.005)
yt+1 14.84 0.022 0.018 61.89 0.099* 0.048
(0.043) (0.038) (0.047) (0.044)
yt+2 17.53 0.067* 0.049 66.93 0.119*** 0.100***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.022) (0.019)
yt+3 21.51 0.056* 0.043 73.42 0.083*** 0.060***
(0.032) (0.029) (0.020) (0.017)
yt+4 23.36 0.050 0.024 76.02 0.045* 0.034*
(0.029) (0.027) (0.019) (0.016)
yt+5 24.91 0.043 0.018 75.07 0.053** 0.044**
(0.030) (0.028) (0.019) (0.016)
yt+6 25.55 0.040 0.019 74.54 0.054** 0.043**
(0.030) (0.028) (0.018) (0.015)
yt+7 26.97 0.093** 0.075** 74.80 0.057*** 0.038**
(0.030) (0.027) (0.017) (0.014)
yt+8 28.19 0.045 0.030 76.35 0.045** 0.020
(0.030) (0.028) (0.017) (0.014)
yt+9 33.38 0.021 −0.001 83.62 0.048** 0.027*




30.68 −1.528* 26.91 0.938
(0.723) (0.959)
Log earnings
yt−2 21.82 −0.044 −0.041* 103.33 0.008 −0.009
(0.025) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013)
yt−1 21.95 0.002 0.002 110.46 0.024* 0.011
(0.020) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009)
yt+1 13.20 0.062 0.068 29.91 0.330* 0.109
(0.079) (0.077) (0.136) (0.116)
yt+2 16.02 0.058 0.052 40.07 0.145* 0.092
(0.047) (0.044) (0.061) (0.050)
yt+3 18.23 0.026 0.008 48.18 0.102 0.097*
(0.040) (0.038) (0.055) (0.046)
yt+4 19.78 0.002 −0.003 50.66 0.112* 0.103**
(0.035) (0.033) (0.047) (0.040)
yt+5 21.93 −0.073* −0.070* 49.86 0.049 0.027
(0.034) (0.032) (0.045) (0.038)
yt+6 23.39 −0.039 −0.043 51.74 0.083* 0.063
(0.032) (0.031) (0.039) (0.034)
yt+7 24.34 −0.024 −0.027 51.71 0.039 0.032
(0.032) (0.030) (0.036) (0.031)
yt+8 25.32 −0.027 −0.022 52.23 0.043 0.023
(0.031) (0.029) (0.035) (0.029)
Continued on next page
3.5. Results 83
Table 3.6 – continued from previous page
Low-income mothers High-income mothers
Control Difference Difference Control Difference Difference
mean† T-C T-C mean† T-C T-C
with controls‡ with controls‡
yt+9 29.41 0.017 0.025 56.71 0.058 0.034
(0.030) (0.029) (0.034) (0.029)
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations. All specifications control for seasonal trends (pre-reform dummy), †
Control mean refers to the average mean of mothers who gave birth in the last quarter of 2006, as the exponential
of the log wage; Controls ‡: Pre-birth wage, age at birth, education, experience (ft & pt), rel. duration of unem-
ployment, size of establishment, working time before birth, change of establishment, east Germany, citizenship, no.
of children, region, tenure and change of employer after birth. The number of observations vary for women who
stay with the same employer between 5,423 (yt+1) and 12,346 (yt−1) for low-income mothers and 7,782 (yt+1) and
27,471 (yt−1) for high-income mothers, and those who change the employer between 2,274 (yt+1) and 15,782 (yt−1)
for low-income mothers and 1,343 (yt+1) and 11,064 (yt−1) for high-income mothers. Significance levels: * p< 0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.6: Effects of the parental leave reform on earnings for women who stayed with the pre-birth
employer and for women who changed employer
3.5.6 Fertility effects and Fathers’ involvement
Positive earnings effects resulting from the parental leave reform could be the consequence of
differences in the family setting caused by the reform. For example, the new parental leave
scheme could have affected subsequent fertility patterns and, thereby, indirectly mothers’ earn-
ings in the medium run. Kluve and Schmitz (2018) find negative reform effects on subsequent
birth for different groups of mothers but not for high-income mothers. Further, Cygan-Rehm
(2016) investigated whether the reform had an effect on timing of higher-order births. She finds
that high-income mothers have a higher probability of a next child within 24 months after a
previous childbirth. This effect, however, fades out after the second year. Thus, there is no
evidence that the positive effects on earnings result from changes in fertility patterns, i.e. that
women are less likely to have higher-order birth.32
Another potential mechanism that could affect mothers’ earnings is the role of fathers. As
described in sections 3.1 and 3.2, the 2007 parental leave reform not only changed the amount
and the duration of the parental leave benefit but also introduced a ”daddy quota”, i.e. a period
of two (out of 14) months of paid parental leave earmarked for each parent. This policy has
strongly changed the take-up of parental leave by fathers. Whereas less than three percent of
fathers with children born before 2007 have taken parental leave, this number has increased to
15 percent immediately after the reform and has been increasing ever since (Samtleben et al.,
2019). Empirical studies have shown that the share of fathers taking parental leave (while
the mother has returned to the labor market) has particularly increased for fathers in couples
where both spouses have a university degree (Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2019) and in couples
where the woman belongs to the highest earnings quartile (Trappe, 2013) rather than taking
leave simultaneously. Moreover, there is descriptive evidence showing that in many couples,
the mothers are working while the fathers are on leave (Wrohlich et al., 2012). Unfortunately,
32Moreover, Raute (2019) compares fertility rates pre- and post-reform and finds that the reform increased
the probability to give birth to a child.
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there is no micro-data set at the moment available for Germany that could be used to analyze
the effect of fathers’ use of parental leave on mothers’ earnings.33 However, the evidence of
the studies analyzing the changes of fathers’ leave taking shows that (i) fathers with high-
income partners where those who reacted most strongly to the parental leave reform and that
(ii) mothers use the leave of fathers to re-enter the labor market. We can speculate that the
stronger child care involvement of fathers facilitates mothers’ re-entry to the labor market and
potentially increases their productivity. This, in turn, could be reflected in higher earnings.
3.5.7 Heterogeneity Analysis
In this section, we present the results from separate regressions for mothers living in East and
West Germany and for mothers with medium income. As shown in Table 3.7, there is no
difference in the effects of the parental leave reform on the duration of mothers’ employment
interruptions between East and West Germany. We do not find any effect on the employment
interruption of mothers in the lowest quartile of pre-birth earnings in either part of the country,
however statistically significant increases in the duration of the employment interruption of
mothers with high pre-birth earnings.
West Germany East Germany
Duration of employment break (months)
Low-income High-income Low-income High-income
mothers mothers mothers mothers
First quarter (vs. last quarter) −1.612* −1.013* −1.680* −0.320
(0.645) (0.447) (0.782) (0.908)
Reform (vs. Pre-reform) −1.733** −2.138*** −1.347 −1.846*
(0.619) (0.441) (0.768) (0.848)
First quarter * Reform −1.033 2.914*** −1.430 2.717*
(0.849) (0.607) (1.048) (1.233)
Constant 33.540*** 24.387*** 26.617*** 15.898***
(0.465) (0.323) (0.563) (0.630)
R2 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003
N 28,020 37,327 11,529 4,509
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations. Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Table 3.7: Effects of the parental leave reform of the duration of employment break in West and East
Germany
The positive effects on earnings that we find for the full sample, however, are only driven
by high-income mothers living in West Germany (Table 3.8 and Figures C.1 and C.2 in the
Appendix). For this sample, we find very similar effects as for the whole sample, i.e. strong
positive effects in the second year after giving birth that are diminishing but still significant
up until nine years after giving birth (except for eight years after giving birth). In contrast,
for high-income mothers living in East Germany, we only find positive earnings effects in the
second year after giving birth.
33Although the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) provides the relevant information, the number of observations
in this data set is too small to estimate precise effects.
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Low-income mothers High-income mothers
Log earnings
Control Difference Difference Control Difference Difference
mean† T-C T-C mean† T-C T-C
with controls‡ with controls‡
West Germany
yt−2 24.04 −0.035 −0.042* 110.98 −0.006 −0.015*
(0.021) (0.019) (0.008) (0.006)
yt−1 23.84 0.006 0.004 118.16 0.011 0.007
(0.016) (0.015) (0.006) (0.004)
yt+1 15.08 0.016 0.027 56.13 0.091 0.032
(0.042) (0.040) (0.051) (0.046)
yt+2 15.89 0.044 0.045 60.05 0.085*** 0.089***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.025) (0.021)
yt+3 18.30 0.030 0.034 65.34 0.061** 0.067**
(0.031) (0.030) (0.024) (0.020)
yt+4 19.90 0.023 0.017 68.03 0.041 0.045*
(0.027) (0.026) (0.022) (0.018)
yt+5 21.74 −0.016 −0.017 66.56 0.040 0.041*
(0.027) (0.026) (0.021) (0.018)
yt+6 22.84 −0.006 −0.008 67.25 0.044* 0.050**
(0.027) (0.025) (0.019) (0.016)
yt+7 23.51 0.039 0.029 67.30 0.041* 0.038*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.015)
yt+8 24.11 0.017 0.020 68.24 0.034 0.028
(0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.015)
yt+9 27.81 0.025 0.027 74.03 0.040* 0.029*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.015)
East Germany
yt−2 18.05 −0.013 −0.013 89.16 0.016 −0.007
(0.039) (0.031) (0.021) (0.018)
yt−1 17.77 0.011 −0.002 96.94 0.028 0.023*
(0.032) (0.025) (0.016) (0.011)
yt+1 11.73 0.014 −0.003 63.27 −0.007 −0.030
(0.089) (0.083) (0.103) (0.099)
yt+2 17.71 0.085 0.089 78.52 0.098** 0.093***
(0.060) (0.055) (0.030) (0.027)
yt+3 20.87 0.091 0.089 85.40 0.041 0.029
(0.050) (0.047) (0.023) (0.019)
yt+4 23.66 0.046 0.048 86.86 0.029 0.016
(0.048) (0.045) (0.025) (0.022)
yt+5 25.77 −0.027 −0.033 86.00 0.032 0.018
(0.047) (0.044) (0.026) (0.023)
yt+6 26.72 0.046 0.043 85.67 0.046 0.029
(0.046) (0.043) (0.026) (0.023)
yt+7 28.93 0.039 0.046 86.14 0.039 0.029
(0.044) (0.041) (0.026) (0.023)
yt+8 31.90 −0.020 −0.019 89.20 0.021 0.008
(0.042) (0.040) (0.025) (0.022)
Continued on next page
86 3. Long-term Effects of the German Parental Leave Reform on Mothers’ Earnings
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Low-income mothers High-income mothers
Log earnings
Control Difference Difference Control Difference Difference
mean† T-C T-C mean† T-C T-C
with controls‡ with controls‡
yt+9 38.78 −0.013 −0.014 97.38 0.033 0.024
(0.040) (0.038) (0.026) (0.022)
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations. All specifications control for seasonal trends (pre-reform dummy), †
Control mean refers to the average mean of mothers who gave birth in the last quarter of 2006, as the exponential
of the log wage; ‡ Controls: Pre-birth wage, age at birth, education, experience (ft & pt), rel. duration of
unemployment, size of establishment, working time before birth, change of establishment, citizenship, no. of
children, region, tenure and change of employer after birth. The number of observations vary for West Germany
between 6,447 (yt+1) and 18,565 (yt−1) for low-income mothers and 7,700 (yt+1) and 27,343 (yt−2) for high-income
mothers, and East Germany between 1,418 (yt+1) and 5,809 (yt−1) for low-income mothers and 1,268 (yt+1) and
5,895 (yt−2) for high-income mothers. Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
Table 3.8: Effects of the parental leave reform on earnings in West and East Germany
Finally, in Table 3.9 we present the results of estimations of the earnings effects of mothers with
medium pre-birth earnings, i.e. with daily earnings above 42.3 euro (25th percentile) and below
91.7 euro (75th percentile).34 We have left out these mothers in the main specification, since the
change in financial incentives induced by the parental leave reform are not so unambiguous as
for the high- and low-income mothers. However, since they form the largest group of mothers,
it is relevant to analyze in what way the parental leave reform affected their post-birth earnings.
As Table 3.9 shows, we find strong positive effects on earnings in the first and second year after
giving birth that are smaller but still significant in the two subsequent years and fade out after
four years. So, the pattern that we find for this group is similar to the effects for high-income
mothers, however, less pronounced. Moreover, the very large positive effect in the first year
after giving birth (earnings are higher by 15 percent in this period for mothers in the control
group), is probably due to selection effects (see Table C.6 in the Appendix).
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The German parental leave reform of 2007, which increased the generosity of the financial
benefits for mothers with medium and high pre-birth earnings but cut the maximum duration
period, has prolonged employment interruptions of high-income mothers by three months on
average. Our estimation results, however, show that these longer employment interruptions
did not have a negative effect on mothers’ long-term earnings perspectives. Nine years after
giving birth, we do not find negative effects on mothers’ daily earnings. In contrast, we even
find positive effects, which diminish over time: In the short run, mothers with high pre-birth
earnings earn ten percent more as a result from the new parental leave scheme. In the medium
run, i.e. three to six years after giving birth, they still earn between 4 to 5 percent and in the
34The reform effects on the duration of the parental leave for medium-income mothers are shown in Figure
C.3 in the Appendix. The selection mechanism are similar to those of high-income mothers, i.e. mothers, who
work in the first year after childbirth, although they were eligible for the benefit, represent a highly labor market
attached group of women.










yt−2 60.66 −0.010 −0.014*
(0.008) (0.006)
yt−1 64.68 0.000 −0.002
(0.006) (0.005)
yt+1 24.27 0.208*** 0.148***
(0.039) (0.032)
yt+2 24.15 0.121*** 0.108***
(0.021) (0.016)
yt+3 30.84 0.063** 0.052***
(0.020) (0.014)
yt+4 32.32 0.050** 0.036**
(0.017) (0.013)
yt+5 32.69 0.023 0.015
(0.017) (0.012)
yt+6 33.24 0.033* 0.018
(0.016) (0.012)
yt+7 33.66 0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.011)
yt+8 34.63 −0.003 0.003
(0.014) (0.011)
yt+9 38.82 −0.001 0.002
(0.014) (0.011)
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations. All specifications control for seasonal trends
(pre-reform dummy), † Control mean refers to the average mean of mothers who gave
birth in the last quarter of 2006, as the exponential of the log wage; Controls ‡:
Pre-birth wage, age at birth, education, experience (ft & pt), rel. duration of unem-
ployment, size of establishment, working time before birth, change of establishment,
east Germany, citizenship, no. of children, region, tenure and change of employer af-
ter birth. The number of observations vary between 15,392 (yt+1) and 56,969 (yt−2).
Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Table 3.9: Effect of the parental leave reform on daily earnings for mothers with medium prior-to-birth
earnings
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long run, i.e. seven to nine years after childbirth, 3 percent more than the control group. This is
also true, albeit to a lesser extent, for mothers with medium pre-birth earnings. In our empirical
analysis, we investigate several potential mechanisms that could cause the positive effects on
mothers’ earnings. We are able to show that these positive effects are not driven by (i) changes in
working hours, (ii) changes in observable socio-demographic characteristics of working mothers
or (iii) changes in employer stability. Actually, employer stability has increased as a result of
the parental leave reform. However, positive earnings effects several years after giving birth are
found for both groups of mothers, those who return to their pre-birth employer and those who
start working with a new employer after the birth-related employment interruption.
One alternative mechanism that could explain the positive effect on mothers’ earnings is the
stronger child care involvement of fathers that has been caused by the ”daddy quota” that was
introduced as part of the 2007 parental leave reform. This policy measure has been shown to
have increased fathers’ parental leave taking, in particular among fathers with highly educated
and high earnings spouses. Thus, it could be that the increased child care involvement of fathers
facilitates mothers’ re-entry into the labor market and increases their productivity, which in
turn could increase their earnings. Up to now, however, it is not possible to directly analyze the
potential effect of fathers’ parental leave taking on mothers’ earnings due to lack of adequate
data.
From a policy perspective, we interpret our empirical findings as good news: Granting a more
generous benefit in the first year in order to provide a financial safeguard for families with young
children has lead to longer employment interruptions for certain groups of mothers without
harming their long-term career perspectives. Actually, we can speculate that the ”daddy quota”
element of the parental leave reform might have diminished the potentially negative effect of
longer paid leave durations for the group of high-income mothers and even lead to a positive
effect on the earnings of this group.
However, from a social policy point of view, it has to be stressed that for mothers with low
prior-to-birth earnings, we did not find positive labor market effects. Thus, not only did this
group experience cuts in their benefit entitlements, but these mothers did also not benefit
in terms of medium- or long-term labor market outcomes. This result is particularly relevant
against the background of other recent family policy reforms such as the expansion in subsidized
child care that have been shown to also benefit primarily mothers with medium or high socio-
economic characteristics (Mu¨ller and Wrohlich, 2020). If family policy wants to target low-
income families, the parental leave benefit scheme should be reformed, for example by increasing
the earnings replacement rate and, thereby, the financial benefit for parents with below-median
earnings. This could directly increase the household income of these families in the first year
after giving birth and incentivize fathers in this group to stronger engage in parental leave
taking. This, in turn, could facilitate the re-entry into the labor market also for mothers with
low prior-to-birth earnings and potentially increase their labor market outcomes in the years
after the employment interruption.
From a Gender Pay Gap perspective, the parental leave reform increases the lifetime earnings
of mothers with high and medium prior-to-birth earnings, and might, therefore, also decrease
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the Gender Lifetime Earnings Gap as well as the Gender Pension Gap. Since the reform did
not decrease the duration of employment interruption of low-income mothers nor increase their
earnings, we expect that the reform had no effect on their lifetime earnings. Hence, these
imbalanced reform effects on earnings between mothers with high and medium prior-to-birth
earnings on the one hand, and low-income mothers on the other, seem to have increased the
earnings gap between these groups.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
Classification Tasks
non-routine analytic researching, analyzing, evaluating and planning, making
plans/ constructions, designing, sketching, working out
rules/ prescriptions, and using interpreting rules
non-routine interactive negotiating, lobbying, coordinating, organizing, teaching
or training, selling, buying, advising customers, advertis-
ing, entertaining or presenting, and employing or man-
aging personnel
routine cognitive calculating, bookkeeping, correcting texts/ data, and
measuring length/ weight/ temperature
routine manual operating or controlling machines and equipping ma-
chines
non-routine manual repairing or renovating houses/ apartments/ machines/
vehicles, restoring art/ monuments, and serving or ac-
commodating
Source: Spitz-Oener (2006)
Table A.1: Activities within tasks
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Code Classification title
111 Occupations in farming
112 Occupations in animal husbandry
113 Occupations in horsekeeping
114 Occupations in fishing
115 Occupations in animal care
116 Occupations in vini- and viticulture
117 Occupations in forestry, hunting and landscape preservation
121 Occupations in gardening
122 Occupations in floristry
211 Occupations in underground and surface mining and blasting engineer-
ing
212 Conditioning and processing of natural stone and minerals,
production of building materials
213 Occupations in industrial glass-making and -processing
214 Occupations in industrial ceramic-making and -processing
221 Occupations in plastic- and rubber-making and -processing
222 Occupations in colour coating and varnishing
223 Occupations in wood-working and -processing
231 Technical occupations in paper-making and -processing and packaging
232 Occupations in technical media design
233 Occupations in photography and photographic technology
234 Occupations in printing technology, print finishing, and book binding
241 Occupations in metal-making
242 Occupations in metalworking
243 Occupations in treatment of metal surfaces
244 Occupations in metal constructing and welding
245 Occupations in precision mechanics and tool making
251 Occupations in machine-building and -operating
252 Technical occupations in the automotive, aeronautic, aerospace and
ship building industries
261 Occupations in mechatronics, automation and control technology
262 Technical occupations in energy technologies
263 Occupations in electrical engineering
271 Occupations in technical research and development
272 Draftspersons, technical designers, and model makers
273 Technical occupations in production planning and scheduling
281 Occupations in textile making
282 Occupations in the production of clothing and other textile products
283 Occupations in leather- and fur-making and -processing
291 Occupations in beverage production
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Code Classification title
292 Occupations in the production of foodstuffs, confectionery and tobacco
products
293 Cooking occupations
311 Occupations in construction scheduling and supervision, and architec-
ture
312 Occupations in surveying and cartography
321 Occupations in building construction
322 Occupations in civil engineering
331 Floor layers
332 Painters and varnishers, plasterers, occupations in the waterproofing
of buildings, preservation of structures and wooden building
components
333 Occupations in the interior construction and dry walling, insulation,
carpentry, glazing, roller shutter and jalousie installation
341 Occupations in building services engineering
342 Occupations in plumping, sanitation, heating, ventilating, and air con-
ditioning
343 Occupations in building services and waste disposal
411 Occupations in mathematics and statistics
412 Occupations in biology
413 Occupations in chemistry
414 Occupations in physics
421 Occupations in geology, geography and meteorology
422 Occupations in environmental protection engineering
423 Occupations in environmental protection management and
environmental protection consulting
431 Occupations in computer science
432 Occupations in IT-system-analysis, IT-application-consulting and IT-
sales
433 Occupations in IT-network engineering, IT-coordination,
IT-administration and IT-organization
434 Occupations in software development and programming
511 Technical occupations in railway, aircraft and ship operation
512 Occupations in the inspection and maintenance of traffic infrastructure
513 Occupations in warehousing and logistics, in postal and other delivery
services, and in cargo handling
514 Service occupations in passenger traffic
515 Occupations in traffic surveillance and control
516 Management assistants in transport and logistics
521 Driver of vehicles in road traffic
522 Drivers of vehicles in railway traffic
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Code Classification title
523 Aircraft pilots
524 Ship’s officers and masters
525 Drivers and operators of construction and transportation vehicles and
equipment
531 Occupations in physical security, personal protection, fire protection
and workplace safety
532 Occupations in police and criminal investigation, jurisdiction and the
penal institution
533 Occupations in occupational health and safety administration, public
health authority, and disinfection
541 Occupations in cleaning services
611 Occupations in purchasing and sales
612 Trading occupations
613 Occupations in real estate and facility management
621 Sales occupations in retail trade (without product specialization)
622 Sales occupations (retail trade) selling clothing, electronic devices,
furniture, motor vehicles and other durables
623 Sales occupations (retail) selling foodstuffs
624 Sales occupations (retail) selling drugstore products, pharmaceuticals,
medical supplies and healthcare goods
625 Sales occupations (retail) selling books, art, antiques, musical
instruments, recordings or sheet music
631 Occupations in tourism and the sports (and fitness) industry
632 Occupations in hotels
633 Gastronomy occupations
634 Occupations in event organization and management
711 Managing directors and executive board members
712 Legislators and senior officials of special interest organizations
713 Occupations in business organization and strategy
714 Office clerks and secretaries
715 Occupations in human resources management and personnel service
721 Occupations in insurance and financial services
722 Occupations in accounting, controlling and auditing
723 Occupations in tax consultancy
731 Occupations in legal services, jurisdiction, and other officers of the court
732 Occupations in public administration
733 Occupations in media, documentation and information services
811 Doctors’ receptionists and assistants
812 Laboratory occupations in medicine
813 Occupations in nursing, emergency medical services and obstetrics
814 Occupations in human medicine and dentistry
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Code Classification title
815 Occupations in veterinary medicine and non-medical animal health
practitioners
816 Occupations in psychology and non-medical psychotherapy
817 Occupations in non-medical therapy and alternative medicine
818 Occupations in pharmacy
821 Occupations in geriatric care
822 Occupations providing nutritional advice or health counselling, and
occupations in wellness
823 Occupations in body care
824 Occupations in funeral services
825 Technical occupations in medicine, orthopaedic and rehabilitation
831 Occupations in education and social work, and pedagogic specialists in
social care work
832 Occupations in housekeeping and consumer counselling
833 Occupations in theology and church community work
841 Teachers in schools of general education
842 Teachers for occupation-specific subjects at vocational schools and
in-company instructors in vocational training
843 Teachers and researcher at universities and colleges
844 Teachers at educational institutions other than schools (except
driving, flying and sports instructors)
845 Driving, flying and sports instructors at educational institutions other
than schools
911 Occupations in philology
912 Occupations in the humanities
913 Occupations in the social sciences
914 Occupations in economics
921 Occupations in advertising and marketing
922 Occupations in public relations
923 Occupations in publishing and media management
924 Occupations in editorial work and journalism
931 Occupations in product and industrial design
932 Occupations in interior design, visual marketing, and interior decora-
tion
933 Occupations in artisan craftwork and fine arts
934 Artisans designing ceramics and glassware
935 Artisans working with metal
936 Occupations in musical instrument making
941 Musicians, singers and conductors
942 Actors, dancers, athletes and related occupations
943 Presenters and entertainers
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Code Classification title
944 Occupations in theatre, film and television productions
945 Occupations in event technology, cinematography, and sound engineer-
ing
946 Occupations in stage, costume and prop design
947 Technical and management occupations in museums and exhibitions
011* Commissioned officers
012* Senior non-commissioned officers and higher
013* Junior non-commissioned officers
014* Armed forces personnel in other ranks
Source: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2011) and Matthes et al. (2015);
Note: Occupations with * are not included in the analysis as they do not offer task informa-
tion
Occupational sectors: S1: Production, S2: Person-related services, S3: Business administra-
tion and business-related services, S4: IT and science related services, S5: Other economic
services











Permanent contract 0.103 0.107
(0.001) (0.002)
Former GDR −0.149 −0.165
(0.001) (0.001)
Leadership Position 0.275 0.261
(0.002) (0.002)
Size of Establishment (ref: 50-499 employees)
1-9 employees −0.222 −0.191
(0.002) (0.002)
10-49 employees −0.107 −0.102
(0.001) (0.001)
>500 employees 0.075 0.084
(0.001) (0.001)
Education (ref: No A-Level. VT)
No A-Level. No VT −0.088 −0.096
(0.002) (0.002)
A-Level. No VT 0.017 0.117
(0.003) (0.004)
A-Level. VT 0.103 0.112
(0.002) (0.002)
Polytechnical degree 0.183 0.210
(0.002) (0.003)




Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, SES,
2014, own calculations.; Note: Not shown: Constant, occupational fixed effects and
female-occupational fixed effects.; (I): Entire sample (min. working hours 9 hs/week),
(II): Full-time sample (min. working hours 35 hs/week); Standard errors presented in
parentheses; All coefficients are statistically significant.
Table A.3: Results: First step
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(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Female 0.026 -0.018 -0.018 -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.019** 0.031 0.027
(0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030)
Level of promotion (ref: Skilled work)
Difficult activity -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.204*** -0.219*** -0.197*** -0.156*** -0.156***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Very difficult activity & -0.648*** -0.648*** -0.424*** -0.384*** -0.241*** -0.122 -0.121
Supervisory Power (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.038) (0.044) (0.066) (0.066)
Female*Level of promotion (ref: Skilled work)
Difficult activity -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.049 -0.054 -0.035 -0.042 -0.038
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
Very difficult activity & 0.099* 0.099* 0.121* 0.094* 0.006 -0.059 -0.055
Supervisory Power (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.044) (0.044)
Constant 0.548*** 0.808*** 0.808*** 0.750*** 0.788*** 0.772*** 1.539 1.983
(0.012) (0.023) (0.023) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (1.137) (1.126)
N 142,848 142,848 142,848 142,848 142,848 142,848 142,848 142,848
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.87 0.87
Earnings growth t−1 X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X
Firm specific controls X X X X
Occupation fixed effects X X X
Firm fixed effects X X
Year fixed effects X
Source: IEB 1976-2017; own calculations. DV: Relative Earnings growth = (earningsafterearningsbefore)/earningsbefore; Occupations:
3-digit level (KldB2010); Controls: Experience in part- and full-time (single and quadratic), Education (w/o A-levels and voc. training;
Voc. Training w/o A-Levels; A-levels, w/o voc. training; A-levels + voc. training; University of appl. science; University), Month of tenure,
Age, East/West Germany, Firm size, Share of women(male, mixed and female occupations). Sample: Persons who were promoted between
2012 and 2017 within the same occupation and the same firm before and after being promoted and who have worked in full-time before and
after the promotion. Women without children and all men. Significance levels:* p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Standard errors are
clustered on the individual level.




(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Female 1.291*** 0.802*** 0.802*** 0.741*** 0.748*** 0.124 -0.062 -0.084
(0.157) (0.182) (0.182) (0.200) (0.201) (0.235) (0.424) (0.424)
Level of promotion (ref: Skilled work)
Difficult activity 2.137*** 2.137*** 2.163*** 2.122*** 2.559*** 1.962** 1.857**
(0.150) (0.150) (0.157) (0.160) (0.201) (0.611) (0.611)
Very difficult activity & 2.253*** 2.253*** 2.649*** 2.686*** 3.371*** 2.623*** 2.638***
Supervisory Power (0.286) (0.286) (0.305) (0.305) (0.397) (0.795) (0.797)
Female*Level of promotion (ref: Skilled work)
Difficult activity -1.175*** -1.175*** -1.806*** -1.820*** -1.300*** -0.945 -0.856
(0.254) (0.254) (0.253) (0.253) (0.278) (0.563) (0.562)
Very difficult activity & 4.753*** 4.753*** 3.532*** 3.484*** 2.562*** 2.115* 2.168*
Supervisory Power (0.578) (0.578) (0.574) (0.576) (0.618) (1.040) (1.036)
Constant 6.202*** 4.746*** 4.746*** 14.103*** 14.247*** 13.347*** 0.944 13.204*
(0.014) (0.027) (0.027) (0.459) (0.467) (0.483) (4.364) (6.112)
N 84,308 84,308 84,308 84,308 84,308 84,308 84,308 84,308
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.31 0.32
Earnings growth t−1 X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X
Firm specific controls X X X X
Occupation fixed effects X X X
Firm fixed effects X X
Year fixed effects X
Source: IEB 1976-2017; own calculations. DV: Absolute Earnings growth = earningsafter − earningsbefore; Occupations: 3-digit level
(KldB2010); Controls: Experience in part- and full-time (single and quadratic), Education (w/o A-levels and voc. training; Voc. Training
w/o A-Levels; A-levels, w/o voc. training; A-levels + voc. training; University of appl. science; University), Month of tenure, Age, East/West
Germany, Firm size, Share of women(male, mixed and female occupations). Sample: Persons who were promoted between 2012 and 2017 within
the same occupation and the same firm before and after being promoted and who have worked in full-time before and after the promotion. Women
without children and all men. Significance levels:* p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level.
Table B.2: Effect of promotion on absolute earnings growth, for the full-time sample
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Total Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Main Variables
Earnings pre-promotion 62.70 53.33 46.69 42.09 77.26 58.10
Earnings post-promotion 73.38 52.14 57.86 42.03 87.50 56.28
Relative earnings growth 1.04 10.86 0.97 6.67 1.11 13.58
Absolute earnings growth 10.86 25.31 11.17 20.83 10.24 28.78
Level of promotion
Skilled work 0.61 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.56 0.50
Difficult activity 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45
Very difficult activity & Supervisory Power 0.12 0.32 0.07 0.26 0.16 0.37
Individual Characteristics
Age 36.53 10.39 37.58 10.44 35.57 10.26
Work experience (ft) 89.45 94.29 61.60 70.83 114.77 105.21
Work experience (pt) 28.52 47.47 44.48 59.53 14.02 25.26
Tenure (months) 57.78 75.64 50.33 64.70 64.54 83.80
Share of unemployment experience 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.09
Education
No A-level, No VT 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.30
No A-Level, VT 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.40 0.26 0.44
A-Level, No VT 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23
A-Level, VT 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.49
Polytechnical degree 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.12
University 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35
Firm Characteristics
East vs. West Germany 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39
Size of the Establishment 1775.26 6153.77 991.83 4382.69 2488.67 7334.47
Observations 262,512 125,020 137,492
Source: IEB, 1976-2017, own calculations.
Table B.3: Summary Statistics, including part-time worker
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Earnings growth β se β se
Female 0.003 (0.005) 0.006 (0.006)
Level of promotion
Difficult activity −0.002 (0.005) −0.001 (0.006)
Very difficult activity & 0.000 (0.006) 0.002 (0.007)
Supervisory Power
Female*Level of promotion
Difficult activity −0.010 (0.006) −0.008 (0.007)
Very difficult activity & 0.009 (0.008) 0.000 (0.009)
Supervisory Power
Previous earnings growth 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Full-time experience −0.001*** (0.000) −0.001*** (0.000)
Full-time experience squared 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
Part-time experience 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
Part-time experience squared 0.000* (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
Unemployment work experience 0.009 (0.017) 0.005 (0.019)
Educational level (ref: No A-Levels/ No VT)
No A-Levels/ VT 0.002* (0.004) 0.003 (0.004)
A-Levels/No VT 0.011 (0.008) 0.009 (0.008)
A-Levels/ VT 0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
University of Applied Science 0.004 (0.007) −0.002 (0.007)
University Degree 0.002 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005)
Tenure 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
Age at promotion −0.001*** (0.000) −0.001*** (0.000)
East Germany 0.034** (0.011) 0.036 (0.011)
Firm size 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
R-squared 0.548 0.553
N 84,308 76,311
Source: IEB 1976-2016; Note: Not shown: Constant, occupational fixed effects and firm fixed effects.; (I):
Full-time workers, (II): Full-time working men and childless women; Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p< 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Table B.4: Effect of promotion on (relative) earnings growth, for the full-time sample, full regression
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Birth quarter
Daily earnings in 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005 N
High-income mothers
t-2 Mean Log(y) 4.66 4.68 4.66 4.68 39,513
SD (0.38) (0.36) (0.38) (0.36)
Mean y 105.95 107.51 106.03 107.70
N 10,152 9390 10,159 9812
t-1 Mean Log(y) 4.73 4.74 4.72 4.74 40,075
SD (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28)
Mean y 113.62 114.60 111.73 114.50
N 10,494 9676 10,447 10,133
t+1 Mean Log(y) 4.18 4.01 4.06 4.02 9293
SD (1.10) (1.04) (1.05) (1.04)
Mean y 65.35 54.97 57.92 55.86
N 1438 2646 2629 2580
t+2 Mean Log(y) 4.17 4.10 4.04 4.08 24,573
SD (0.82) (0.88) (0.89) (0.87)
Mean y 64.47 60.24 56.64 59.20
N 6414 5983 6258 5918
t+3 Mean Log(y) 4.22 4.20 4.12 4.18 24,256
SD (0.77) (0.79) (0.84) (0.80)
Mean y 67.78 66.83 61.41 65.11
N 6461 5808 6154 5833
t+4 Mean Log(y) 4.26 4.23 4.19 4.21 25,274
SD (0.73) (0.74) (0.76) (0.76)
Mean y 70.88 68.82 65.82 67.10
N 6618 6043 6329 6284
t+5 Mean Log(y) 4.23 4.21 4.16 4.19 27,044
SD (0.74) (0.75) (0.80) (0.78)
Mean y 68.97 67.57 64.17 65.77
N 7082 6524 6810 6628
t+6 Mean Log(y) 4.23 4.22 4.16 4.20 29,301
SD (0.71) (0.75) (0.76) (0.73)
Mean y 68.58 67.72 64.18 66.69
N 7602 7045 7489 7165
t+7 Mean Log(y) 4.23 4.21 4.16 4.18 31,392
SD (0.70) (0.73) (0.75) (0.73)
Mean y 68.80 67.67 63.77 65.59
N 8065 7568 8061 7698




Daily earnings in 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005 N
t+8 Mean Log(y) 4.25 4.23 4.18 4.19 32,336
SD (0.69) (0.70) (0.72) (0.73)
Mean y 70.29 68.76 65.04 65.84
N 8306 7754 8306 7970
t+9 Mean Log(y) 4.35 4.32 4.20 4.21 32,616
SD (0.68) (0.71) (0.71) (0.73)
Mean y 77.59 74.91 66.85 67.30
N 8252 7684 8508 8172
Low-income mothers
t-2 Mean Log(y) 3.09 3.12 3.14 3.14 26,013
SD (0.73) (0.71) (0.71) (0.73)
Mean y 22.03 22.73 23.05 23.14
N 6717 6828 6213 6255
t-1 Mean Log(y) 3.10 3.11 3.11 3.13 31,328
SD (0.65) (0.64) (0.64) (0.64)
Mean y 22.18 22.53 22.41 22.86
N 8078 8177 7489 7584
t+1 Mean Log(y) 2.73 2.66 2.72 2.68 7895
SD (0.89) (0.84) (0.83) (0.81)
Mean y 15.29 14.34 15.11 14.62
N 1741 2203 1944 2007
t+2 Mean Log(y) 2.91 2.83 2.82 2.80 16,014
SD (0.84) (0.85) (0.85) (0.88)
Mean y 18.42 16.92 16.83 16.48
N 4611 4018 3729 3656
t+3 Mean Log(y) 3.00 2.99 2.97 3.00 18,642
SD (0.85) (0.87) (0.86) (0.87)
Mean y 20.17 19.96 19.44 20.07
N 5219 4651 4507 4265
t+4 Mean Log(y) 3.11 3.07 3.07 3.05 21,520
SD (0.82) (0.85) (0.84) (0.85)
Mean y 22.43 21.55 21.50 21.21
N 5817 5559 5067 5077
t+5 Mean Log(y) 3.16 3.15 3.12 3.09 22,297
SD (0.82) (0.84) (0.84) (0.87)
Mean y 23.57 23.33 22.60 22.06
N 6031 5795 5260 5211
t+6 Mean Log(y) 3.20 3.19 3.17 3.16 23,074
SD (0.83) (0.83) (0.85) (0.87)
Mean y 24.56 24.38 23.78 23.64
N 6140 5962 5520 5452
t+7 Mean Log(y) 3.25 3.24 3.19 3.21 23,589
SD (0.82) (0.83) (0.85) (0.85)
Mean y 25.83 25.52 24.32 24.85
N 6225 6105 5623 5636
t+8 Mean Log(y) 3.29 3.28 3.25 3.25 23,904
SD (0.83) (0.83) (0.84) (0.85)
Mean y 26.76 26.61 25.86 25.88
Continued on next page
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Birth quarter
Daily earnings in 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005 N
N 6287 6150 5720 5747
t+9 Mean Log(y) 3.45 3.44 3.31 3.31 24,041
SD (0.81) (0.81) (0.84) (0.84)
Mean y 31.50 31.13 27.27 27.50
N 6268 6149 5811 5813
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations.
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics on Daily Earnings of Mothers
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Birth quarter
Variables 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005
High-income mothers
Log(Daily Earnings 10 months prior-to-birth) Mean 4.78 4.77 4.78 4.78
SD (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Non-German Mean 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
SD (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Full-time work experience (months) Mean 90.45 89.67 90.07 88.53
SD (57.77) (57.17) (56.60) (55.42)
Part-time work experience (months) Mean 35.60 33.69 35.74 33.57
SD (46.70) (45.11) (46.57) (45.27)
Unemployment work experience (Share of total
work life)
Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
SD (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age at birth Mean 31.97 31.89 31.81 31.81
SD (3.49) (3.54) (3.58) (3.52)
Change of employer after birth Mean 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.29
SD (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45)
Employment ten months prior-to-birth
Full-time Mean 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.77
SD (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42)
Part-time Mean 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23
SD (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42)
Marginal Employment Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SD (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Location of the establishment (before birth)
West Germany Mean 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.89
SD (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
East Germany Mean 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
SD (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Educational level
No A-Levels/ No VT Mean 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
SD (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
No A-Levels/ VT Mean 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.40
SD (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
A-Levels/ No VT Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
SD (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
A-Levels/ VT Mean 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27
SD (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
Continued on next page
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Birth quarter
Variables 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005
University of Applied Science Mean 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
SD (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28)
University Degree Mean 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.22
SD (0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42)
Tenure (months, 10 months prior-to-birth) Mean 73.95 70.05 73.83 69.89
SD (50.28) (49.68) (50.99) (50.27)
Number of children
1 Mean 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.58
SD (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
2 Mean 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.38
SD (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
3 Mean 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
SD (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
4 Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SD (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
5 Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SD (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
Observations 8,252 7,684 8,508 8,172
Low-income mothers
Log(Daily Earnings 10 months prior-to-birth) Mean 3.30 3.11 3.30 3.08
SD (0.60) (0.60) (0.64) (0.60)
Non-German Mean 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17
SD (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Full-time work experience (months) Mean 19.15 19.67 19.82 18.78
SD (27.63) (29.67) (29.79) (28.69)
Part-time work experience (months) Mean 27.31 26.14 28.30 27.21
SD (33.89) (32.69) (33.67) (33.47)
Unemployment work experience (Share of total
work life)
Mean 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
SD (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Age at birth Mean 26.17 26.14 26.22 25.85
SD (5.16) (5.20) (5.30) (5.28)
Change of employer after birth Mean 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.54
SD (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Employment ten months prior-to-birth
Full-time Mean 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16
SD (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37)
Part-time Mean 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.53
SD (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Marginal Employment Mean 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.31
SD (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46)
Location of the establishment (before birth)
West Germany Mean 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.67
SD (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47)
East Germany Mean 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.33
SD (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47)
Educational level
No A-Levels/ No VT Mean 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
SD (0.29) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30)
No A-Levels/ VT Mean 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.29
SD (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45)
A-Levels/ No VT Mean 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
SD (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
A-Levels/ VT Mean 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
SD (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34)
University of Applied Science Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
SD (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
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Birth quarter
Variables 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005
University Degree Mean 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
SD (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
No Information Mean 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.41
SD (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Tenure (months, 10 months prior-to-birth) Mean 33.58 31.57 34.16 34.16
SD (30.33) (30.25) (30.24) (30.63)
Number of children
1 Mean 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66
SD (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48)
2 Mean 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
SD (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45)
3 Mean 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
SD (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21)
4 Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SD (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
5 Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SD (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 6,228 6,149 5,811 5,813
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations.
Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics on Control Variables, Nine years after giving birth
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Birth quarter
Working hours in 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005 N
High-income mothers
2008 Mean 29.61 29.40 28.56 29.79 743
SD (12.96) (12.17) (11.76) (12.17)
N 181 202 185 175
2009 Mean 30.33 30.20 28.54 28.15 753
SD (11.41) (11.80) (11.46) (12.30)
N 179 205 192 177
2010 Mean 28.99 29.18 27.88 29.56 845
SD (11.78) (11.06) (11.36) (12.07)
N 203 231 206 205
2011 Mean 28.22 29.28 27.52 29.01 1008
SD (11.92) (11.29) (11.88) (11.84)
N 269 246 254 239
2012 Mean 27.72 28.64 28.11 28.38 947
SD (11.22) (12.05) (12.91) (12.17)
N 249 234 224 240
2013 Mean 28.44 28.16 27.46 27.96 980
SD (11.59) (11.15) (12.32) (11.25)
N 261 245 241 233
2014 Mean 28.30 27.94 28.11 28.29 1246
SD (11.53) (11.21) (12.00) (11.06)
N 330 302 320 294
2015 Mean 27.42 27.45 28.85 26.57 1306
SD (11.68) (10.75) (12.05) (11.10)
N 350 331 304 321
2016 Mean 28.98 28.56 28.63 28.35 1634
SD (12.27) (11.73) (11.59) (11.29)
N 396 408 400 430
Low-income mothers
2008 Mean 31.11 28.68 28.67 24.78 162
SD (11.94) (12.75) (12.99) (12.82)
N 38 41 39 44
2009 Mean 24.43 23.32 24.30 24.78 191
SD (12.73) (12.93) (12.56) (11.81)
N 47 47 46 51
2010 Mean 23.88 23.29 22.76 24.10 219
SD (13.82) (13.36) (12.46) (13.29)
N 57 48 55 59
2011 Mean 27.35 26.28 24.21 24.77 214
SD (13.24) (13.47) (14.64) (12.90)
N 51 50 61 52
2012 Mean 23.40 23.66 21.78 23.54 226
SD (12.84) (12.92) (12.04) (14.02)
N 57 59 64 46
2013 Mean 20.65 22.29 21.92 19.59 234
SD (12.25) (13.10) (12.79) 11.25)
N 43 72 60 59
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Birth quarter
Working hours in 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005 N
2014 Mean 21.35 20.22 20.74 21.05 254
SD (12.33) (11.89) (11.37) (11.89)
N 54 78 62 60
2015 Mean 23.27 18.88 21.60 20.10 257
SD (15.38) (11.81) (10.88) (11.05)
N 52 72 63 70
2016 Mean 21.88 24.53 21.44 20.95 286
SD (12.11) (23.46) (13.00) (13.62)
N 59 75 66 86
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder,
Microcensus 2008-2016, own calculations.
Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics on Mothers’ Working Hours (conditional on working)
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Birth half-year
Variables 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005
High-income mothers
2008 Age Mean 33.23 34.25 34.55 34.94
SD (3.44) (4.07) (4.34) (4.02)
Married Mean 0.76 0.80 0.79 0.78
SD (0.43) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41)
Single Mother Mean 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07
SD (0.22) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25)
German Mean 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93
SD (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
Foreigner, European Mean 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04
SD (0.15) (0.21) (0.16) (0.20)
Foreigner, Non-European Mean 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
SD (0.21) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17)
Partner’s age Mean 36.09 37.00 36.85 37.96
SD (4.53) (5.32) (5.35) (6.09)
Net income Mean 1355.64 1208.16 1419.46 1439.35
SD (1037.32) (925.26) (991.49) (1348.31)
Net household income Mean 3936.94 3667.98 3952.53 4046.96
SD (2384.09) (2081.73) (2017.38) (2502.27)
Fulltime Mean 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.38
SD (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Observations 181 202 185 175
2009 Age Mean 33.85 35.11 34.55 35.60
SD (3.59) (4.16) (4.04) (4.17)
Married Mean 0.75 0.80 0.84 0.81
SD (0.43) (0.40) (0.37) (0.39)
Single Mother Mean 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.08
SD (0.21) (0.30) (0.23) (0.28)
German Mean 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.92
SD (0.26) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27)
Foreigner, European Mean 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06
SD (0.13) (0.24) (0.20) (0.23)
Foreigner, Non-European Mean 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02
SD (0.23) (0.18) (0.20) (0.15)
Partner’s age Mean 36.67 38.24 38.06 38.60
SD (4.46) (5.98) (5.48) (4.88)
Net income Mean 1636.57 1437.24 1504.10 1584.43
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Birth half-year
Variables 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005
SD (11,137.79) (1056.65) (1110.33) (1603.86)
Net household income Mean 4138.89 3777.27 4183.53 4351.90
SD (2072.82) (2129.47) (2312.92) (2683.81)
Fulltime Mean 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.39
SD (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Observations 179 205 192 177
2016 Age Mean 40.11 40.57 40.80 41.78
SD (4.66) (4.76) (4.97) (4.97)
Married Mean 0.76 0.79 0.74 0.82
SD (0.43) (0.41) (0.55) (0.39)
Single Mother Mean 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.13
SD (0.39) (0.18) (0.41) (0.34)
German Mean 0.94 0.91 0.90 0.92
SD (0.24) (0.28) (0.30) (0.28)
Foreigner, European Mean 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06
SD (0.16) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Foreigner, Non-European Mean 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03
SD (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.16)
Partner’s age Mean 43.18 43.35 43.98 44.53
SD (6.30) (5.76) (5.93) (4.88)
Net income Mean 2026.98 2002.37 2138.54 1854.03
SD (1559.57) (1555.72) (2037.86) (1195.73)
Net household income Mean 4773.78 4922.81 4804.37 5003.35
SD (2868.12) (2982.95) (3018.83) (2871.30)
Full-time Mean 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.31
SD (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.46)
Observations 396 408 400 430
Low-income mothers
2008 Age Mean 25.34 28.51 27.36 27.45
SD (5.38) (7.31) (6.03) (6.03)
Married Mean 0.55 0.63 0.56 0.57
SD (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Single Mother Mean 0.18 0.29 0.21 0.30
SD (0.39) (0.46) (0.41) (0.46)
German Mean 0.87 0.80 0.74 0.84
SD (0.34) (0.40) (0.44) (0.37)
Foreigner, European Mean 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.05
SD (0.16) (0.00) (0.27) (0.21)
Foreigner, Non-European Mean 0.11 0.20 0.18 0.11
SD (0.31) (0.40) (0.39) (0.32)
Partner’s age Mean 30.87 34.34 30.77 32.58
SD (6.83) (8.60) (6.55) (6.34)
Net income Mean 645.95 677.78 690.54 792.68
SD (559.87) (314.69) (451.71) (342.11)
Net household income Mean 1795.94 1982.81 1763.89 1964.47
SD (1061.30) (820.17) (574.66) (1224.84)
Full-time Mean 0.61 0.41 0.54 0.50
SD (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51)
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Birth half-year
Variables 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005
Observations 38 41 39 44
2009 Age Mean 26.70 28.25 29.93 28.67
SD (5.63) (6.40) (5.99) (5.86)
Married Mean 0.53 0.72 0.53 0.61
SD (0.50) (0.45) (0.50) (0.49)
Single Mother Mean 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.35
SD (0.44) (0.44) (0.38) (0.48)
German Mean 0.81 0.81 0.74 0.75
SD (0.40) (0.40) (0.44) (0.44)
Foreigner, European Mean 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.04
SD (0.25) (0.15) (0.31) (0.20)
Foreigner, Non-European Mean 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.22
SD (0.34) (0.38) (0.36) (0.42)
Partner’s age Mean 31.49 34.49 34.00 33.06
SD (8.51) (7.06) (7.32) (4.80)
Net income Mean 645.56 663.33 679.38 864.67
SD (416.60) (379.73) (361.35) (506.94)
Net household income Mean 1980.00 1982.14 1861.11 1894.05
SD (2074.04) (873.93) (704.99) (975.07)
Full-time Mean 0.34 0.30 0.37 0.33
SD (0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48)
Observations 47 47 46 51
2016 Age Mean 35.59 34.43 36.33 36.16
SD (6.53) (5.99) (6.70) (6.19)
Married Mean 0.61 0.71 0.71 0.65
SD (0.49) (0.46) (0.46) (0.48)
Single Mother Mean 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.31
SD (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46)
German Mean 0.73 0.69 0.73 0.73
SD (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45)
Foreigner, European Mean 0.10 0.19 0.09 0.15
SD (0.30) (0.39) (0.29) (0.36)
Foreigner, Non-European Mean 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.12
SD (0.38) (0.33) (0.39) (0.32)
Partner’s age Mean 40.00 39.84 41.02 39.84
SD (11.39) (7.56) (6.11) (7.56)
Net income Mean 962.07 1032.00 1014.23 877.65
SD (546.04) (532.61) (604.35) (546.04)
Net household income Mean 2353.51 2606.08 2665.39 2536.47
SD (991.12) (1429.32) (1118.24) (1045.47)
Full-time Mean 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.26
SD (0.42) (0.45) (0.49) (0.44)
Observations 59 75 66 86
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, Microcensus 2008-2016, own
calculations.
Table C.4: Descriptive Statistics on Control Variables for selective years (Microcensus)
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Working hours 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
no VT (vs. University) −2.90 −8.40* −8.08* −3.73 −8.58** −4.71 −8.85***−10.65*** −4.04
(3.70) (3.27) (3.41) (3.50) (3.20) (2.97) (2.64) (2.55) (2.81)
Birth 1st half (vs. 2nd half) −1.12 0.60 −1.37 −1.45 −0.21 −0.45 −0.61 1.94* 0.23
(1.26) (1.21) (1.15) (1.04) (1.10) (1.00) (0.86) (0.88) (0.74)
no VT * Birth 1st half (vs.
2nd half)
−0.95 0.16 0.59 0.46 2.47 −1.68 0.24 2.48 −0.43
(2.95) (2.65) (2.56) (2.75) (2.63) (2.33) (2.16) (2.01) (2.27)
Birth 06/07 (vs. 05/06) −0.73 1.83 −0.37 −0.33 0.07 0.29 −0.49 0.75 0.05
(1.29) (1.22) (1.09) (1.00) (1.04) (0.95) (0.83) (0.80) (0.78)
no VT* Birth 06/07 (vs.
05/06)
2.73 3.89 2.25 −0.44 1.72 −0.41 1.02 2.59 −3.34
(2.95) (2.65) (2.56) (2.75) (2.63) (2.33) (2.16) (2.01) (2.27)
Treatment 1.41 −0.59 1.37 0.72 −1.27 0.37 0.52 −1.89 −0.13
(1.78) (1.70) (1.58) (1.45) (1.49) (1.40) (1.20) (1.20) (1.10)
no VT * Treatment 4.12 0.77 1.81 2.07 4.22 −3.00 2.13 6.21* −3.50
(4.16) (3.72) (3.72) (3.91) (3.56) (3.41) (3.10) (3.25) (3.19)
Age 0.17 −1.95* −1.03 0.44 0.82 0.41 −0.37 −0.82 −0.95
(0.82) (0.79) (0.83) (0.74) (0.74) (0.63) (0.59) (0.68) (0.65)
Age squared −0.00 0.03* 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of Children (ref: 1 child)
2 0.91 −0.27 −1.11 −2.73*** −5.36*** −4.17*** −3.62*** −2.66*** −3.83***
(1.27) (0.93) (0.76) (0.73) (0.73) (0.71) (0.62) (0.64) (0.62)
3 0.12 −1.69 0.03 −2.23 −5.46*** −6.69** −7.01*** −5.95*** −6.33***
(8.18) (4.44) (3.25) (1.88) (2.04) (1.40) (1.15) (1.04) (0.89)
4 −6.67 −1.53 −9.73***
(7.42) (3.15) (2.04)
East Germany 4.06*** 5.32*** 5.63*** 5.49*** 6.69*** 8.48*** 7.49*** 6.11*** 6.56***
(0.94) (0.89) (0.88) (0.76) (0.78) (0.76) (0.65) (0.70) (0.64)
Nationality (ref: German)
Non German, EU-Citizen −1.68 −6.19** 2.34 −2.40 2.27 0.92 2.87* −0.65 0.11
(2.34) (2.06) (1.99) (1.56) (1.96) (1.86) (1.49) (1.50) (1.31)
Non German, Non-EU-
Citizen
−3.71* −1.53 −3.83* −3.43* −3.23* −1.70 1.39 −1.74 0.40
(2.04) (1.65) (1.65) (1.68) (1.39) (1.43) (1.31) (1.35) (1.48)
Marital status (ref: single)
married −2.44* −1.38 −1.42 −1.40 −2.24* −1.56 −2.51*** −2.28** −0.25
(1.03) (1.00) (0.92) (0.87) (0.87) (0.86) (0.71) (0.77) (0.70)
divorced −12.62*** 1.31 2.36 1.37 −1.87 −1.56 −2.39 1.10 2.73*
(3.80) (2.39) (2.49) (1.92) (1.44) (1.46) (1.32) (1.44) (1.11)
Public sector 0.66 0.81 1.12 0.39 −0.10 −0.22 1.00 1.27* 0.10
(0.90) (0.84) (0.78) (0.72) (0.73) (0.67) (0.58) (0.58) (0.53)
Region (ref: City)
Urban Region −0.73 −2.26* −0.54 −1.82* −2.47** 0.03 −0.45 −0.15 −0.53
(0.94) (0.88) (0.80) (0.76) (0.78) (0.79) (0.67) (0.67) (0.62)
Rural region 1.05 −0.65 0.47 −0.42 −1.62 −1.36 −1.07 0.37 −0.55
(1.35) (1.24) (1.19) (1.14) (0.97) (0.83) (0.70) (0.73) (0.69)
Constant 28.96* 62.08*** 48.33*** 25.23 19.66 22.53 38.62*** 44.02*** 50.99***
(13.32) (13.22) (14.40) (13.22) (13.13) (11.74) (11.04) (13.04) (12.77)
R-squared 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.14
N 905 944 1064 1222 1173 1214 1500 1563 1920
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, Microcensus 2008-2016; own calculations. Treatment
dummy equals 1 if the first child is born in the first half of 2007. VT: Vocational Training. Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p< 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.5: Effects of the parental leave reform on working hours
132 C. Appendix to Chapter 3
(a) Low-income mothers (b) High-income mothers
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations.




Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations.
Figure C.2: Effects of the parental leave reform on the duration of employment interruptions in East
Germany
Birth quarter
Daily earnings in 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005 N
Medium-income mothers
t-2 Mean Log(y) 4.04 4.05 4.05 4.06 76,363
SD (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Mean y 56.83 57.40 57.40 57.97
N 18,625 19,679 18,500 19,559
t-1 Mean Log(y) 4.11 4.12 4.12 4.13 79,345
SD (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.39)
Mean y 60.95 61.56 61.56 62.18
N 19,341 20,423 19,253 20,328
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Birth quarter
Daily earnings in 1st 2007 4th 2006 1st 2006 4th 2005 N
t+1 Mean Log(y) 3.94 3.21 3.19 3.20 15,413
SD (1.14) (0.99) (1.03) (1.03)
Mean y 51.42 24.78 24.29 24.53
N 2240 4579 4181 4413
t+2 Mean Log(y) 3.41 3.26 3.27 3.30 41,458
SD (0.89) (0.92) (0.94) (0.95)
Mean y 30.27 26.05 26.31 27.11
N 10,720 10,674 9838 10,226
t+3 Mean Log(y) 3.52 3.55 3.43 3.52 45,165
SD (0.85) (0.87) (0.89) (0.88)
Mean y 33.78 34.81 30.88 33.78
N 11,692 11,311 11,144 11,018
t+4 Mean Log(y) 3.60 3.57 3.55 3.57 50,707
SD (0.80) (0.81) (0.83) (0.83)
Mean y 36.60 35.52 34.81 35.52
N 12,505 13,150 12,076 12,976
t+5 Mean Log(y) 3.59 3.58 3.55 3.56 52,471
SD (0.80) (0.81) (0.84) (0.84)
Mean y 36.23 35.87 34.81 35.16
N 13,015 13,558 12,596 13,302
t+6 Mean Log(y) 3.60 3.59 3.56 3.59 55,528
SD (0.79) (0.80) (0.82) (0.81)
Mean y 36.60 36.23 35.16 36.23
N 13,673 14,358 13,475 14,022
t+7 Mean Log(y) 3.62 3.60 3.57 3.57 59,201
SD (0.77) (0.78) (0.80) (0.80)
Mean y 37.34 36.60 35.52 35.52
N 14,400 15,334 14,248 15,219
t+8 Mean Log(y) 3.64 3.63 3.60 3.40 60,593
SD (0.77) (0.77) (0.79) (0.80)
Mean y 38.09 37.71 36.60 29.96
N 14,796 15,753 14,510 15,534
t+9 Mean Log(y) 3.75 3.74 3.64 3.63 61,355
SD (0.75) (0.76) (0.77) (0.78)
Mean y 42.52 42.10 38.09 37.71
N 14,788 15,680 14,878 16,009
Source: IEB 1976-2016; own calculations.
Table C.6: Descriptive Statistics on Daily Earnings of Mothers, Medium-income mothers
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Log(Daily Earnings) β se β se
FirstQuarter −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.01)
Reform 0.13*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01)
FirstQuarter × Reform 0.01 (0.02) 0.03* (0.01)
Previous wage 0.11*** (0.02) 0.93*** (0.02)
Foreign −0.09*** (0.02) 0.15*** (0.01)
Full-time experience 0.00*** (0.00) −0.00*** (0.00)
Full-time experience squared 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00)
Part-time experience 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Part-time experience squared 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
Unemployment work experience −0.48*** (0.06) −0.11 (0.10)
Age at birth 0.00* (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00)
Change of employer after birth −0.10*** (0.01) −0.20*** (0.01)
Employment pre-birth (ref: Full-time)
Part-time 0.08*** (0.03) 0.18*** (0.01)
Marginal Employment −0.05 (0.03) 0.04 (0.14)
East Germany 0.37*** (0.01) 0.36*** (0.01)
Educational level (ref: No A-Levels/ No VT)
No A-Levels/ VT 0.04* (0.02) −0.07** (0.03)
A-Levels/No VT 0.15** (0.04) 0.00 (0.04)
A-Levels/ VT 0.10*** (0.02) −0.06* (0.03)
University of Applied Science 0.19*** (0.05) −0.03 (0.03)
University Degree 0.44*** (0.04) 0.02 (0.03)
No Information 0.21*** (0.02) 0.15 (0.13)
Tenure −0.00** (0.00) −0.00*** (0.00)
Firm size (ref: < 50)
50-100 0.31*** (0.03) 0.33*** (0.01)
101-200 0.32*** (0.03) 0.39*** (0.01)
201-500 0.38*** (0.03) 0.43*** (0.01)
>500 0.50*** (0.03) 0.47*** (0.01)
Missing −0.03 (0.02) 0.05* (0.03)
Constant 2.63*** (0.08) −0.85*** (0.09)
R-squared 0.13 0.33
N 23,931 32,5865
Source: IEB 1976-2016; Besides firm size all variables refer to the employment spell 10 months prior to birth.
Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.7: Effects of the parental leave reform on daily earnings, nine years after birth
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Figure C.3: Effects of the parental leave reform on the duration of employment interruptions for
Medium-income mothers
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Appendix to Chapter 4
136
Summary
This dissertation consists of four independent chapters. In the first two chapters, I investigate
gender differences in pay between men and women within occupations and occupational posi-
tions. In particular, the chapter analyzes whether occupational characteristics and promotions
are linked with the Gender Pay Gap. The third chapter deals with the long-run earnings of
mothers after the parental leave reform that was implemented in 2007. Since the reform changed
the incentives to work during the first two years after giving birth differently for women with
low and high prior-to-birth incomes, the chapter analyzes the earnings effect for both groups
separately. The last chapter examines whether the integration of national rich lists compared
to international list can improve the estimation of top tail of the wealth distribution.
Chapter 1 is concerned with question why some occupations have large Gender Pay Gaps
while others have only small gaps. Using data from the Structural Earnings Study merged
with occupational task information provided by the Federal Labor Office, this chapter aims
at uncovering the relationship between occupational characteristics and the Gender Pay Gap.
To do so, I apply a two-step approach, where the first step uses individual characteristics to
estimate the adjusted occupation-specific Gender Pay Gaps. In the second step, occupational
characteristics are regressed on these gaps. I find that wage differences between men and women
are lower in occupations with linear earnings and in occupations with a large share of public
firms. Moreover, I observe that an increasing share of persons with supervisory power is linked
to larger wage differences between men and women, which indicates the presence of a ”glass
ceiling”. Finally, the Gender Pay Gap is lower in occupations with non-routine tasks. Moreover,
the findings suggest that the more that employees can be substituted with other employees, the
lower is the Gender Pay Gap. Hence, this study extends previous findings on the relationship
between the Gender Pay Gap and occupational characteristics on a more general level.
Chapter 2 focuses on the Gender Pay Gap within occupational positions. Although occupational
positions can explain an important part of the differences in pay between men and women, a
considerable Gender Pay Gap exists even within the same occupational position. In this chapter,
we aim at understanding the reasons for the gap within occupational positions and, therefore,
investigate whether promotions lead to the same effect on earnings growth for men and women.
Using administrative data, we are the first to investigate potential gender gaps in earnings
increase due to a promotion in Germany. Moreover, we are the first to analyze differences in
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the gender gap across promotions into different occupational positions. Our results emphasize
that women’s earnings growth are larger than men’s after being promoted to the same position.
We find that this effect is mainly due to selection, since we compare a highly positively selected
group of women to an average group of men. Once, we add firm fixed effects, however, gender
differences disappear, which highlights the role of collective agreements.
In chapter 3 we analyze the impact of the German Parental Leave Reform of 2007 on mothers’
long-term earnings. This reform introduced a new earnings-related benefit that is more gen-
erous than the previous means-tested benefit but granted for a shorter period of time. Thus,
it changed financial incentives to work during the first two year after childbirth depending
on prior-to-birth earnings. Additionally, a ”daddy quota” of two months was introduced. To
identify the causal effect of this policy, we use a difference-in-difference approach that com-
pares labor market outcomes of mothers who gave birth just before and right after the reform
and net out seasonal effects by including the year before. Using the total population of the
Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB), we confirm previous findings and show that the
average duration of employment interruptions increases for high-income mothers. This effect,
however, does not translate into lower earnings after re-entering the labor market. We even find
a positive effect on earnings for mothers with high prior-to-birth earnings that diminish in the
long run. These effects cannot be explained by changes in working hours, observed character-
istics of working mothers, or fertility patterns. Descriptive evidence suggests that the stronger
involvement of fathers, incentivized by the reform, could have facilitated mothers’ re-entry to
the labor market and thereby increased earnings. For mothers with low prior-to-birth earnings,
however, we do not find any beneficial labor market effects of this parental leave reform.
In chapter 4 we analyze the top tail of the wealth distribution in France, Germany and Spain
using the first and second waves of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS).
Since top wealth is likely to be underrepresented in household surveys, we integrate big fortunes
from rich lists, estimate a Pareto distribution, and impute the missing rich. In addition to the
Forbes list, we rely on national rich lists, since they represent a broader base of the big fortunes
in those countries. As a result, the top one percent wealth share increases notably for the three
selected countries after imputing the top wealth. We find that national rich lists can improve
the estimation of the Pareto coefficient in particular when the list of national USD billionaires
is short.
German Summary
Diese Dissertation besteht aus vier unabha¨ngigen Kapiteln. In den ersten beiden Kapiteln un-
tersuche ich die Gender Pay Gaps zwischen Ma¨nnern und Frauen innerhalb von Berufen und
beruflichen Positionen. Insbesondere gehen die Kapitel dabei der Frage nach, ob Berufsmerk-
male und berufliche Aufstiege mit dem Gender Pay Gap verbunden sind. Das dritte Kapitel
befasst sich damit, wie sich die Lo¨hne von Mu¨ttern nach der Einfu¨hrung des Elterngeldes
langfristig vera¨ndert haben. Da sich die Anreize zu arbeiten beziehungsweise nicht zu arbeiten
in den beiden ersten Jahren nach der Geburt fu¨r Frauen, die niedrige und hohe Einkommen
vor der Geburt des Kindes hatten, unterschiedlich vera¨ndert haben, werden in diesem Kapi-
tel die Lohneffekte fu¨r beide Gruppen getrennt untersucht. Das letzte Kapitel untersucht, ob
die Verwendung nationaler Reichenlisten im Vergleich zu der internationalen Forbes-Liste die
Scha¨tzung des Vermo¨gensanteils der Superreichen am Gesamtvermo¨gen verbessern kann.
Kapitel 1 befasst sich mit der Frage, warum einige Berufe große geschlechtsspezifische Lohnun-
terschiede, andere hingen nur kleine Lu¨cken aufweisen. Auf Basis der Daten der Verdienststruk-
turerhebung, die mit einem Datensatz u¨ber die berufsspezifischen Tasks, der auf Informationen
der Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit beruht, zusammengespielt werden, soll in diesem Kapitel der
Zusammenhang zwischen den Berufsmerkmalen und dem Gender Pay Gap untersucht werden.
Dazu wird ein zweistufiger Ansatz verwendet, wobei im ersten Schritt basierend auf den indi-
viduellen Charakteristika die bereinigten berufsspezifischen Gender Pay Gaps gescha¨tzt werden.
Im zweiten Schritt werden die Berufsmerkmale auf diese geschlechtsspezifischen Lohnlu¨cken re-
gressiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Lohnunterschiede zwischen Ma¨nnern und Frauen in
Berufen mit linearer Entlohnung und in Berufen mit einem hohen Anteil an o¨ffentlichen Un-
ternehmen geringer sind. Außerdem kann beobachtet werden, dass ein zunehmender Anteil
von Personen in Fu¨hrungspositionen mit gro¨ßeren Lohnunterschieden zwischen Ma¨nnern und
Frauen einhergeht, was auf das Pha¨nomen einer ”gla¨sernen Decke” hinweist. Zudem ist das
geschlechtsspezifische Lohngefa¨lle in Berufen mit nicht routinema¨ßigen Tasks geringer. Außer-
dem legen die Ergebnisse nahe, dass das geschlechtsspezifische Lohngefa¨lle umso geringer ist,
je mehr Arbeitnehmer*Innen durch andere Arbeitnehmer*Innen ersetzt werden ko¨nnen. Die
vorliegende Studie erweitert daher den bisherigen Erkenntnisstand, da sie einen allgemeinen
Zusammenhang zwischen dem Gender Pay Gap und den Berufsmerkmalen herstellt.
Kapitel 2 konzentriert sich auf den Gender Pay Gap innerhalb beruflicher Positionen. Neben
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der Tatsache, dass Ma¨nner und Frauen in unterschiedlichen beruflichen Positionen arbeiten, die
einen großen Teil des Lohnunterschieds zwischen Ma¨nnern und Frauen erkla¨ren kann, besteht
auch innerhalb derselben beruflichen Position ein betra¨chtlicher Gender Pay Gap. In diesem
Kapitel wollen wir die Gru¨nde fu¨r die Lohnlu¨cke innerhalb beruflicher Positionen verstehen
und in diesem Zusammenhang untersuchen, ob berufliche Aufstiege bei Ma¨nnern und Frauen
zu den gleichen Lohnanstiegen fu¨hren. Auf Basis administrativer Daten untersuchen wir die
potenziellen Unterschiede zwischen Ma¨nnern und Frauen im Lohnanstieg nach beruflichen Auf-
stiegen in Deutschland. Daru¨ber hinaus analysieren wir, ob sich die Lu¨cke im Verdienstanstieg
zwischen Ma¨nnern und Frauen fu¨r die unterschiedlichen Ebenen der Aufstiege unterscheiden.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Lohnanstiege von Frauen nach einem beruflichen Aufstieg
innerhalb der gleichen Position gro¨ßer sind als die von Ma¨nnern. Allerding legen die Ergebnisse
nahe, dass dieser Effekt hauptsa¨chlich auf Selektion zuru¨ckzufu¨hren ist, da wir eine sehr positiv
selektierte Gruppe von Frauen mit einer durchschnittlichen Gruppe von Ma¨nnern vergleichen.
Sobald wir jedoch betriebs-fixe Effekte in das Modell mit aufnehmen, verschwinden die Unter-
schiede zwischen den Geschlechtern, was die Bedeutung von Tarifvertra¨gen unterstreicht.
In Kapitel 3 analysieren wir die Auswirkungen der 2007 durchgefu¨hrten Elterngeldreform. Mit
dieser Reform wurde die bisherige bedarfsorientierte Transferleistung (Erziehungsgeld) durch
das Elterngeld, dessen Ho¨he vom Lohn vor Geburt des Kindes abha¨ngt, ersetzt. Somit steigt
die Ho¨he der Leistung an, wa¨hrend sich die Bezugsdauer aber verku¨rzt. Damit haben sich
die finanziellen Anreize in den ersten zwei Jahren nach der Geburt zu arbeiten oder nicht zu
arbeiten in Abha¨ngigkeit der Ho¨he des Einkommens vor der Geburt unterschiedlich vera¨ndert.
Zusa¨tzlich wurden die (zwei) sogenannten ”Va¨termonate” eingefu¨hrt. Um den kausalen Ef-
fekt dieser Reform zu identifizieren, verwenden wir einen Differenzen-in-Differenzen-Ansatz,
der die Lo¨hne von Mu¨ttern, die unmittelbar vor und unmittelbar nach der Reform entbunden
haben, vergleicht und dabei saisonale Effekte durch das Einbeziehen des Vorjahres heraus-
rechnet. Anhand der Grundgesamtheit der Integrierten Erwerbsbiographien (IEB) besta¨tigen
wir die bisherigen Ergebnisse und zeigen, dass die durchschnittliche Dauer der Erwerbsunter-
brechungen bei Mu¨ttern mit hohem Einkommen zunimmt. Dieser Effekt schla¨gt sich jedoch
nicht in niedrigeren Lo¨hnen nach dem Wiedereinstieg in den Arbeitsmarkt nieder. Bei Mu¨ttern,
die vor Geburt hohe Lo¨hne hatten, finden wir sogar positive Lohneffekte, die in der langen Frist
kleiner werden. Diese Effekte lassen sich nicht durch A¨nderungen in der Arbeitszeit, in den indi-
viduellen Merkmalen der berufsta¨tigen Mu¨tter oder in den Fertilita¨tsmustern erkla¨ren. Mittels
deskriptiver Evidenz gehen wir davon aus, dass die durch die Reform bedingt sta¨rkere Ein-
bindung der Va¨ter, den Wiedereinstieg der Mu¨tter in den Arbeitsmarkt erleichtert und damit
deren Lo¨hne erho¨ht haben ko¨nnte. Fu¨r Mu¨tter, die vor der Geburt geringe Lo¨hne hatten, finden
wir jedoch keine positiven Arbeitsmarkteffekte dieser Elternzeitreform.
In Kapitel 4 analysieren wir das obere Ende der Vermo¨gensverteilung in Frankreich, Deutschland
und Spanien mit Hilfe der ersten und zweiten Welle des Household Finance and Consumption
Survey (HFCS). Da das Vermo¨gen der Superreichen in den Haushaltsbefragungen wahrschein-
lich unterrepra¨sentiert ist, verknu¨pfen wir die Survey-Daten zusa¨tzlich mit den Vermo¨gen-
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sangaben aus Reichenlisten. Darauf aufbauend scha¨tzen wir eine Pareto-Verteilung und im-
putieren die fehlenden Reichen. Zusa¨tzlich zu der Forbes-Liste stu¨tzen wir uns auf nationale
Reichenlisten, da diese eine gro¨ßere Basis der Topvermo¨genden in diesen La¨ndern darstellen.
Folglich steigt der Vermo¨gensanteil des obersten 1 % fu¨r die drei ausgewa¨hlten La¨nder nach der
Imputation der Topvermo¨gen deutlich an. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die nationalen Re-
ichenlisten die Scha¨tzung des Pareto-Koeffizienten insbesondere dann verbessern ko¨nnen, wenn
die Forbes-Liste nur wenige Milliarda¨re aus dem jeweiligen Land entha¨lt.
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